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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OFTHE
STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffi'Respondent
vs

TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant/Appellant

Appealedfrom the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the State ofIdaho, in and for Boise County
Honorable PATRICK OWEN, District Judge

LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
Attorney for Respondent

~

,~

~fD .

Attorney for Appellant

Filed this 3(1" day ofMarch, 2015

Mary T Prisco, Clerk
By Kelly White, Deputy

JUL t 5 2015
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SUPREME COURT NO.
CASE NO CR-2013-458

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and
For the County of Boise.
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Fourt

ime: 10:40 AM

User: HZIMMERS

dicial District Court - Boise County
ROA Report

'age 1 of 4

Case: CR-2013-0000458 Current Judge: Patrick Owen
Defendant: Franklin, Tricia

State of Idaho vs. Tricia Franklin
late

Code

User

/29/2013

NCRF

WHITE

New Case Filed - Felony

Roger E. Cockerille

PROS

WHITE

Prosecutor assigned Boise County Prosecutor

Roger E. Cockerille

CRCO

WHITE

Criminal Complaint

Roger E. Cockerille

SMiS

WHITE

Summons Issued

Roger E. Cockeril!e

HRSC

WHITE

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 05/20/2013
09:30 AM) DUI X3
DWPX2

Roger E. Cockerille

ARRN

WHITE

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on
05/20/2013 09:30 AM: Arraignment/ First
Appearance DUI X3
DWPX2

Roger E. Cockerille

AANG

WHITE

Appearance Of Atty. And Plea Of Not Guilty

Roger E. Cockerille

STDR

WHITE

Statement Of Defendant's Rights In DWP Cases Roger E. Cockerille

SRDC

WHITE

Statement Of Defendant's Rights in DUI or Drug
Case

Roger E. Cockerille

WAIV

WHITE

Waiver Of 21 days for preliminary Hearing

Roger E. Cockerille

RQFD

WHITE

Request For Discovery

Roger E. Cockerille

HRSC

WHITE

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 06/24/2013
11:00AM) DUI
DWP

Roger E. Cockerille

RQFD

LONDON

State's Request For Discovery

Roger E. Cockerille

RPTD

LONDON

State's Response To Discovery

Roger E. Cockerilie

i/24/2013

CONT

LONDON

Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on
06/24/201311:00AM: Continued DUI
DWP

Roger E. Cockerille

i/25/2013

REQD

AUBREY

States First Supplemental Response to Discovery Roger E. Cockerille

'/1/2013

HRSC

WHITE

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 07/22/2013
11 :00 AM) Cont. as per Gordon - DUI/ DWP

Roger E. Cockerille

'/2/2013

RPTD

WHITE

Response To Discovery

Roger E. Cockerille

'/15/2013

RTSR

WHITE

Personal Return Of Service

Roger E. Cockerille

'/22/2013

BOUN

LONDON

Roger E. Cockerille
Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on
07/22/2013 11 :00 AM: Bound Over (after Prelim)
Cont. as per Gordon - DUI/ DWP

f/30/2013

COMM

LONDON

Commitment

Roger E. Cockerille

CHJG

LONDON

Change Assigned Judge

Patrick Owen

INFO

LONDON

Information

Patrick Owen

RESP

HZ!MMERS

States Third Supplemental Response to
Discovery

Patrick Owen

l/6/2013

HRSC

LONDON

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 09/12/2013
10:00 AM)

Patrick Owen

)/10/2013

TRAN

LONDON

Transcript Filed

Patrick Owen

l/11/2013

RQFD

LONDON

State's Fourth Supplemental Request For
Discovery

Patrick Owen

/21/2013

i/10/2013

Judge
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Case: CR-20·13-0000458 Current judge: Patrick Owen
Defendant: Franklin, Tricia

State of Idaho vs. Tricia Franklin
)ate

Code

User

1/12/2013

ARRN

LONDON

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on
09/12/2013 10:00 AM: Arraignment/ First
Appearance

Patrick Owen

HRSC

LONDON

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
10/10/2013 10:00 AM) Entry of Plea

Patrick Owen

HRHD

LONDON

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Patrick Owen
on 10/10/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Heid Entry of
Plea

WAIV

LONDON

Waiver Of Speedy Trial

0/11/2013

HRSC

LONDON

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/30/2014 09:00 Patrick Owen
AM)

0/22/2013

MOTN

LONDON

Motion to Suppress

Patrick Owen

NOHG

LONDON

Notice Of Hearing

Patrick Owen

HRSC

LONDON

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress
11/14/201310:00AM)

Patrick Owen

0/28/2013

RQFD

WHITE

Request For Discovery

Patrick Owen

1/14/2013

HRVC

LONDON

Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled
on 11/14/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Patrick Owen

ORDR

LONDON

Scheduling Order

Patrick Owen

1/18/2013

RETN

AUBREY

Return Of Service-Robert Tatilian

Patrick Owen

1/19/2013

RETN

AUBREY

Return Of Service-Dale Rogers

Patrick Owen

MEMO

LONDON

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress

Patrick Owen

1/26/2013

RETN

AUBREY

Return Of Service-Robert Tatilian

Patrick Owen

2/2/2013

RPTD

AUBREY

States Fifth Supplemental Response To
Discovery

Patrick Owen

2/3/2013

HRSC

LONDON

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress
12/23/2013 01:30 PM)

Patrick Owen

NOHG

LONDON

Notice Of Hearing re: Motion to Suppress

Patrick Owen

NOHG

LONDON

Amended Notice Of Hearing re: Motion to
Suppress

Patrick Owen

2/9/2013

OBJE

LONDON

State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress

Patrick Owen

2/10/2013

HRVC

LONDON

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 12/12/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Patrick Owen

2/16/2013

RETN

AUBREY

Return Of Service- Dale Rogers

Patrick Owen

2/17/2013

STIP

LONDON

Stipulation Re: Hearing on Motion to Suppress

Patrick Owen

2/23/2013

CONT

LONDON

Continued (Motion to Suppress 12/26/2013
02:00 PM) and Pretrial Conference

Patrick Owen

RETN

AUBREY

Personal Return Of Service-Dale Rogers

Patrick Owen

RETN

AUBREY

Personal Return Of Service- Robert Tatilian

Patrick Owen

SUBI

AUBREY

Subpoena Issued

Patrick Owen

0/10/2013

Patrick Owen
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Code

User

!/8/2014

HRHD

LONDON

Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled
on 12/26/2013 02:00 PM: Hearing Held and
Pretrial Conference

Patrick Owen

/17/2014

MEMO

LONDON

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to
Suppress

Patrick Owen

/24/2014

MOTN

LONDON

Motion to Reconsider

Patrick Owen

/27/2014

HRSC

LONDON

Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea 01/29/2014 Patrick Owen
08:30 AM)

SUBR

AUBREY

Subpoena Returned- Jeremy Cadotte Served

CAGP

LONDON

Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on Patrick Owen
01/29/2014 08:30 AM: Court Accepts Guilty Plea

HRVC

LONDON

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
01/30/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Patrick Owen

HRSC

LONDON

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 04/10/2014
10:00 AM)

Patrick Owen

DENY

LONDON

Motion to Reconsider Denied- on record

Patrick Owen

PS101

HZIMMERS

Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered Document dated 01/29/2014

Patrick Owen

GLTY

HZIMMERS

Guilty Plea Advisory -document dated 01/29/2014 Patrick Owen

/10/2014

CONT

LONDON

Continued (Sentencing 06/12/2014 10:00 AM)

Patrick Owen

/12/2014

SENT

LONDON

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on
06/12/2014 10:00 AM: Sentencing

Patrick Owen

CAGP

LONDON

Court Accepts Guilty Plea (118-8004 {F} Driving
Under the lnfluence-(Third or Subsequent
Offense))

Patrick Owen

SNIC

LONDON

Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004 {F} Driving Patrick Owen
Under the lnfluence-(Third or Subsequent
Offense)) Confinement terms: Penitentiary
determinate: 1 year. Penitentiary indeterminate: 5
years.

JCOC

LONDON

Judgment Of Conviction & Order Retaining
Jurisdiction

Patrick Owen

ORDR

LONDON

Order Staying Execution of Judgment

Patrick Owen

SNPF

LONDON

Sentenced To Pay Fine 285.50 charge: 118-8004 Patrick Owen
{F} Driving Under the lnfluence-(Third or
Subsequent Offense)

'30/2014

NOTA

BHENDRYX

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Patrick Owen

·112014

CCOA

PETERSON

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Patrick Owen

12/2014

ORDR

PETERSON

Order Conditionally dismissing Appeal

Patrick Owen

29/2014

NOTA

PETERSON

Anended NOTICE OF APPEAL

Patrick Owen

PETERSON

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Patrick Owen
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Gordon Law Receipt number: 0002256 Dated:
9/18/2014 Amount: $100.00 (Check)

/29/2014

119/2014

18/2014

Patrick Owen
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)ate

Code

User

0/14/2014

ORDR

WHITE

Order Dismissing Appeal

Patrick Owen

0/17/2014

ORDR

WHITE

Order Withdrawing Dismissal

Patrick Owen

0/30/2014

MOTN

WHITE

Motion to withdraw as attorney of record

Patrick Owen

1/24/2014

ORDR

WHITE

Order Granting Motion to withdraw and suspend
briefing schedule

Patrick Owen

/21/2015

MOTN

BWOOD

Motion For Appointment Of State Appellate Public Patrick Owen
Defender

AFFD

BWOOD

Affidavit of Tricia Franklin in Support of Motion
For Appointment Of State Appellate Public
Defender

Patrick Owen

HRSC

BWOOD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/12/201510:00
AM) apptmnt for appellate public defender

Patrick Owen

NOTH

BWOOD

Notice Of Hearing

Patrick Owen

/12/2015

DCHH

BWOOD

Patrick Owen
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/12/2015 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Rhodes
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: apptmnt for appellate public defender
-50

113/2015

ORDR

BWOOD

Order Granting Motion For Appointment Of
Counsel On Appeal

Judge

Patrick Owen

MAGISTRAl i;'~ DIVISION
O!S"rRICT COUF-JT .

POJd.flDi J_UOICIAL DISTRICT
t:,UISt <..;Oi INTY. IDAHO

IANW. GEE
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery
Box 186
Idaho City, Idaho 83631
Tel: (208) 392-4485

Fax:

(208) 392-3760

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
VS.
)
)
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN,
)
DOB
)
OLN
)
ADD:4875 W. BLOOM ST.
)
BOISE, ID 83703
)
_____
D_e_fe_n_da_n_t_ _ _ _ _ _. )

Case No. CR 2013-0

COMPLAINT

PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this

tq

day of

/+pp,. L,

2013, IAN W. GEE I JAY F. ROSENTHAL, Prosecuting Attorney/Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, who, being first duly sworn, complains
and says that the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of February,

2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did then and there commit the crime(s) against
the people of the State ofidaho, to-wit:

COMPLAINT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 1

COUNT!
A
VEHICLE WHILE UNDER
INFLUENCE
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS
(THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN 10 YEARS)
Idaho Code §18-8004, §18-8005(6), Felony
That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of
February, 2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did drive a motor vehicle, to-wit:
a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1A1P638, on or at Banks Lowman
Road, milepost 5.7, while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, with an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: approximately 0.236, as shown by an analysis of her
- blood, while having pled guilty to or having been found guilty of at least two violations of
I. C. §18-8004 or substantially conforming statute of another jurisdiction within the
previous ten years.
COUNT II
DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES
(SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS)
Idaho Code §18-8001(4), Misdemeanor

That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of February,
2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle, to-wit: a a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1A1P638, on or
at Banks Lowman Road, milepost 5.7, knowing her operator's license or permit was
suspended in Idaho, while having pled guilty to or having been found guilty of a violation
of LC. § 18-8001 within the previous five years.

All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute(s) in such case,

and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
Said Complainant therefore prays that a Summons be issued for the Defendant,

COMPLAINT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 2

MAGISTRATE

COMPLAINT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 3

•

68-COURTROOM

1:06:26 PM JRosenthal
:DUI 3rd within 10 and such Franklin complaint with
:
:summons .. ...
··········································· '········································································'···················································································--··················································································································j
1 :07: 16 PM JJudge
Jaccepted for filing ... ... with summons....
,

1 of 1

4/29/2013

5

•

Time

Speaker .

68-COURTROOM

·

: .. Note

. ·

·.

9:41 :38 AM /Arraignment CR-2013- i
1458 State of Idaho v :
:Tricia Franklin- Judge
Roger E Cockerille - ·
i Dpty Prosecutor Ian
[Gee - Clerk Kelly
:White

i

i

9:41 :41 AM :,!Judge

I

!
j Rights

(yes) charges .... Felony penalties are as follows ....

iPreliminary heaiing and that date 1,vill be on

........................................... :.......................................................................... , : ................................................................................................................................................................................................... .

9:44:04 AM :Gee
9:44 :30 AM /Judge
I

.
/short time date,,, and the attorny 6/24/2013 @ 11 :00 being
Jheld without bond and I encourage you to show on time.

1 of 1

5/20/2013

lo

FOlJRT JTJDIClA..L DISTRTCT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BOISE
Deputy

1.

You have the right to

2.

You have the right to have an attorney represent you at all stages of these proceedings; if you are
poor and unable to pay coUJ.-isel you are entitled to a court-appointed attorney at public V-~,_,~-'-"'"'~

3.

You have the right to a iurv trial and to com.Del the attendai.1.ce of vvitnesses on -)1our behalf Viithout
expense to you.

4.

You have the right to confront or ask questions of any ·witness who testifies against you. You
cannot be compelled to testify and your silence will not be used against you.

5.

You may enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at this time or request a continuance
your attorney as to the plea.

6.

If you plead NOT GUILTY the Court will set a trial date.

7.

If you plead GUILTY the Court will set a date for sentencing. Prior to the sentencing you will be
required to undergo, at your expense, an alcohol evaluation which will be considered by the court in
determining the appropriate sentence. At sentencing you will be allowed to make a statement by
way of explanation or mitigation.

8.

If you plead guilty or are found guilty of driving under the influence maxim.um penalty is:

-

(a)

(b)

(c)

9.

silent;

_i

,,,

statement you

can

used against

.I.

If a first DlJl offense - 6 months in jail, a fine of $1,000.00 and a suspension of your driving
privileges for 180 days; during which, the fust 30 days absolutely no driving privileges may
be granted.
For a second DUI offense (within a five year period) - at least 10 days but not more than
one year in. jail; a fine of $2,000.00; and a suspension of your driving privileges for one year
after your release from jail during which absolutely no driving privileges may be granted.
For a third DUI offense ("within a five year period)- a felony; a sentence to the State Board
of Corrections for up to five years; a $5,000.00 fine; and a suspension of your drivrng
privileges for at least one year but not more than five years after release from imprisonment;
during which time absolutely no driving privileges may be granted.

If you plead guilty or are found guilty, a record of the conviction vvill be sent to the State
Department of Law Enforcement and becomes part of your driving record. There is a traffic
violation point system and the accumulation of po in.ts may lead to a suspension of your drivrng
privileges if the Court has not already done so.
I acknowledge tha.t I have read this statement a.nd folly understand its contents.

Defendant

J:\Court\M..A.GISTRA. TE C01JRT\CRL""MJNA.L\Rights\Rights for DUI.doc
06/03/11

order to consult

1

JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BOISE

OF
any statement you make can

1.

You
the right to
to incriminate yourself.

2.

You have the right to bail. The amount and type of bail or release on your o,vn recognizance is determined by the
judge after considering factors provided by law.

3.

You ha"ve the right to have an attorney represent you at all stages of these proceedings; if you are poor and unable
to afford counsel, you may apply to the Court for the appointment of an attorney to represent you at public
expense.

4.

You have the right to a jury trial, or you may waive jury and have the matter tried before the Court. At the trial,
the prosecution has to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt Any guilty verdict by a jury must be
unammous.

used against you. You can not be compelled

5. You have the right to confront or ask questions of any witness who testifies against you; and to compel the
attendance of witnesses on your own behalf without expense to you.
6.

You may enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at this time or request a continuance in order to consult your attorney
as to the plea.

7. If you plead GUILTY, you waive or give up all of the above rights and you waive or give up any defenses you
may have to the complaint filed against you. Specifically, by pleading guilty you waive or give up your right
against compulsory self-incrimination, which is the right to remain silent or not to incriminate yourself. You also
waive or give up your right to a trial by jury and your right to confront witnesses against you.
8.

You have the right to appeal any conviction or sentence to the District Court. The appeal must be filed within
forty two (42) days after the judgment of conviction is entered.

9. If you plead NOT GUILTY, the Court will set a trial date and you or your attorney will be notified of that date.
10. If you plead GUILTY, the Court will set a date for sentencing.
11. If you plead guilty or are found guilty of driving or being in actual physical control of any motor vehicle upon the
highway with knowledge that your driving privileges have been cancelled, revoked, or suspended, the minimum
and maximum penalties are:
(a) If a first offense: At least two (2) days but not more than six (6) months in jail; a fine of up to one thousand
dollars ($1,000); and suspension of driving privileges for six ( 6) months following the end of that period of
suspension existing at the time of the violation.
(b) If a second offense (within any five (5) year period); At least twenty (20) days but not more than one (l) year
in jail; a fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000); and mandatory suspension of driving privileges for one (1)
year following the end of any period of suspension existing at the time of the second violation, during the first
thirty (30) days of which time there are no driving privileges of any kind.
(c) If a third or subsequent offense ('i\ri.thin a five (5) year period): Incarceration in the county jail for a minimum
of thirty (30) days and up to one (1) year; a fine of up to three thousand dollars ($3,000); and mandatory
suspension of driving privileges for an additional two (2) years following the end of any period of suspension
existing at the time of the violation, during the first ninety (90) days of which ti.me there are no driving privileges
of an kind.
I acknowledge that I have read this statement and fully
Dated:

5 \\ )..() I\ l~

Signed:----"'-""-'---'-"-'-'-'-'-'~'--'-.::.......J,...--=--='------6/3/2011

MAGitn tiA1 t:;:, u,v1:::s1or,
DISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BOlSE COUNTY IDAHO

Philip Gordon, ISB #1996
GORDON
623 W. Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-7100
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE,
ENTRY OF "NOT GUILTY
PLEA" REQUEST FOR JURY
TRIAL AND DEMAND FOR
SPEEDY TRIAL

COMES NOW, Philip Gordon of Gordon Law Offices, Chartered, and hereby:
1.

Appears as attorney of record on behalf of the defendant herein; and

2.

Enters a plea of not guilty for and on behalf of said defendant, to any and all
charges in this case; and

3.

Requests a jury trial in the above entitled matter; and

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page 1

4.

Invokes the Defendant's right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed to her by the
Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article 3, Section

6th

of the

Constitu~ ofldaho, and Title 19, Chapter 35 of the Idaho Code.
a_
y, ~
2013.
Dated: M _

By:

, 2013, I caused e within and foregoing document, to
I hereby certify that on May
be served on the following pers , by the met a indicated below:
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
PO Box 186
Idaho City, ID 83631

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page 2

MAG1S'i riAi

i::." LilV,ciiON

DISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BO!SF r.r. 1!\tTY IDAHO
1

,

Philip Gordon, ISB # 1996

GORDON LAW OFFICES,
W. Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-7100
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458
WAIVER

)

TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through her attorney Philip Gordon of Gordon Law
Offices, Chartered, and hereby:
1.

Waives her right to have her Preliminary Hearing held within 21 days of her
arraignment on this charge. And

2.

Requests the Court to set her Preliminary Hearing for June 24r\ 2013, at 11 :00

am

~

Dated: MayZQ_, 2013.

W AIYER - Page 1

II

CERTIFICATE OF

d7Jo

I hereby certify that on MayW , 2013, I
the within and foregoing
served on the following person, by the method indicated
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
PO Box 186
Idaho City, ID 83631
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HAND DELfVERY

U.S. MAJL

to

SB-COURTROOM

11: 12:46 AM/ Prelilimary Hearing CR- 1Present W Philip Gordon
12013-458 State of IDahoi
!v Tricia Franklin - Judge !
!Roger E Cockerille - !
i DPTY Prosecutor Jay ·
!Rosenthal -Defense Atty!
!David Smethers-- Clerk !
!Kelly White
I

11: 12:54 AM JJudge
11 :13: 33 AM fRosenthal

jl have been advised that there is a stip and no warrant. .. .
..........................na·cr·oriAiiirr~i"n{.Ts. .n.on··warranc···· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Eii ;~ ;~l!~~~~hai - - --

li~!i~:~::.~,~~~~;~~~it~~~~ Exclude__ --- --- -I

11 :14:47 AMf Rosenthal
11 :15:11 AMf Judge

!testified before,, refresher of record and court rules .....

l

j
11 :15:53 AMiRosentahl / Devalle
!
11 :17:40 AMf Gordon

jJohn Devalle,,,, fire chief for GV fire ..... Direct
!examination
Jobject hersay

·~·~-:-~-;::~.;~,~~:;;thal................................................1.~:~a;~..
11 :18:04 AM1Rosenthal / Devalle

~~~:~:~~..that ..in.. motion...is ..sustained ................................................

!cont with Direct examination ....

E1~ ~~ ;~/;J; ;~h~~v~1~t1 · - i~:h:a~:bn::~z:~::~~~:~i:!::~~~~t ~: 1"~\~ :egula,0

5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .itiem.................................................................................................................................................................................
11 :21: 11 AM !Gordon / Devalle
!

!document you looked at and did you prepare it.. .. Cross
!examination make a copy before you leave .... Jason

........................................... 1.................................................................................

11 :31 :16 AM!Rosenthal

1.Yearsley. ·..............................................................................................................................................................
!speak slower

.1.1.:.31.:24.AMjGordonJ.Devalle ........................Jcross.. examination._._._..__Yol.firefighters_._._. ................................................................
11 :32:54 AM !Judge
!Nothing further and the witness steps down
.1..1.:.33: 1. 2_ AM jRosenthal................................................i.make .. copies .. _._please ..T ati_ltian ............................................................................... .
11 :33:45 AM!Rosenthal / Tatilian
!Tatilian, Robert Direct examination .. ..
.1.1.:34:57.AMjGordon......................................................../..............................................................................................................................................................................................
11 :34:59 AM! Rosenthal
!only for foundation not truth
11 :35:09 AM jJudge
ito extent sustained and not for truth of the matter therefor
ihe may answer
11 :35:34 AM1Rosenthal / Tatilian
!cont. Direct examination .....

i
Tf:':3~f3:r;;:rv;T60.rci'ori. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .rmayT.ask. a. .q.ues·tr;;·;:;·:-..c;-;;;-ititied·:·:·:·--takeri···carses·:-··wrih,fr.awi. . . . l
!
i
11 :40:23 AM/Rosenthal/ Tatiltian
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jcont. Direct examination ... states #1 move
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•

Time

•

Speaker

68-COURTROOM

Note

11 :44 :56 AMJGordon
11 :45: 12 AM fJudge
;
.

]object. .. . reserve ruling
jI will note that state,#1 offered and understood mr.
]Gordon has objections and given oppertu ning to ad ress
]and reserve ruling

I;··:;.~;-~~l~:;;:~ht~

[6~::s

12:03:49 PMiRosenthal / Tatilian
12:04:42 PMiJudge

iRe-direct examination ... .
:

12:04:44 PM.,/ Gordon / Tatilian
.
12:06:05 PM1Rosenthal / Tatilian
12:06:28 PMf Gordon/ Tatilian
:
12:07:22 PM]
12:07:36 PMiRosenthal / Rogers

/2/6/2013 have you ever participated in obtaining a search
]warrant ....
:
jdid you know that judges have power to issue search
jwarrant. ... . 2/6/2013 .... boise city officer....
]Nothing further and the witness steps down
ioale Rogers ... BCSO and an officer for 37 yrs Direct
jexamination ..... .

~;l~~~an

examination .. did you try to obtain a warrant from····
)udge Cockerille .....

'

i

.)~··i.;•J~ :~l~u:::n./· era- -l
Rog

i

12:17:52 PMiGordon

i

12:26:30 PM/Gordon

~~l~~;:~~~:: ~~i~:;:;~~~:; i

=~~~~hibit ·.·.·-

- -

]Gordon no evidence ....
iruling on exhibit #1 by state .... reasonings ... statement.. ... I
jdon
j I don't think the state has meet the burdon of proof. .. .

I

·1··:i:.3'f:·1·Lrr·11Ai·R·a·se.ri'fhaT··························· · ·················j·re.s'i;o·ri·se.To···ci'eFc:'~ii'n···;:;·ot'·rei'vo·i<e··he·r··can·s·e·;:;r:·:··.·we··w1iT··················1
!

/submitt it your honor .... certified under 8004

·~·~:·~~:!~···~~t~~~~:n······················································fopty ..Rogers...doesn.'t'°even .. know.. who.drew.that'°blood ... ·.············

l
12:33:24 PM!Rosenthal
12:33:34 PM JJudge
J
;

.

I
;
io.k. let me make my ruling on exhibit #1 .. ... 5.1b states
!that .. .. .whith all due respect to Judge Owen, however it
!requires all judges to make a ruling on preliminary
jissues .. .. the issue before the court is ....... I am bound by
]that and I will say a district judge would not supress .... .
]due to state vs. Diaz .. . statement on these issues ... . rule
/41 clears that up .... . search warrant may be issued by
Uudge in judicial district.. ... given the location of secene
!and all the details and I view that time was an important
!factor .... however under state vs . Diaz, there for exhibt #1
]comes into the record .. ..

I
'

.

·~~:: ~·:~~·· ~~ f~~;;~~hal··············································f·::~~~s ..not.. meet ..its .. burdon ..of ·proof ...................................................................i
12:43:07 PMjJudge

7/22/2013
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Time

Speaker

12:43: 12 PM :Rosenthal
12:44:01 PM l Judge
·

·

•

Note

6B-COURTROOM

·

\on topic of drive of vech . .. .. statement...
l
j100% crystal clear ... evidence that was not submitted to
:the court .. ... only on evidence that was given to the
j
!court .... ! am not deciding right now th at you were driving I
lthe car ... .! can see that he could have been on scene ,
!question is based on the fact of Ms. Frankins location is ;
jshe is probable the driver and I think there is PC to say
) hat she could have been the driver ... .. statement .... .. and
:therefor I find the state meet the burdon and I Bound over.

I

I

..........................

.

12:47:39 PM I

.

:8/8/@10:00

12A7:45._PM /Gordon ........................................................·............................................................................................................................................................................................
12 AB: 58 .. PM lJudg e............................................................
~.@.~_g..
12:49:18 PM Gordon
fun to be here.
12:49:29 PM!Judge
[venue has alot to do with that. .. Franklin I wish you good
:luck

i

l. ~(~.~!..?. ?. ~.

i

~~t~.i.~.~.J.~.~0.~~:. ~0.~.~. ~~········· · · ··· · ·········· · . . .. . ..... ..
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IS

IANW. GEE
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 186
Idaho Cit/, Idaho 83631
Tel: (208) 392-4485
Fax: (208) 392-3760

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN,
)
---~D~efi_en_d_a_n_t._ _ _ _ _ _~)

Case No. CR-2013-00458

COMMITMENT

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, having

( ~ f e n brought) before this Court for a Preliminary Examination on the

\_] "1 I~

, 2013,

1>2

day of

on a charge that the Defendant on or about the 6th day of

February, ; 13, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did c01mnit the crimes of COUNT

I, OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN 10 YEARS), Idaho Code
§18-8004, §18-8005(6), Felony and COUNT II, DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES
(SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS), Idaho Code §18-8001(4), Misdemeanor, as

follows:
COUNTI
PART I

That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of
February, 2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did drive a motor vehicle, to-wit:
a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1AlP638, on or at Banks Lowman
COMMITMENT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 1

Ila

Road, milepost 5.7, while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, with an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: approximately 0.236, as shown by an analysis of her
blood, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code Sections 18-8004, 18-8005(6), and against the
power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.

COUNT II
DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES
(SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS)
Idaho Code §18-8001(4), Misdemeanor

That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of February,
2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle, to-wit: a a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1A1P638, on or
at Banks Lowman Road, milepost 5.7, knowing her operator's license or permit was
suspended in Idaho, while having pled guilty to or having been found guilty of a violation
of LC. §18-8001 within the previous five years.

PART II
That TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, did willfully, knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully
and feloniously commit those acts set forth in Part I of this Complaint in that said Defendant
has heretofore pled guilty to or been found guilty of at least two or more violations of
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol, a felony, pursuant to
Section 18-8004 of the Idaho Code, or substantially conforming statute of another
jurisdiction within ten (10) years from the 6th day of February, 2013, to-wit:
On or about the 23rd day of June, 2010, the Defendant, under the name of TRICIA
M. FRANKLIN, pled guilty to or was found guilty of the crime of Operating a Motor
Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (Second Offense), a
Misdemeanor, in the Magistrate Court, of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Ada, Case Number CR-MD 2010-0001887; and
On or about the 6th day of December, 2010, the Defendant, under the name of
TRICIA MARIE FRANKLIN, pled guilty to or was found guilty of the crime of
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (Second Offense), in the
Magistrate Court, of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County
of Ada, Case Number CR-MD-2010-0009994;

COMMITMENT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 2
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The Defendant having so appeared and having had her preliminary examination, the
Court sitting as a Committing Magistrate finds that the offense charged as set forth has been
committed

Boise

Idaho, and that there is sufficient cause to believe that the

Defendant is guilty of committing the offenses as charged.

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN,
~e he~d~ to ~nswer to th: ~i~trict ~ou~ of th~ F o~rth J~di~ial ~i~t~ict o~ th~ State o~ I~~
rn ana tor me County or tl01se, to t ~ g e nerem set rortn. .tlall 1s set m the sum or ~ E_.

DATED this

f/1tray of

\j IA 17

,20

--~.-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

LL/ ,

,30

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of J:1J
2013, I caused
to be served a true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
U.S.MAIL
_HANDDELIVERED ~TELECOPY
POSTAGE PREPAID
Philip Gordon
Attorney at Law
623 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83702
IANW.GEE
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
Idaho City, Idaho 83631

COMMITMENT (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page
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RICT COURT BOISE COUMTY, IDAHO
rded in

IANW.GEE
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 186
Idaho City, Idaho 83631
Tel: (208) 392-4485
Fax: (208) 392-3760

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
TRICIA M. FRANKLIN,
)
=D-"-e=fe=n=da=n=t_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~)

Case No. CR-2013-00458

INFORMATION

IAN W. GEE I JAY F. ROSENTHAL, Prosecuting Attorney/Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, in and for the County of Boise, State of Idaho, who in the name and by the
authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes now into District Court of the County
of Boise, and states that TRICIA M. FRANKLIN is accused by this Information of the
crimes of: COUNT I, OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE

INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN 10
YEARS), Idaho Code §18-8004, §18-8005(6), Felony and COUNT II, DRIVING
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES (SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS), Idaho Code §188001(4), Misdemeanor, which crimes was committed as follows:
COUNTI
PARTI
That the Defendant, TRICIA l\'l. FRA.c~KLIN, on or about the 6th day of
February, 2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did drive a motor vehicle, to-wit:
a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1AIP638, on or at Banks Lowman

INFORMATION (TRICIA M. FRANKLIN), Page 1
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Road, milepost 5.7, while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, with an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: approximately 0.236, as shown by an analysis of her
blood, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code Sections 18-8004, 18-8005(6), and against the
peace and dignity of the State ofidaho.

COUNT II
DRIVING WITHOUT PRIVILEGES
(SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS)
Idaho Code §18-8001(4), Misdemeanor

That the Defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, on or about the 6th day of February,
2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle, to-wit: a a red Ford pickup truck bearing Idaho License number 1A1P638, on or
at Banks Lowman Road, milepost 5.7, knowing her operator's license or permit was
suspended in Idaho, while having pled guilty to or having been found guilty of a violation
of LC. §18-8001 within the previous five years.

PART II
That TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, did willfully, knowingly, intentionally, unlawfully
and feloniously commit those acts set forth in Part I of this Complaint in that said Defendant
has heretofore pled guilty to or been found guilty of at least two or more violations of
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol, a felony, pursuant to
Section 18-8004 of the Idaho Code, or substantially conforming statute of another
jurisdiction within ten (10) years from the 6th day of February, 2013, to-wit:
On or about the 23rd day of June, 2010, the Defendant, under the name of TRICIA
M. FRANKLIN, pled guilty to or was found guilty of the crime of Operating a Motor
Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (Second Offense), a
Misdemeanor, in the Magistrate Court, of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Ada, Case Number CR-MD 2010-0001887; and
On or about the 6th day of December, 2010, the Defendant, under the name of
TRICIA MARIE FRANKLIN, pled guilty to or was found guilty of the crime of
Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (Second Offense), in the
Magistrate Court, of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofidaho, in and for the County
of Ada, Case Number CR-MD-2010-0009994;

INFORMATION (TRICIAM. FRANKLIN), Page 2

All of which is contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statutes in such case
made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State ofidaho.

Pursuant to Rule 7(b ), Idaho Criminal Rules, the following is a list of all witnesses insofar
as they are known to the State at this time, who are or may be witnesses in this action:

Witness:
ROB TATILIAN
BRENDA GLENN
DALE ROGERS
RACHEL CUTLER
KERRY RUSSELL
JOHN DELVALLE
HOLLY PERAZZO
JANET SCHAADT

Address:
BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
BOISE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
IDAHO STATE POLICE FORENSICS
IDAHO STATE POLICE FORENSICS
17 WILDWOOD DR., GARDEN VALLEY
2 COYOTE LN., GARDEN VALLEY
24/7 PRO SOLUTIONS

Felonies:
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN

**All reports disclosed are incorporated by reference and any individuals named in
such reports may be called as witnesses. **Any photographs, video or audio listed are
available for your review at the Boise County Prosecutor's office through appointment at
(208)392-4485. In the event you would request a copy, please provide this office with the
necessary tape.

I

Ian
e,A Jay F. Rosenthal
Bo
u ·ty Prosecuting Attorney/
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3D

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of ::S::V L\(
, 2013, I caused
to be served a true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
_HANDDELIVERED _}LTELECOPY
U.S.MAIL
POSTAGE PREPAID
Db;1;_ I:..r....,.d~~
H.UJJ u VJ. Vll

.L

Attorney at Law
623 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83702
IANW.GEE
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
Idaho City, Idaho 83631
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Distric Court September 1 ,'2013 Honorable Patrick H Owen , pre

I

g

6B-COURTROOM

10: 12: 13 AM[Arraignment CR-2013!458 State v Tricia
.
iFranklin - Judge Patrick i
lH Owen - Chief Dpty
l
Prosecutor Jay
: Rosenthal - Defense
'
JAtty Phillip Gordon !COURT REPORTER
: Roxanne Patchell :Clerk Lisa London

i

10:12:16 AM JHonorable Patrick H
/Owen
10:13:32 AMf Gordon
10:13:38 AM fHonorable Patrick H

i

!call of case. Defendant previously informed of rights
,
:waive reading information
]Advises defendant of penalties .

.L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . ... . ... ........ . . . . . . ... .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. ...... . . . .. . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.... .................................. J owen .........................................................
1O: 14:48 AM :,,:·d
JUnderstands penaltiesUnderstands rightsUnderstands
jcharge(s)
1
10:15:01 AM fHonorable Patrick H
!Owen
.
10:15:14 AM jGordon
jclient wants add'! time
10: 15:49 AM j Honorable Patrick H
jwill set ?Ver for furth~: proceedings-eop on 10/10/13 _at
:Owen
:1oam. impose cond1t1ons of release: operate no vehicle
/while unlicensed/uninsured or drinking. consume no
.
!alcohol
10:17:09 AM iend
:

1 of 1
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23

j

District Court Thursday, Octo..,er 10, 2013 , Honorable Patrick H Ower1, pres68-COURTROOM

Time

:- Speaker

·,

..

. ·. .

.

.'Note ~ . : · :, 1- . . •

·:.

10:04:53 AM!Entry of Plea CR-2013- /present w/atty
/458 State v Tricia
!
!Franklin - Judge Patrick !
H Owen - Chief Dpty
;
/Prosecutor Jay
i Rosenthal - Defense
!Atty David Smethers ]COURT REPORTER
Kamra Toalson - Clerk
!Lisa London

l

i

I

I

i
I
·ro:·os·:··1·5··AKii" iH·on·ar.ahie···Pafrl"ck·H··············i·c"ALL···o f··f'H°E~··c;;.:s·E···································--········································--·--···--··----····------··--·----······ ·1
jOwen

!

,

_1_0:_ 05 :29_AMJgordon.........................................................Jenter_.ng __ plea __ and __ ask_for_trial___ dates_.......................................................................
10:05:59 AM/Honorable Patrick H
!enter ng plea and set for ptc and jt

J

........................................... !Owen..............................................................i. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10:07:29 AMirosenthal
:2 days
_1 _0:_07_:30_AM !g_ordon _______ ................................................... ;...............................................................................................................................................................................................
10:07:38 AM iHonorable Patrick H
Uan 2 work
jOwen
;
10:07:44 AMjgordon
10:07:51 AMjHonorable Patrick H

jwon't be in country
Jan 16

........................................... !Owen..............................................................'...............................................................................................................................................................................................
_1_0:_07: 55 _AM gordon.......................................................... !.still..out __ of _country.............................................................................................................................
10:08:01 AM!Honorable Patrick H
/discuss speedy?
!Owen
10:08:12 AMfgordon
)waive speedy
.
10:08:21 AM1Honorable Patrick H
)advises defendant of speedy trial rights

i

i

:ow
:
-n
0

10:09:09 AMjd
10: 09:23 AM i Honorable Patrick H
jOwen

l

:

jwaives right to speedy
;
.

i.!~.~.

1__ 0 :_09:3 5__ AM rosentha1...................................................
_i~.Y~-~y-~il·~·~1-~...f.?r.. ?~.~-t-~.........................................................................................................
10:09:43 AMU
Uan 30
10:09:46 AM jgordon
jworks
10:10:04 AM jj
jjan 30 and 31 for jt
10: 11 :28 AM jgordon
could run over into 3rd day
1O: 11: 38 AM Jj
monday would be a scheduling issue. will sort out if
:
i comes to that
/

i
i

10:12:10 AMjend

10/10/2013

I

1 of 1

Uct. 1~. LUU
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\Jordon Law UTT1ces

IVO, I /V'J

,,

Philip Gordon, ISB #1996
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
623 W. Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-7100
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff,

vs.
TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant..

-~----------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458
MOTION TO SUPPl{ESS

)

COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby moves
this Court for its Order as follows:
1.

Suppressing as evidence in the trial or any other proceedings in this cause, the following:

a. The results of the test for alcohol concentration. performed on blood taken from the
Defendant (against her will) on or about the day of February, 2013.
b. Each and every statement made, or alleged to have been made, by Defendant to any
law enforcement officer subsequent to the Defendant having been initially contacted by
law enforcement at the scene of a vehicular accident at approximately mile of the Banks

MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page 1

L

Uct. I~.

LUU

j:11nv1

to Lowman Road

uoraon Law v11 ices

11 U, I I V ,

r, J

Boise County, Idaho, on or about the day of February, 2013.

c. ,A.ny and all tangible evidence, statements, observations, conclusions or testimony

any type or kind which are or may be deemed to be "fruits of the poisonous tree" (as that
doctrine is set forth either in the opinions of the appellate courts of the State of Idaho, or
the federal appellate courts), of any violation ofthe Defendant's rights under or pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or Article 1, Section 17
of the Constitution of!daho.
This Motion is made and brought pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and/or Article I, §17 of the Constitution ofldaho, and the specific bases and grounds
for this Motion are as follows:
1. Defendant's blood was taken without her consent and without a search warrant while
she was a patient in St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, despite the fact that several
hours had elapsed between when law enforcement officers first made contact with the
Defendant and first suspected that she was or may have been ru1der the influence of
alcohol, and when a sample of her blood was taken. There was accordingly more than
ample time for officers to obtain a search warrant for a sample of the Defendant's blood,
yet they made no effort to seek a warrant.
2. No officer observed Defendant driving a motor vehicle, and there was evidence at the
scene of the crash that the vehicle may have been driven by another person.
Additionally, several hours then elapsed before a law enforcement officer encountered
Defendant in the hospital. The combination of these factors militate in favor of requiring
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that the Defendant be given her Miranda
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before

questioned,
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no

warnings were given.
3. Defendant reserves the right to assert such other, further and additional grounds as
may be revealed in subsequent discovery, testimony and presentation of evidence .
.A~RAL ARGUMENT rs REQUESTED.
Dated: October ~013.

CERTIF~E OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October£, 2013, I caused the within and foregoing document,
to be served on the following person, by the method indicated below:
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
PO Box 186
Idaho City, ID 83631
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Philip Gordon, ISB #1996
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
623 W. Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-7100
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby provides
the Court with her pre-hearing Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, on file herein.
In consequence of the fact that this Memorandum is being submitted in advance of the hearing on
the Defendant's Motion, Defendant reserves the right to submit a supplemental Memorandum
subsequent to the said hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The great majority of the operative facts which dictate the result in this instance can be
gleaned from the transcript of the Preliminary Hearing (hereafter "PH") held in this matter before
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ORIGINAL

the Honorable Roger
will be

U.vJ..iVC'->U

as

Cockerille on the 22nd day of July, 2013 (references to that Transcript
followed by page and line numbers).

are largely

undisputed.
The first witness for the State at the PH was John Delvalle, who is the Garden Valley Fire
Chief. TR, P. 7, 11. 13-18. On February 6t", 2013, he responded to a report of single vehicle
accident on the Banks to Lowman road. TR, P. 7, 11. 19-25. He was not the first rescue person on
the scene, TR, P. 8, 11. 2-7, arriving approximately three minutes behind the rescue truck, TR. P.
15, 11. 17-21. The Chief promptly commenced assisting in caring for the Defendant
approximately 2-3 minutes after arriving on the scene. TR, P. 8, 11. 10-14; TR., P.14, 11. 12-16.
As Chief Delvalle was "performing C-spine immobilization", he detected an odor of alcohol
coming from the Defendant. TR, P. 10, 11. 2-5. After Ms. Franklin was immobilized, her care
was transferred to the Crouch Ambulance, whose responsibility it was to transport her to a
helicopter landing zone in Banks, where she was to be further transferred to a Life Flight
helicopter. TR, P. 10, 11. 9-19. The Department's official log revealed that members of his
department arrived at the accident scene at approximately 10:30 p.m. TR, P. 12, 11. 14-19; TR, P.
13, 11. 6-18.
While performing first aid on Ms. Franklin, Chief Delvalle observed that "she had some
head trauma" TR, P. 16, l. 5, with "considerable amount of -of hemorrhage", TR, P. 16, 11. 1112. The Chief estimated that it took between 10 and 12 minutes to fully immobilize Ms.
Franklin on a backboard, so that she could be turned over to the care of the Crouch ambulance,
TR. P. 17, 11. 16-2 0.
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Boise County Deputy Sheriff Robert Tatillian arrived at the accident scene prior to Chief
Delvalle. TR, P. i

L

18, L 6, who informed the Deputy of his observation that Ms.

Franklin had the odor of alcohol about her person. TR, P. 18, L 16 to P. 19, L 1O; TR, P. 40, IL
17-23.
Deputy Tatillian was the State's second witness. He testified that he was dispatched to
the scene of this accident at 10: 12 p.m. TR, P. 41, 11. 3-8, and that dispatch gave him a
description of the involved vehicle, Ibid. LL 16-19. Immediately upon being provided with the
description of the vehicle, "the first thing that came to my mind" TR, P. 42, 11. 1-2 was that it was
the same vehicle whose two occupants he had spoken to earlier that evening at the Wander Inn in
Crouch, and he believed that one of the two people he had spoken to earlier had driven the
vehicle to the accident scene. Ibid, 11. 3-8. He also concluded that, if the vehicle had been driven
to the accident scene by one of the two people he encountered earlier -who were the only two
people associated with that vehicle, TR. P. 42, 11. 23-25- that meant that it had been driven there
by a person who was under the influence of alcohol. Ibid., 11. 15-22. The Deputy admitted that it
was possible that he had received confirmation that Ms. Franklin was at the scene of the accident
even before he arrived there. TR, P. 45, 11. 1-4.
Deputy Tatillian undertook no efforts whatsoever to get a search warrant to take the blood
of Ms. Franklin after her identity was confirmed as the individual found at the scene of the
accident. TR, P. 45, 1. 18 - P. 49, 1. 24, (with particular emphasis on the colloquy on P. 49, 11. 12 24).
Deputy Tatillian acquired "actual knowledge" TR, P. 50, 1. 15, that Ms. Franklin had been
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transported by ambulance to a landing zone so that she could then be taken by Life Flight to St.
Alphonsus Hospital. Ibid., 11. l

18, but, despite having this knowledge, he still made no efforts

to obtain a warrant. Ibid., 11. 19-21. He did, however, remain on site and conducted an accident
investigation, TR., P. 51, 11. 7-9, at the conclusion of which he returned to Crouch to look for
Jacob Snowball, whom he had encountered earlier that evening at the Wander Inn. TR., P. 51, 11.
15-16; TR, P. 39, 11. 13-24.
After describing the search he undertook at and near the scene of the accident, he testified
that he "had dispatch get in contact with Chief Deputy Rogers, who was in Ada County at the
time ... ", TR, P .. 34, 11. 15-16, to request Rogers "to [go] to the hospital with and do a blood draw
on the victim [sic]." Ibid, 1. 20. Tellingly, though he went through dispatch to reach Chief
Deputy Rogers so he could do a blood draw on Ms. Franklin, he did not ask dispatch to have
anyone "get a warrant for Chief Deputy Rogers to do that blood draw ... ". TR, P. 51, 11. 23-25,
even though he knew that Judge Cockerille [the resident Boise County Magistrate Judge] had the
power to issue search warrants at any and all times TR, P. 55, 11. 16-21; even though he assumed
that there were sitting Magistrate Judges in Ada County [the location of St. Alphonsus hospital]
who had the power to issue search warrants TR, P. 57, 11. 8-11; and even though he knew that
Deputy Rogers "had been a Boise City Police officer for an extended period .. ". Ibid, 11. 15-21.
Dale Rogers was the State's third and final witness at the Preliminary Hearing. He
candidly admitted that Ms. Franklin did not consent to having her blood drawn. TR, P. 60, 11. 1217. He testified that the call asking him to draw Ms. Franklin's blood was received by him at his
home (in Ada County, TR, P. 62, 11. 1-3) between 12:20 and 12:30 a.m., TR, P. 61, 11. 14-17; 11.
24-5. He thought the call came "through our dispatch", rather than from Deputy Tatillian. TR, P.
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62, 11. 4-8. Rogers neither made any effort to ascertain whether or not a warrant had been
obtained for this blood draw, TR, P. 62, 11. 20-23, nor did he make any eff01is to obtain a warrant
to take Ms. Franklin's blood. TR, P. 62, 1. 24 - P. 63, 1. 1.
Deputy Rogers testified that Ms. Franklin made it very clear to him and hospital
personnel in the room with him that she would not submit to having her blood drawn. TR, P. 64,
11. 2-5, 11. 12-14. Despite learning that Ms. Franklin would not voluntarily submit to having her
blood drawn, Rogers still made no effort to obtain a search warrant, Ibid., 11. 15-19, and
proceeded to take her blood against her will, Ibid. LI. 20-21. At the time he elected not to seek a
warrant Rogers was aware that there Magistrate Judges were available at all times for the purpose
of granting warrants, TR, P. 65, 11. 13-24, and he even knew one or more of the currently sitting
Ada County Magistrates. TR, P. 65, 1. 25 - P. 66, I. 2, yet he made no efforts to find out which
Magistrate was then on-call for the issuance of warrants. TR, P. 66, 11. 3-8.
Taken together, all of these unchallenged facts establish that:
1.

A minimum of 2 1/2 hours elapsed between the time Deputy Tatillian first learned of the
accident and the time when blood was drawn from Ms. Franklin against her will and
without a warrant while she was a patient in SARMC.

2.

It was Boise County Dispatch which informed Deputy Tatillian about the accident and

provided him with the license number and/or a description of the involved vehicle. For
the next couple of hours Deputy Tatillian was always able to access Dispatch.
3.

During the entire sequence of events culminating in the involuntary draw of Ms.
Franklin's blood, Chief Deputy Rogers was in Boise, within a short distance of SARMC,
and he could be and was in fact reached by Dispatch.
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4.

Rogers had been an officer with the Boise City Police Department for over 30 years,
knew that

was always an on-call Magistrate, and

he could obtain a warrant to

seize Ms. Franklin's blood from that judicial officer.
5.

No attempt was ever made by either officer to obtain a warrant to seize blood from Ms.
Franklin.

6.

Ms. Franklin did not consent to having her blood drawn by law enforcement, and her
blood was taken over her objection.
ISSUE PRESENTED
\Vhether the involuntary taking of Franklin's blood without a warrant constitutes an

unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
ARGUMENT
A compelled physical intrusion beneath one's skin and into one's veins to obtain a sample
of one's blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation is an invasion of bodily integrity that
implicates an individual's "most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy." Missouri v.
NcNeely, 569 U.S._ (2013) (slip op., at 4 -5), citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).

I. A Blood Draw is a Seizure and thus Requires a Warrant.
The taking of a blood alcohol content test is a seizure within the context of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 (1989). Any
warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
specific and well delineated exceptions. Id. When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by
defendant, the burden is on the prosecution to show that evidence seized falls within a recognized
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exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
While officers on scene are likely to be hurried, excited and intent on securing an arrest, a
neutral and detached magistrate serves to safeguard the constitutional liberties of the suspect. "[T]he
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, [] is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches
than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (internal quotation omitted)
(abrogated on other grounds by Californiav. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)). Simply stated, without
a magistrate standing guard between police and citizens, the Fourth Amendment becomes
meaningless.

II. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement.
A. Per Se Exceptions.
The Supreme Court has recognized very few per se exceptions to the warrant requirement,
which can be generally grouped into distinct categories. It should be noted at the outset that "for the
most part, per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context." United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,201 (2002).

The first per se exception is for searches or seizures that comport with Congress' power to
protect the Nation. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 US 531,538 (1985).
"Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant." Id
The second is for "special needs." Searches that fall within this exception include searches
of probationers' homes, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), government employee work
spaces, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), and student's property by school officials, New
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Jersey v. TL. 0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). "A State's operation of a probation system, like its operation
of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents
'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant
and probable-cause requirements." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-874.
The third per se exception to the warrant requirement is for searches incident to arrest.
"When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated."

Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969).
B. Exigent Circumstances Exception.

The exigent circumstances exception is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement. Unlike the above cited per se exceptions to the warrant requirement which
require little, if any, analysis of the specific facts of the case, a warrantless search based upon the
exigent circumstances exception requires a court to evaluate the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether an emergency existed which would justify a warrantless intrusion. "The
exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek
exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,455 (1971) (internal quotation omitted). "In cases where the securing of
a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156
(1925).
The Supreme Court has recognized only a few well delineated situations in which the exigent
circumstances exception applies. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot
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pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v.
California. 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,
296 (1973) (same); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (same); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499.
509 (1978) (ongoing fire). "Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions
to the warrant requirement are few in number and carefully delineated." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (internal quotation omitted). "Police bear a heavy burden when attempting to
demonstrate an urgent need" for a warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception.

Id., 466 U.S. at 749-750. "When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be
in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he
postponed action to get a warrant." Id., at 751 (citing McDonald v. US, 335 U.S. 451,460 (1948)).
The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to delay their investigation if doing so
would endanger the lives of themselves or others. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). When officers are faced with a situation where the delay in
obtaining a warrant could result in the destruction of evidence, an exigency may also exist. Ker, 3 74
U.S. at 40-41; Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757. When determining whether there is a risk of destruction
of evidence sufficient to excuse a warrant courts also consider the seriousness of the offense. Welsh,
466 U.S. at 751. Simply because evidence may or will be destroyed in a particular case does not
necessarily mean that an exigent circumstances exception applies. See, e.g., Johnson v. US, 333
U.S. 10 ( 1948) (warrantless search not appropriate simply because opium fumes were dissipating);
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (warrantless search not appropriate simply because
whiskey mash smell may dissipate); Welsh, 466 U.S. 740 (warrantless seizure of defendant not
appropriate simply because blood alcohol level was dissipating).
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The Supreme Court has rejected prior attempts to create new per se exigency rules. Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (rejecting per se exigency rule when police are investigating a

murder scene); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984) (same). The Court has similarly rejected
attempts to create per se exceptions to the knock and announce rule. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520
U.S. 385 (1997) (rejecting per se exception in felony drug cases).
Idaho Courts have also recognized that "[t]he exigent circumstances exception allows agents
of the State to conduct a wanantless search when there is a 'compelling need for official action and
no time to secure a wanant."' State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470,472 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). "The exigent circumstances exception does not apply where there is time

to secure a wanant." State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496,501, 163 P. 3d 1208, 1213 (Ct. App. 2007).
This exception does not serve to streamline police procedures or investigations. "The mere
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the
Fourth Amendment." Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. "The investigation of crime would always be
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed
in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law." Id.
Exigent circumstances cases are always fact-specific and require the State to show that
immediate action was necessary to prevent flight, safeguard the police or public, or stop destruction
of evidence. The word itself, exigent, connotes urgency and implies that immediate action is
necessary. Whether sufficient exigent circumstances existed at the time of the anest or search to
obviate the need to obtain a wanant should always be a fact intensive analysis based upon the
particular facts of the case, with consideration being given to the totality of circumstances.
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III. There is no Per Se Exigency Exception in all DUI Cases.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a wmTantless blood draw can, in some
circumstances, fall under the exigent circumstances exception in Schmerber v. California, 3 84 U.S.
757 (1966). In Schmerber, the defendant was involved in a serious car accident that required his
hospitalization and a police investigation of the crash. 384 U.S. at 771. The Court engaged in an
exigent circumstances analysis and concluded that "[g]iven these special facts", this warrantless
blood draw falls within the exception. Id. The fact the defendant's BAC was diminishing was only
one of the factors the Court considered in reaching its conclusion. Also important to the Court's
analysis was the fact that the officer had to spend time to conduct an accident investigation, and the
fact that defendant had to be taken to the hospital to be assessed for injuries. Id. Given these two
additional delays, coupled with the fact that defendant's BAC was dropping, the Court found that
exigent circumstances existed to negate the warrant requirement. The Court concluded by stating,
"[i]t bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record."
Id., at 772.
In the recent opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _

(2013), the United States

Supreme Court explicitly found that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream, a
factor present in every "dui" investigation, does not give rise to a per se exigency always justifying
an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Court explicitly found and held
that exigency in this context must be determined on a case by case basis after careful analysis of the
totality of the circumstances. 569 U.S._ (2013) (slip op., at 1). The Court further found that "[i]n
those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a
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blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth
Amendment mandates that they do so." Id. at p. 9.
In McNeely, the Court recognized that the "context of blood testing is different in critical
respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are truly confronted with a
'now or never' situation." 569 U.S._ (2013) (slip op., at 10). "[B]ecause a police officer must
typically transport a drunk-driving suspect to a medical facility and obtain the assistance of someone
with appropriate medical training before conducting a blood test, some delay between the time of
the arrest or accident and the time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether police officers are
required to obtain a warrant." Id. The court acknowledged that BAC evidence is lost gradually and
relatively predictably (Id. at12-13) at the rate of approximately 0.015 to 0.02 percent per hour once
the alcohol has been fully absorbed. (Id. at 9.)
As part of its effort to distinguish Schmerber, supra, the Court taught that:
The State's proposed per se rule also fails to account for advances in the 47 years since
Schmerber was decided that allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant
applications, particularly in contexts like drunk-driving investigations where the evidence
offered to establish probable cause is simple. Ibid, Slip Opinion pp. 10-11.
The first category of advances noted by the Court fall within the realm of technological aids
which facilitate the process of securing warrants. Ibid, P. 11. After noting that since 1977 Federal
Magistrates have been empowered to issue warrants "based on sworn testimony communicated by
telephone" Ibid, the majority opinion also acknowledged post-1977 amendments to the law which
now allow the consideration of"information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic
means." Ibid., quoting Fed. Rule Crim Proc. 4.1. The Court further observed that "well over a
majority of states allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search warrants remotely through
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various means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as eand video conferencing." 569 U.S._ (2013) (slip op., at 11). This latter proposition was
buttressed with an extensive footnote listing the various state statutes which are similar to the
Federal Rule. Tellingly, Idaho was mentioned as among the majority of jurisdictions, with the Court
citing to Idaho Code §§ 19-4404 and 19-4406. 1
IV. Idaho's Implied Consent Statute does not void the Fourth Amendment's
Requirement that law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant prior to conducting an
evidentiary blood draw in the absence of exigent circumstances.

It can be anticipated that the State will argue that warrantless blood draws are
countenanced under the Idaho Implied Consent Statute. In order fully to appreciate why this
argument is groundless, it is important to realize that, like Idaho, Missouri (where McNeely was
arrested) has an "implied consent" law, a fact acknowledged by the Supreme Court, which added
that:
and each state's officers are required to read a form to the driver whose blood or breath
they wish to test. Ibid. ("Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer asked NcNeely whether
he would consent to a blood test. Reading from a standard implied consent, the officer
explained to McNeely that under state law refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would
lead to the immediate revocation of his driver's license for one year and could be used
against him in a future prosecution." Ibid.)

1. While working on this brief, the undersigned attorney received a call from a Deputy Prosecutor in a relatively
small outlying county. After discussing the case she is prosecuting and I am defending, an exchange of pleasantries
ensued. We discussed cases we were working on, and I mentioned the fact that I was, at that moment, drafting this
very brief. She infonned me that many of the officers she works with now carry thumb drives containing, inter alia,
form applications for search warrants in "dui" cases. This fact is offered as being illustrative of the accuracy and
reach of the McNeely Court's proposition that technological advances can and do aid law enforcement officers in
promptly securing search warrants in "dui" cases. The undersigned will, upon request of the Court, reveal the name
of this Prosecutor in chamber.
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The fact that the United States Supreme Court -the final arbiter of federal law- did not
allow Missouri's implied consent statute to defeat McNeely's claim that his rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution had been violated by the warrantless taking
of his blood (In both the case at bar and McNeely, the sample of the Defendant's' blood was
taken over their objection. See, Statement of Facts, supra P. 5, and McNeely Slip Opinion, P. 2.)
must be binding upon this Court, given that the majority opinion specifically expressed its
awareness of the existence and proper role of such enactments:
As an initial matter, States have a broad range oflegal tools to enforce their drunk-driving
laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood
draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require
motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC
testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.
(Citation omitted). Such laws impose significant consequences when a motorist
withdraws consent: typically the motorists's driver's license is immediately suspended or
revoked, and most States allow the motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be used as
evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Ibid, P. 18. 2
The United States Supreme Court is plainly the Court of last resort when it comes to the
interpretation of the United States Constitution, and that document's Supremacy Clause bars
Idaho Courts from disregarding the Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal law. Plainly
stated, in the instant context, the line of Idaho cases with holdings contrary to McNeely, supra can
no longer be interposed as a rationale for excusing the requirement of a warrant to draw blood
from a "dui" suspect, absent a clear showing of exigent circumstances. 3

2. The Idaho Implied Consent Statute, namely I.C. §18-8002 is quoted in full at Page 5. of the Memorandum
Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress, issued on June 13th, 2013 by the Honorable Benjamin
R. Simpson, a District Judge of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, which is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A". A plain reading of that law shows that our enactment contains precisely the type of penalty for a refusal to
submit to testing mentioned by the Supreme Court.

3. See the discussion of this topic in Pages 8-10 of Judge Simpson's attached Memorandum Opinion.
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V. The facts in the instant action are demonstrate that there were no "exigent
circumstances" sufficient to excuse the requirement that a warrant had to be obtained
before drawing Ms. Franklin's blood:
In the absence of a per se exigency in "dui" cases, the Court's plain duty is to consider all
of the salient facts to detennine whether or not there was an exigency sufficient to dispense with
a warrant for the taking of Ms. Franklin's blood against her will. A comparison of some of the
facts which obtain in the instant action and those in McNeely follows:
a.

Time between arrest and blood draw: McNeely was stopped at 2:08 a.m., and the sample
of his blood "was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m." Slip Opinion, P. 2., accounting for
a mere 27 minute interval. In sharp contrast, approximately 2 1/2 hours elapsed between
the time Deputy Tatillian was dispatched to the scene of the accident involving Ms.
Franklin, and when her blood was drawn over her objection.
This contrast demonstrates that, in the case at bar, officers had approximately 5.55
times as long an interval within which to secure a warrant. This factor plainly militates
against a finding of exigent circumstances.

b.

The officer's ability to seek a warrant: In McNeely, supra, it appears that only one officer
was involved. He stopped Mr. McNeely and, after McNeely failed field sobriety tests, it
was he who transported him to the hospital. Ibid., P. 2. In contrast, as the facts educed at
the Preliminary Hearing herein display, at least two officers were involved, one of whom
lived not in Boise County, but in Boise City, the location not only of the hospital to which
Ms. Franklin was taken, but also of an on-call Magistrate, who could have taken a phone
call from either Deputy or from Boise County Dispatch. This latter office was a 30 year
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veteran of the Boise City Police Department, and testified that he was aware of the
procedures for obtaining a warrant from the on-call Magistrate. The Preliminary Hearing
record is replete with evidence that Deputy Tatillian was in near constant contact with
Dispatch, and Chief Deputy Rogers testified that it was Dispatch which contacted him
and requested him to go to the hospital and draw blood from Ms. Franklin. Nothing
prevented Deputy Tatillian from, at any time, working through Dispatch to reach either
the resident Magistrate or the on-call Magistrate in Boise City to obtain a warrant.
Of significance, Deputy Tatillian was not involved at all in treating or transporting
Ms. Franklin. These tasks were accomplished by the members of the Garden Valley Fire
Department, the Crouch Ambulance, and (presumably) St. Alphonsus Life Flight. Thus,
though Ms. Franklin sustained serious injuries necessitating her being stabilized and
transported by air to SARMC, because others handled the mechanics of the transport,
Deputy Tatillian was not precluded from utilizing a small portion of his time to obtain a
warrant.
c.

Neither Deputy identified a single fact or factor suggesting that he faced an emergencv or
unusual delay in securing a warrant. Both simply elected to make no effort to obtain one.
As soon as Ms. Franklin was transported from the scene of the accident by
paramedical personnel, Deputy Tatillian's involvement with her, such as it was, ended.
While her medical condition appears to have required emergency care, it was not Deputy
Tatillian who provided it, even at the scene. Once the ambulance left with Ms. Franklin,
and without the Deputy, he could have immediately notified Dispatch on his patrol car
radio to institute the process for obtaining a warrant. He simply elected to forego so
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honoring the Constitution, and elected instead to devote his time to other, non-emergency
tasks, such as helping to clean up debris from the area of the accident, and traveling back
to Crouch to look for Jacob Snowball. Surely he could have contacted Dispatch while en
route to perform this latter task, if not before. His plain and simple rationale for not
seeking a warrant in the hours available to him to do so was reliance on the implied
consent law. TR, P. 54, 11. 2-6.
As for Deputy Rogers, it appears that he was at home, off-duty when Dispatch·
contacted him and requested him to go to SARMC to obtain a blood sample from Ms.
Franklin, a task he performed in an official vehicle. TR, P. 62, 11. 17-19. Nothing
whatsoever amounting to or even suggesting an exigency prevented Deputy Rogers from
obtaining a warrant to draw Ms. Franklin's blood. Further, the fact that Rogers was
initially contacted at home through Dispatch suggests that he could have been so reached
at any time during the 2 hour interval commencing when Deputy Tatillian learned that
Ms. Franklin was found at the scene of the accident.
Indeed, the factual pattern here is so egregious as to justify invoking Justice
Sotomayor' s informative illustration of a situation where a warrant is clearly required:
Consider, for example, a situation in which the warrant process will not
significantly increase the delay before the blood test is conducted because an
officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is being transported to
a medical facility by another officer. In such a circumstance, there would be no
plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.
McNeeley, supra, at P. 10 (emphasis added)
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CONCLUSION
Careful analysis of the totality of the facts in the instant case clearly demonstrates that
there was ample time for the officers to obtain a warrant. Accordingly, by definition, no
exigency. In the absence of both an actual exigency and a per se exigency applicable to any ·
"dui" case, the Fourth Amendment accordingly required that a search warrant be obtained in
order to draw Ms. Franklin's blood. The warrantless seizure of a sample of her blood violated her
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from
umeasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful
blood draw must be suppressed.
Dated: November 11 1h, 2013.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
MICAH ABRAHAM WULFF,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress is based upon the following factuaJ history;

f'

On October 23, 2012, at approximately 11 :24 p.m., Deputy Larsen of the

f

!
i

Kootenai County Sheriff's Department was stationary in the north parking lot of the
Sheriffs Department Public Safety Building, when his attention was dravm to the sound
of a vehicle accelerating at a rugh rate of speed. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep.
Larsen): Deputy Larsen noted in his report that he observed a dark colored vehicle pass

l

the north gate heading eastbound on Dalton Avenue. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test.

l

Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). Deputy Larsen estimated the speed of the vehicle at 50-60

t

miles per hour. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). Deputy

·,''

l

Larsen pulled out of the par.king lot, began to foHow the vehicle, and radioed other patrol
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units in the area that he was trying to catch up to the vehicle. (Mot to Suppress Hearing,
Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). During the pursuit, Deputy Larsen estimated that the
vehicle was traveling at 60 miles per hour in areas where the posted speed limit ranges
from 25 to 35 miles per hour. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Tesl Dep. Larsen; Incident

Report). As he approached Deerhaven Avenue, Deputy Larsen activated his overhead
lights; the vehicle came to a stop at this point. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep.
Larsen; Incident Report).
Deputy Larsen approached the driver's side door and spoke with the driver, whom
he identified by his Idaho Driver's License as Micah A. Wulff, Defendant. (Mot. to
Suppress Hearing, Test Dep. Larsen). Deputy Larsen reported that he asked Defendant
why he was driving so fast, to which Defendant replied "I don't know, 1 probably
shouldn't be driving." (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dcp. Larsen; Incident Report).
Deputy Larsen noted that he detected a strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from

i

f

the vehicle as Defendant spoke. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen). Deputy
Larsen also reported that, without prompting, Defendant told him that he had been
"drinking in town." (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dcp. Larsen; Incident Report).
Deputy Larsen infonned Defendant he was being detained and asked Defendant
to exit the vehicle. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report).
Deputy Larsen noted that Defendant was cooperative and complied. (Mot. to Suppress
Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). As Defendant neared Deputy Larsen,
Depufy Larsen observed that the odor of alcohol grew stronger and that Defendant was

j
1

unsteady on his feet. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report).

t

.
i.

l'

When Depu1y Larsen asked Defendant how much he had had to drink, Defendant,

i

[
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I

with some additional prompting, infonned Deputy Larsen that he had had some "vodka
drinks." (Mot to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dcp. Larsen; Incident Report). Deputy Larsen
reported that during his conversation with Defend ant, Defendant was having a difficult
time maintaining his balance and that his eyes were red and bloodshot. (Mot. to Suppress
Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report).
Deputy Larsen informed Defendant that he was going to have Defendant perform
some field sobriety evaluations; Defendant had some difficulties perfonning the field
sobriety evaluations. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report).
B~ed upon Defendant's performance of the field sobriety evaluations, the odor of
alcohol emitting from Defendant's person, Defenda.'1t's admission to consuming alcohol
that evening, and Defendant's high rate of speed while driving, Deputy Larsen reported

that he believed Defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence,
in violation ofl.C. § 18-8004. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident

Report). Deputy Larsen placed Defendant into custody and transferred him to the
Kootenai County Puhlic Safety Building ("PSB"). (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep.
Larsen; Incident Report). At the PSB, Deputy Larsen began the process to take a breath
sample from Defendant. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test Dep. Larsen; Incident Report).
When Deputy Larsen asked Defendant to sit in the chair near the breath sampling
instrument, Defendant stated "I'm not going anywhere near that" and pointed to the
breath sampling instrument. (.Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident

Report).
Deputy Larsen then informed Defendant that he would transfer Defendant to
Kootenai Medical Center ("KMC") for a blood draw. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test.
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Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). Defendant stated he understood and accompanied Deputy
Larsen to his vehicle. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; Incident Report). At
no point did Deputy Larsen obtain a warrant for the blood test.
At KMC, a nurse began to prepare Defendant's ann for the blood draw, however,
Defendant allegedly became uncooperative and placed his left arm in a "block" position,
telling the nurse "you're not touching me." (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen;
Incident Report). When two security officers arrived Defendant allowed the nurse to
perfonn the blood draw without further issue.
Defendant has brought this Motion to Suppress the blood draw on the basis that it
was an unreasonable search since it was done without first obtaining a search warrant.
DISCUSSION

I. Whether e,ridence obtained as a result of drawing and testing Defendant's
blood must be suppressed because the blood draw was conducted without a
search warrant'!
Administration of blood alcohol testing constitutes a seizure of the person, and a
search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905,
243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App. 2010), citing Schumber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767,
86S.Ct. 1826, I833-34, 16L.Ed.2d908,917-l8(1966);Statev. Diaz, 144Idaho300,

302,160 PJd 739, 741 (2007) (other citation omitted). Searches and seizures performed
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Id (citation omitted).
To overcome this presumption, the State bears the burden of establishing two
prerequisites. First, the State must prove that a warrantless search fell within a weUrecognized exception to the warrant requirement Second, the State must show that
even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant requirement, it
must still be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding circumstances.

Id (internal citations omitted).
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Idaho's Implied Consent Statute, I.C. § 18-8002 provides that:

(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol ... , and to have given his consent to evidentiary testing
for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances, provided that such
testing is administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds
to believe that person has been dri.vi...,g or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section
18-8006, Idaho Code.

(3) At the time cvidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the presence
of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall be
informed that ifhe refuses to submit to or if he fails to complete, evidcntiary
testing:

I.'
l
l'

(a) He is subject to a civi.l penalty of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for
refusing to take the test;

i

i

f

(b) He has the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days to show
cause why he refused to submit to, or complete evidentiary testing;

J

i

[

f

fI

( c) If he does not request a hearing or does not prevail at the hearing, the
court shall sustain the civil penalty and his driver's license will he
suspended absolutely for one (1) year if this is his first refusal and two (2)
years if this is his second refusal within ten (10) years;

f

t
f

f

( d) Provided however, if he is admitted to a problem solving court
program and has served at least forty~five (45) days of an absolute
suspension of driving privileges, then he may be eligible for a restricted
perm.it for the purpose of getting to and from work, school or an alcohol
treaunentprogram;and

I

!

i-

''

f

l
j

(e) After submitting to evidentiary testing he may, when practicable, at his
own expense, have additional tests made by a person of his O'Wn choosing.

!

(emphasis added).
Under Idaho's implied consent statute, anyone who drives or is in actual physical
control of a vehicle is deemed to have impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for

·,

f

i

iI

alcohol when an officer .who has reasonable grounds to believe an individual is driving

f

I
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under the influence requests this testing. LeClercq, 149 Idaho at_, 243 P.3d at 109596, quoting Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741 (other citation omitted); I.C. § 18-

8002(1). Such implied consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 1095,
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)
(other citation omitted). This implied consent to evidentiary testing includes testing of a
suspect's blood or urine under LC. § 18-8002, in addition to breathalyzer testing-the test
requested is of the officer's choosing. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741, citing

Halen v. State, 136 ldaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257,261 (2002).
According to Idaho case law, the right of an officer to order a blood draw is not
limited by LC. § l 8-8002(6)(b). Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. Under LC. § 18-

l

I

}.

8002(6)(b), an order for a blood draw must be supported by probable cause that one of

the enumerated crimes, such as aggravated DUI or vehlcular manslaughter, have
occurred. J.C. § l8-8002(6)(b). However, in lfalen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833-34, 41
P.3d 257, 261-62 (2002), the Supreme Court ofldaho ''held that Idaho Code§ 18-8002(6)(b) limits only when an officer can order medical personnel to administer a blood
withdrawal but does not otherwise limit when ru1 officer 'may request that a defendant

i

i

peacefully submit to a blood withdrawal."' Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742
(quoting Halen, 136 Idaho at 834, 41 P.3d at 262 (emphasis supplied)).
Despite the fact that "[n]othing in Idaho Code§ 18-8002 limits the officer's
authority to require a defendant to submit to-a blood draw[,]" the recent United States
Supreme Court Case Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._ (2013), places new limits on the
ability of law enforcement to conduct a blood test without a warrant. Diaz, 144 Idaho at
303, 160 P.3d at 742. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "fi]n those drunk-
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driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a
blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search,
the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." 569 U.S._.

The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that there may be some circumstances that
would "make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from U1e
blood stream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood
test[,]" but the Court rejected the risk of dissipation of alcohol as a per se exception to the
warrant requirement. Id Instead, the Court emphasized that "[ wjheilier a warrantless
blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case
based on the totality of the circumstances." Id ( emphasis added).

It.is not disputed that Deputy Larsen had probable cause to believe that Defendant
was driving under the influence. Probable cause is infonnation that "would lead a man of
ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that

r

such person is guilty." State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 776 P.2d 458, 461 (1989). In
passing on the question of probable cause, the expertise and experience of the officer may
be taken into account. State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323, 824 P.2d 894, 898
(Ct.App.1991).

Deputy Larsen allegedly observed Defendant operating a vehicle at a speed 25 to
35 miles per hour over the posted speed limit, that the odor of alcohol was emanating
from Defendant's person, that Defendant performed poorly on field sobriety evaluations.,
and that Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol prior to driving that night. (Mot. to
Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen; State's Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress;
Incident Report). Based upon these observations, it was reasonable for Deputy Larsen to
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believe that Defendant had committed the offense of Driving Under the Influence.
Deputy Larsen transported Defendant to the Public Safety Building where
Defendant subsequently refused to submit to the breathalyzcr test. (State's Br. in Opp 'n

to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress). After Defendant refused the breath test, Deputy Larsen
transferred him to KMC for a blood draw; Deputy Larsen did not obtain a warrant prior
to the blood draw. (State's Br. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress). When it appeared
the Defendant may attempt to block the nurse and physically refuse the blood draw, two

additional security personnel entered the room. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep.
Larsen). Ultimately, no force was used against Defendant and Defendant complied with
the blood draw. However, there is no evidence or allegation that Defendant gave his
consent to the blood draw, only that with the implied threat of force he succumbed to the
test. Id.

a. Whether Idaho's Implied Consent Statute Voids the Requirement that
Police Must Obtain a Warrant Prior to Conducting an :Evidcntiary Blood
Draw Where There are No Exigent Circumstances

The State argues that the warrantless blood draw was proper under Idaho's
Implied Consent Statute, I.C. § 18-8002. The State argues that, pursuant to the Idaho
1

Statute, Defendant impliedly consented to evidentiary testing of his blood. (State's Br. in
Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress). The State further argues that once tmplied consent
has been given by an individual who has "taken advantage of the privilege of driving on
Idaho roads" that individual cannot withdraw the implied consent. Id.
The State alleges that in the case at bar, "at the time [Defendant] was taken to the

1

It should be observ~d, however, the statute itself provides negative ramifications for a refusal to submit to
evidentiarf testing; specifically an individual accepts the risk that his driver's license will be suspended. lf
all drivers impliedly consented, it seems that a refusal could never truly occur as any evidentiary testing
could be forced.
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hospital for the blood draw, the Defendant for all intents and purposes had consented to
the blood draw." Id. The State fi..rrther argues that the U.S. Supreme Court did not "delve
or decide the constitutionality of'' implied consent statutes in its McNeely decision. Id

The State notes that any discussion by the U.S. Supreme Court in McNeely was dicta and
"does not change the status of implied consent law in Idaho." Id
The State's logic, however, is contradictory to a reasonable interpretation of the
implied consent statute, J.C.§ 18-8002, and to the recent U.S. Supreme Court McNeely
decision. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically stated that "[w]hether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case
!i

by case based on the totality of the circumstances." .McNeely, 569 U.S._ (emphasis

I

added). Adopting the State's view, implied consent statutes would, in essence, act as a

!

per se exception to the warrant requirement. In turn, implied consent statutes would have
the effect of making the McNeely decision oflittle or no consequence.

r

!

The State points out that McNeely did not explicitly address implied consent
statutes. While this is correct, it would be antithetical to interpret the McNeely opinion as

I
i

pennitting warrantless blood draws simply because a state has Jegislation that allows such
action. Under the State's logic, states could circumvent the McNeely decision by simply

relying on implied consent statutes. In other words, the State's position is that states can

Fourth Amendment mandates that an officer obtain a warrant prior to conducting a blood
draw by simply arguing implied consent. Therefore, despite the fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court did not directly discuss implied consent statutes, interpreting the McNeely
opinion as pennitting forced blood draws simply because a state has legislation that

55

~

I
t
t

bypass the U.S. Supreme Court's announcement that, absent exigent circumstances, the
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allows such action would render the McNeely decision a dead Jetter.

b. Whether There Were Exigent Circumstances Which Justified the
Warrantless Blood Draw?

In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court cited several factors that may Jead to
circumstances where a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect may be
appropriate. Id. Factors that may contribute to exigent circumstances may include: (1)
time must be spent investigating the scene of the accident and transporting an injured
t

suspect to the hospital to receive treatment; (2) the availability of a magistrate and

!
'
i
;

procedures in place for obtaining a warrant; (3) "metabolization of alcohol in the

l

I

t·

bloodstream and the ensuing loss of evidence[;]" and (4) other "practical problems of

f

I

obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain

I

{

reliable evidence[.]" Id.

'
i
[
)

..

r

The State's alternative argument is that there were exigent circwnstanccs

i-

i

sufficient to justify the warrantless withdrawal of Defendant's blood. Specific exigent

l

!

circumstances the State alleges were present in this case include: (1) that retrograde ·

t

'

!

I

extrapolation is not available in the state of Idaho, and therefore "the legal environment
in Idaho should be seen as one of the 'special facts' supporting a finding of exigency"

2

!
!

ti
l

(

(State's Br. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress); (2) that obtaining a warrant requires
time,

i

r

"faJt best, the process currently takes several hours[,]" and therefore even assuming

2
The State cites no authority for this broad a~sertion that "in Jdaho retrograde extrapolation is not
permitted" and this statement is only in part correct. The State is correct that where an individual's
evidentlary testing results reveal that the individual's BAC is below the legal limit the State cannot use
retrograde extrapolation to prosecute him. LC. 1S-8004(2); State v. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701, 979 P.2d I 03
( 1998). However, that limited exception does not equivalate to a rule that retrograde extrapolation is never
allowed in Idaho. Jn fact, several Idaho cases have insinuated that retrograde extrapolation may be
allowable. Slate v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436 (2004); State v. Stutlijf, 97 Idaho 523, 547 P2d
1128 (1976). (applying a repealed statute, lhe court stated "Th.is section entitles either party to produce a
witness capable of extrapolating the results to a prior period of time. The burden, however, is on the party
who seeks to introduce this evidence."); State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 718 P.2d 589 (Ct.App. 1986).
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Deputy Larsen had taken steps to obtain a warrant it would have taken several hours to
acquire3 (State's Br. in Opp'n to Det: 's Mot to Suppress); and (3) that the State is "in the
untenable position of having an ethical obligation to preserve evidence that could be
exculpatory while that evidence is in the body of an adversarial party." (State's Br. in
Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress).
Similar to the State's primary argument, its alternative exigent circumstances
argument suggests that in Idaho, or at least in Kootenai County, there should be a per se
exception to the warrant requirement. Like the State's primary argument, these assertions

go against the tenor of the McNeely opinion. As noted above, in McNeely, the U.S.
Supreme Court specifically stated that "[wJhether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-

driving suspect is reasonable must be detennincd case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances." McNeely, 569 U.S.-·--· (emphasis added).

;

t-

In the case at bar, the State has not alleged any unique facts, which under the
f
i

totality of the circumstances, would result in an exigency justifying a warrantless blood

}-

draw. The State argues that "it took Deputy Larsen some time to catch up to and stop the
vehicle driven by the Defendantf.l"(State's Br. in Opp'n to Def 's Mot. to Suppress).
However, Deputy Larsen did not testify as to the specific amount of time it took for him
to catch Defendant, and there is no evidence that a significant amount of time elapsed

between Deputy Larsen's initial sighting of the vehicle and the execution of the traffic
stop. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen).

l

'lbe State also argues that Deputy Larsen bad to transfer Defendant to the jail

t1'

'

i
3

The State later mentions in its Brief, however, that due to Defendant's excessive BAC (.217) "he would
have still been over the legal limit 6 hours after the initial call was made." (State's Br. in Opp'n to Def. 's
Mot to Suppress). This statement by the State discredits the alleged exigent circumstance that would result
from waiting for a warrant.
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t

l
l
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t

l

l

first,

following Defendant's refusal to the breath test., Deputy Larsen had to transport

Defendant to the hospital. (State's Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress). Deputy
Larsen estimated that approximately one hour and twenty five minutes elapsed from the
arrest to the time of the blood draw. (Mot. to Suppress Hearing, Test. Dep. Larsen).
However, other than the dissipation of Defendant's blood alcohol content, the State has

made no argument of exigency unique to this case which would justify the warrantless
blood draw, and, more importantly, no attempt to secure a warrant was ever made.

2. Whether Exclusion is the Proper Remedy?
Finally, the State asserts "that the defendant is not deserving of a remedy."
(State's Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress). The State cites to Defendant's BAC of

.217 and also the officer's "good faith" and reliance on I 8-8002, State v. Wheeler, 149
Idaho 364,233 P.3d 1286 (Ct.App. 2010), and State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d

1

r
L

739 (2007). (State's Br. in Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Suppress). The State asks the Court to
consider a parallel between this case and the reasoning of the inevitable discovery
doctrine, and to determine that the exclusionary rule is not the proper remedy in this case.

Id The State asserts that if the officer had known a warrant was required, he would have
obtained one, and therefore there was not misconduct on his part.
Both the Idaho Courts and Federal Comis have noted that "[tJhe primary
justification for the exclusionary rule ... is the deterrence of police conduct t.hat violates
Fourth Amendment rights." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d

I

l

j

1067 (1976); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511,514,272 P.3d 483, 486 (2012). In United

States v. leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the U.S. Supreme

r
!

I

Court adopted the Leon "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth
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Amendment; essentially the Leon Rule is that exclusion is not the appropriate remedy
where police have acted in good faith when conducting their search. Koivu, 152 Idaho at
514, 272 P.3d at 486; Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. The leon
Ru.le "has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in
reasonable re[iance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, tike
judges, are not the focus of the rule[.]" Id at 515, 272 P.3d at 487. The Idaho Supreme
Court, however, has rejected the Leon rule, most recently in the 20 I2 Koivu case. There
the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy for searches and seizures that
violate the Constitution.... [C]ourts have disagreed over the years as to whether
there should be any remedy for such constitutional violations and, if so, whether it
should focus upon redressing the wrong committed against the victim of the
unconstitutional search or seizure or only upon deterring future violations of such
constitutional rights by law enforcemen1 officials.

This Court's rejection of the Leon good-faith exception in [State v.] Guzman[, 122
Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992).) was supported by an independent exclusionary
rule announced eighty-five years ago in [State v. JArregui[, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P.
788 (! 927). In Arregui, there was no claim oflaw enforcement misconduct. ...
When Gmman was decided. "Idaho had clearly developed an exclusionary rule as
a constitutionally mandated remedy for il1egal searches and seizures in addition to
other purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the exclusionary rule as a
deterrent for police misconduct." Donato, 135 Idaho at 472, 20 P.3d at 8. In some
instances, we have construed Article I, section 17, to provide greater protection
than is provided by the United States Supreme Court's construction of the Fourth
Amendment. "[W]e provided greater protection to Idaho citizens based on the
uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence."
Id To overrule Guzman and hold that the exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to
deter police misconduct, we would also have to overrule Arregui, which adopted
the exclusionary rule in Idaho in a case in which there was no police misconduct.
Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519, 272 P.3d 483,491 (2012).
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Therefore, under the current Idaho law there is no recognized good faith
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exception, and thus exclusion is the appropriate remedy.
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ORDER:
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HERBY ORDERED, that:
1.

The warrantless blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances,
and therefore violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely; Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.

2.

Because Idaho has declined to follow the Leon Good Faith Exception,
evidence of the warrantless blood draw is excluded.

DATED: This /.Bday of June, 2013
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DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO
F1ecorded in

IAN W. GEE, ISB # 4813
JAY F. ROSENTHAL, ISB # 2722
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney/
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 186
Idaho City, Idaho 83631
Tel: (208) 392-4485
Fax: (208) 392-3760

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
V.

TRICIA M. FRANKLIN,
Defendant.

) CASE NO. CR 2013-00458
)
)
) STATES OBJECTION TO
) DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
) SUPPRESS
)
)
)

The defense moves to suppress the blood drawn in this case citing Missouri v. McNeely.
569 U.S._; 133 S. Ct. 1552(2013). The States objects.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The testimony adduced at the Preliminary Hearing as well as that anticipated during the
suppression hearing will show that Deputy Tatilian came in contact with the Defendant and a
male friend at the Wander Inn in Crouch, Idaho at approximately 8:32 p.m. Deputy Tatilian had
received information through his dispatch center that employees of the Longhorn Saloon in
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Crouch had reported an intoxicated driver of a red Ford pickup truck. The Deputy observed the
vehicle at the Wander Inn, and though

did not see either the Defendant or her companion

driving, made contact with them outside of their room and determined that they were very
intoxicated. The Deputy warned them not to drive the vehicle since they were in his opinion,
extremely intoxicated. Deputy Tatilian was in Ada County at approximately 10:12 p.m. when he
was dispatched to an accident at milepost 5.7 on Banks Lowman Road in Boise County. The
Deputy testified that it took him approximately 45 minutes to reach the scene of the accident, a
distance estimated at 40 miles. The Deputy testified that he recognized the vehicle described in
his dispatch call as "probably" being the one he had the complaint about approximately one and
a half hours prior. At that time the Deputy will testify, that he had no idea who the driver of the
vehicle was, or what the circumstances of the accident were. The Deputy arrived at the scene of
the crash at 10:47 p.m. When he arrived the Deputy spoke to Garden Valley Fire Chief Delvalle
who advised him that the driver and only occupant of the vehicle was Defendant Franklin, that
she appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and that she had been transported to the
landing pad for pick up by the Life Flight Medical Helicopter for transport to St. Alphonsus
Hospital. The Deputy will testify that he began his accident investigation immediately, dealing
with on scene witnesses, measuring the accident area, inventorying the vehicle prior to its being
towed and searching for any other individual who might have been in the wrecked vehicle. The
Deputy also assisted in traffic control as the west bound lane of the highway was closed because
of the fuel spill from the wreckage.

Deputy Tatilian notified dispatch that he needed a

phlebotomist to go to St. Alphonsus Hospital for a blood draw at 11: 17 p.m. At 11 :53 p.m.
Deputy Tatilian was at the Wander Inn in Crouch to advise the Defendant's companion that she
had wrecked the pickup and was enroute to St. Alphonsus Hospital, and further, to confirm that
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he had not been the driver of the wrecked vehicle.
The evidence adduced at the Motion Hearing will clearly show that a trained phlebotomist
Defendant's blood properly; and thereafter turned the blood sample kit over to Deputy
Dale Rogers who placed it into evidence.
The testimony of Deputy Tatilian will show that until he reached the scene he had no
effective way to communicate with his department since he was driving at speeds of 80 to 100
miles per hour. Further, until he had contact with Fire Chief Delvalle, he was not sure who was
driving the wrecked vehicle, and in fact was not positive of the identity of the driver until he
contacted the Defendant's companion, asleep at 12:00 a.m. in room 14 of the Wander Inn in
Crouch, some four miles from the crash scene. Deputy Tatilian will testify there is no cell phone
coverage in the area of the crash at milepost 5. 7 on Banks Lowman Road.

It is not disputed that the Defendant objected to her blood being drawn. She was obviously
intoxicated, profane and combative with all she came in contact with at St. Alphonsus Hospital,
stating that she had four prior DUI' s and hated all men.
Deputies Tatilian and Rogers will testify that on February 6, 2013 the Boise County
Sheriffs Department relied upon the direction of the Idaho Supreme Court in State vs. Diaz, 144
Id 300, 160 P3d 739 (2007) in drawing blood of licensed drivers thought to be under the
influence of alcohol. In this case, there is no question that the Defendant was a licensed Idaho
driver. Further, the Deputies will testify that they had no procedure established to interface with
Magistrates for blood draws on DUI cases.
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE BLOOD ORAW
Legal Standard
Drawing blood from a driver in a driving under the influence case is a seizure. It is well
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settled that to do so, the State must either have a warrant, or the facts surrounding a blood draw
must fall within an exception to the warrant requirement.
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and a
search for evidence within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d
908, 917 (1966); State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472, 65P.3d 211, 213
(Ct.App.2002). Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d at 919; State v.
Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 488, 680 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Ct.App.1984). To overcome the
presumption, the state bears the burden of establishing two prerequisites. First, the state
must prove that a warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P3d 739, 741 (2007). Second, the state
must show that even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant
requirement, it must still be reasonable in light of all other surrounding circumstances. Id.
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711-12, 184 P.3d 215, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2008).
There are a number of possible exceptions to the warrant requirements.

"Such an

exception exists when the search or seizure is conducted with proper consent. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 142 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973): State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho

261, 264, 858P.2d 800, 803 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 558, 560, 716 P.2d
1328, 1330, 1332 (Ct.App.1986)." State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410, 973 P2d 758, 762
(Ct.App. 1999).

Exigent circumstances are another well settled exception to the warrant

requirement. State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496,499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct.App.2007).
The state submits that each of these exceptions applies in these circumstances.
CONSENT

Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Wheeler, 149
Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct.App.2010) citing Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at
742. In Idaho, by driving on the public roadways, drivers demonstrate that they have consented
to evidentiary testing pursuant to LC. 18-8002.
By terms of this statue, anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor
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vehicle upon Idaho's highway has thereby consented in advance to admit to a BAC test.
McNeely v. State, 119 Idaho 182, 187, 804 P2d 911, 916 (Ct.App.1990). By implying
consent, the statute removes the right of a driver to refuse an evidentiary test. Goering v.
State. 121 Idaho 26, 29. 822 P2dd 545, 548 (Ct.App.1992). Hence, although an individual
has the physical ability to prevent a test, there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily
implied consent. Woolery, 116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214; State v. Burris. 125 Idaho
289,291, 869 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Ct.App.1994).
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,410, 973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct.App.199)
In Diaz, The Idaho Supreme Court found that the blood draw at issue in the case "fell
within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement," because Diaz had given his
implied consent to the testing. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). The
Court also performed the second step in the analysis by reviewing whether the search was
"reasonable" in light of the circumstances. The Court examined whether the blood draw was
done in a medically acceptable manner. The Court discussed the administration of the test at a
hospital by a qualified hospital technician, among other facts, and concluded that under the
totality of the circumstances, the test was reasonable. Id. See also State v. Worthington, 138
Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 211 (Ct.App.2002). In the case at bar, Ms. Franklin's blood was drawn by a
trained phlebotomist in a medically acceptable manner.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Wheeler found, that:
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 Idaho
at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. "Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle" in Idaho consents to be tested for alcohol at the request of a peace officer with
reasonable grounds to believe the person drove under the influence. LC. § 18-8002(1);
Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. In Diaz, Court found that the defendant gave his
consent to a blood draw by driving in Idaho, despite his repeated protests. Id. At 302-03,
160 P.3d at 741-42. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Diaz, we concluded that a
protest to a blood draw does not invalidate consent created by a person's actions and statue.
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 370, 233 P.3d 1286, 1292 (Ct.App.2010). Thus, any purported
protests to the blood draw in the current case do not invalidate the consent. Such an analysis
contemplates that the driver had already taken advantage of the privilege of driving on the public
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roadways prior to being stopped. Having gotten the benefit of the bargain of implied consent,
the driver may not void consent already given.
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Supreme Court identified the sole issue they examined as,
"whether the natural metabolization [sic] of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se
exigency that

justifies an exception the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for

nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases."

Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.

_ , _ ; 133 S. Ct. 1552,1556 (2013). Neither the statement of the issue under analysis in
McNeely, nor the Court's holding implicated the consent exception to the warrant requirement.
There may be some argument that because the Supreme Court identified certain states as
having implied consent laws with certain restrictions, the Court thereby endorsed those
restrictions. However, the existence of implied consent laws at the state level was used by the
Supreme Court to document certain findings:
wide-spread state restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing provide further support
for our recognition that compelled blood draws implicate a significant privacy interest.
They also strongly suggest that our ruling today will not "severely hamper effective law
enforcement." Garner, 471 U.S., at 19, 105 S.Ct. 1694.
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,__; 133 S.Ct.1552, 1567 (2013). Identifying these statues
for such a limited purpose does not amount to a binding opinion of the Court on the restrictions
listed in those various statutes. Missouri does have an implied consent statute, however the
Supreme Court did not examine that statue as a possible exception to the warrant requirement in
this case. Further, Missouri's implied consent law has not historically provided for forced tests.
Due to a recent statutory change, the question of whether it does now is a matter yet to be
decided in the Missouri courts. (See Missouri v. McNeely, 2011 WL 2455571 (Missouri Court
of Appeals, 2011).) The United States Supreme Court opinion in McNeely did not comment on
the validity of the Idaho implied consent law or one like it. Thus, the dicta in McNeely does not
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change the status of the implied consent law in Idaho.
The blood draw in the instant case is admissible under this analysis. It was taken from a
driver who was driving on the public roadways and who had therefore given consent. The blood
draw was taken in a medically acceptable manner and was reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances.
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the presence of exigent
circumstances.
"[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person
unless 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
unless the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at ----, 126 S.Ct. 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d at 657 (quoting Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d. 290, 301 (1978)). A
warrantless search under this exception must be strictly circumscribed by the nature of the
exigency that justifies the intrusion. State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807,
810 (Ct.App.2002).
State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct.App.2007). Exigent
circumstances may justify warrantless search of the body through a blood draw. See, Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835-36, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

It is important to note that in McNeely, the Supreme Court did not rule that blood draws
are constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court merely concluded that the elimination of
alcohol does not alone create a per se rule of exigency in Driving Under the Influence cases. The
Court maintained that to evaluate whether a blood draw was permissible pursuant to the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, a trial court must analyze the totality of the
circumstances. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_; 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). Such analysis

will reflect that the collection of blood in this case was done in exigent circumstances sufficient
to serve as an exception to the warrant requirement.
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The Supreme Court opinion in McNeely, is premised on the idea that blood alcohol is not a
"now or never" proposition, because the rate of alcohol elimination can be determined to within
a reasonable range. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_; 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013). The
Supreme Court assumes that retrograde extrapolation is available to the State. 1 The Majority
opinion presumes that so long as some alcohol is in the defendant's system when the test in
administered, there is a formulaic method through which the actual blood alcohol concentration
at the time the defendant was driving can be determined. It is largely based on this premise that
the Supreme Court concludes that "special facts" in addition to inevitable elimination of alcohol
must be necessary to create an exigency. See, Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_; 133 S.
Ct. 1552, 1557 (2013).
However, in the State of Idaho, retrograde extrapolation is not permitted. In the event that

an evidentiary test for blood alcohol reveals a result that is under .08, even if it is substantially
after the defendant last drove, that person cannot generally be prosecuted.2 Idaho Code Section
18-8004(2) provides that ,"[a]ny person having an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, as
defined in subsection (4) of this section, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, by a
test requested by a police officer shall not be prosecuted for driving under the influence of
alcohol except as provided in subsection (3)[drug, dui], subsection (l)(b) [commercial vehicle
dui] or subsection (l)(d) [underage dui] of this section" Thus the laws of the State of Idaho
create a need for a much quicker process that the circumstances contemplated by the Supreme
Court. That is to say, that the elimination of alcohol at even the rate of .015 to .02, even if

1

This ignores the fact that intoxicants other than alcohol may be at issue as well.
There is an exception of cases where the defendant fails to provide a valid sample on a breath tests. "A shallow
breath sample testing at below .08 does not inherently show that the individual's true breath alcohol concentration is
less than .08. Consequently, it does not ipso facto bar prosecution by the terms of Section 18-8004(2)."
2

State v. Turbyfill, 38579, 2012 WL 4465773 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012), review denied (Nov. 29, 2012)
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accurate, as suggested by the Supreme Court, is enough that the State's evidence can be lost in
short order. See, Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._,_; 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1575 (2013). Thus,
the legal environment in Idaho should be seen as one of the "special facts" supporting a finding
of exigency.
There are certain factual elements of this stop that contribute to the totality of the
circumstances analysis as well. The stop occurred in Boise County at mile post 5.7 of Banks
Lowman Road. Deputy Tatilian will testify that he faced the unique situation of having no cell
phone coverage from the location of the stop making it more difficult to have direct contact with
a prosecutor or a judge for purposes of a warrant request. Deputy Tatilian was required to
conduct an accident investigation and interview other witnesses, deal with a partial road closure
as well as confirm that Ms. Franklin's companion was safe as well as confirming that he had not
been driving. While Ms. Franklin was being transported to a Boise hospital, Deputy Tatilian was
completing the accident investigation. Deputy Tatilian will testify that he believes it would have
taken several hours to get a search warrant in either Boise or Ada County. This situation was
further complicated by the fact that the accident was in Boise County, and the phlebotomist was
located in Ada County. Accordingly, a search warrant would most likely have required issuance
by an Ada County Magistrate Judge. Both Tatilian and Rogers will testify that on February 6,
2013 there were no procedures to accomplish that. Further, Deputy Tatilian will testify that he
was more than one hour away from Ada County when he completed his investigation in Crouch
after contacting the defendant's companion.
The U.S. Supreme Court believes that, "in addition to technology-based developments,
jurisdictions have found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such as by using standardform warrant applications for drunk driving investigations. :Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.
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_ , _ ; 133 S. Ct. 1552,1562 (2013). The Supreme Court notes that such forms were available
in the relevant jurisdiction when McNeely was arrested. Id. FN 5. However, such forms were
not available in Boise County on the date of Ms. Franklin's arrest, nor to his knowledge available
in Ada County. Thus, we have to assume that had Deputy Tatilian chosen to seek a warrant in
the current case after normal court/business hours (i.e. approximately 12:00 midnight), it would
have taken at least an additional several hours to complete. This estimate is based upon the
following logistical requirements: the officer would have to find a location for reliable cell phone
coverage within proximity to the accident scene (a difficult and sometimes impossible task in
Boise County), a prosecutor would have to be located, the officer and prosecutor would need to
review the facts telephonically, the prosecutor would then need to call either the Boise County
Magistrate or the on call Ada County Prosecutor to be able to make contact with the on call Ada
County Judge, the judge would need to call the prosecutor and officer back for phone
conferencing purposes, the call would need to be conducted and the warrant approved and
issued; the officer would then need to obtain the warrant and deliver it, in this case, to the
hospital. Again with estimated time lapse and travel distances involved, this process would likely
take at least three hours, and likely more.
The State is also in the untenable position of having an ethical obligation to preserve
evidence that could be exculpatory while that evidence is in the body of an adversarial party.
The State should avail itself of every opportunity to take a sample of the evidence for the benefit
of accurate testing, regardless of which party the outcome benefits.
Taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, the needs of law enforcement
were sufficiently compelling and the "exigencies of the situation" great enough that the
warrantless search of Ms. Franklin was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
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REMEDY

Even if the Court finds that there is not an applicable exception to the warrant requirement,
the State submits that the defendant is not deserving of a remedy. The defendant was a .236 blood
alcohol content at the time her blood was drawn. At the time of she was actually operating her
vehicle her blood alcohol level was significantly higher thereby placing the general public at
significant risk. The officer acted in a good faith and in reliance on Idaho Codel8-8002, Diaz and
\Vheeler when he made the decision to have the defendant's blood drawn. The public interest
supports admission of the results, especially with a defendant who openly stated to hospital
personnel that she had four prior DUI' s.
CONCLUSION

The State submits that the Court's inquiry need go no further than the implied consent
statute in order to establish the legality of the blood draw. Ms. Franklin had, by driving on the
public roadways, consented to evidentiary testing. That testing was completed in a medically
sound manner and the results of the blood draw should be deemed as admissible. The blood
draws results would also be admissible due to the exigent circumstances surrounding this
investigation. The factual and legal environment of this case created an exigency for the officer.
Because retrograde extrapolation is not available to the State, the evidence that Ms. Franklin was
above the legal limit of alcohol was being eliminated as time passed. To get a warrant would
require significant time. That period would permit significant blood alcohol to be eliminated and
the State could potentially be barred from prosecution if the driver fell below a .08 before the
administration of the test. Given the totality of the circumstances, the situation fell within the
exigency exception to the warrant requirement as well.
In the event that the Court finds that neither of these exceptions to the warra_nt requirement

STATES OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 11

are satisfied, the State submits that the blood draw results should still be seen as admissible. To
rule otherwise is to invite a manifest injustice. This event and countless others like it involved a
driver putting the public at great risk and the officer responding with the explicit authorization of
the Courts and the legislature. Not only did the officer act in good faith, the public policy and
community protection interests at issue lean heavily in favor of admitting the evidence. The
exclusionary rule does not require exclusion in these circumstances, where the officer was acting
under the well settled law of the State at the time he had the defendant's blood drawn.
The motion to suppress evidence sh~d be denied.
Respectfully Submitted on the

fl!.- i ay of December, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accmat% of the above and foregoing document was
served upon counsel for the Defendant on the

day of December, 2013, at:

Philip Gordon
Attorney at Law
623 West Hays St.
Boise, ID 83702
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jtoday . Any word from your client?

!she called me and asked if l wanted a ride up with her and
2:03:37 PM !Phillip Gordon
!
:her
dad
........................................... ·..........................................................................•......·...............................................................................................................................................................................................
2:03:53 PM 'Honorable Patrick Owen jok. lets continue hrg now
2:04 :00 PM fJay Rosenthal

)call Rob Tatillian

...2:04:2.0 .. PMJ clerk.............................................................. J swears.. in .. state's.. witness ..#1., .. officer.. Rob.Tati llian ............................ 1
1
2:05 :26 PM ]Jay Rosenthal
\Direct examination
.

. .;rof:·i's . rfvf'H::fr,·ri·or.ahie. .Pafri'ck. ci'wen\v\'sh. 'fo. .n.ote. thai"'fvfs·... Fr·a·nkii'n. hiis. .iii'rrivecL. . .. . ... . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ,
:

:

~

2:07 :34 PM :Jay Rosenthal
!continues Direct examination
JDon't know what wit is referring to
2:12:23 PM JPhillip Gordon
2: 12:36 PM !Honorable Patrick Owen !what looking at?
2:12:39 PM iwit #1
2: 12:46 PM jJay Rosenthal
2:14:51 PM !Phillip Gordon

inotes
!clarifies with wit for defense's edification . continues Direct
/examination
Jobjection-hearsay. move to strike

...2 :1.4:57 .. PM .. jJay ..Rosenthal ................................ Jnot..for ..truth .. of.it .................................................................................................... .....................................
2: 15:03 PM Honorable Patrick Owen jThe Court overrules the objection

i

. .. . . .. .... ... . . ..... . .... ............. .. . . ~ ... . ........ .... .. . ... .. .. .. . . .... . . ..... . .... ... ..... ...... . .. ......... .. .. .... . 1,,, ........... ........ . ...... . . . ..... .......... ........ . ..... ...... .. .... .. ........ .. ........... ... .. .. ...... .. . . ..... .. .. . .. . ... .. . ... .... .... ....... .... ..... ........... . . . . .. . .. . . ......... .

2: 15:25 PM :wit #1
2: 16:30 PM 1Jay Rosenthal
2: 19: 19 PM 1Phillip Gordon
'

:finishes answering question
icontinues Direct examination
jCross examination. Planned to call this wit as one of my
!own. May I question him now or do I have to wait until
jlater? [Judge approves questioning] Direct examination

2:47:46 PM jJay Rosenthal
jRe-direct examination
2:50:00 PM !Nothing further and the !
!witness steps down and :
'
lis dismissed

_____________________
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2:50: 13 PM )ay Rosenthal
2:50:36 PM fc1erk

I:rso

54 rM· b·ayRosenthai

resii6B-COURTROOM

!call Dale Rogers
[Swears in State's witness #2, Chief Dpty Dale Rogers

- --- -/orrecrexamrnatron· - - - -- - - -- -- - -- -

2:51 :40 PM jPhillip Gordon
2:51 :43 PM /wit #2
2:51 :54 PM ,,!Jay Rosenthal
2:52:30 PM !Phillip Gordon
2:52:41 PM Iros
2:52:47 PM fwit #2 ·

Jneed to speak up
jresponse
)continues Direct examination. phlebotomist was Marge
1Shot?
!Marge Shot was former owner of Cincinnati Reds
/excuse me. was phlebotomist JanetShrop?
Jresponse

~~~:: :~ 1~~11:

1:::i~~~:s~i:::~~::i~:~~r:ct examine at same time?

~~~!:~

0

2:56:55 PM jHonorable Patrick Owen jgo ahead

3:21: 11 PM jJay Rosenthal
3:21 :15 PM jPhillip Gordon
3:21 :29 PM !Nothing further and the
/witness steps down

jno questions
Jquestions wit #2 based on judge's questions
!
/

3:21 :34 PM /Jay Rosenthal
3:21 :40 PM !Phillip Gordon

/nothing further
!served subpoena on dispatcher but, don't need him

3:22:01 PM Ic1erk
3:22:17 PM IPhillip Gordon

!swears in defendant
!Direct examination

-~.;~.!~· :~ i~::n:~:~:~::rick Owent~ ~:;:s:a·questions-- - - - - --- ---- ---1

1

3:25:45 PM !Nothing further and the !
!witness steps down and !
lis dismissed
j
...3:25.:48 .. PMjPhillip __Gordon................................Jrest..................................................................................................................................................................................
3:25:54 PM )Jay Rosenthal
!no rebuttal
3:26:00 PM iPhillip Gordon
!closing argument
3:37:38 PM }Jay Rosenthal
jclosing argument
3:38:47 PM fHonorable Patrick Owenlwill issue formal ruling. have had this issue in other
l
!cases. this case has some things that I need to look inot.
·
!will have clerk contact you when i have decision ... w/i 10
idays
3:40:32 PM jPhillip Gordon
j1eaving jan 1-19.
·
12/26/2013

2 of 3

.

District Court, Thursday,

~mber 26, 2013. Judge Patrick H 0

presii6B-COURTROOM

1 Time .-:
Speaker
· : -. ·
·. : : :1 ~_9te ·
3:40:50 PM !Honorable Patrick Owen !asking me to cont trial. not inclined to do that.
3:41:12 PM jend
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1

2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

3

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

4
5

6

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

7

Plaintiff,

8

Case No. CR-2013-458
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

vs.

9

10
11

TRICIA M. FRANKLIN,
Defendant.

12
13

The Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol ("DUI") charge in

14

this case involves, in part, a blood draw showing an alcohol concentration above the legal limit;
15

to wit: .236. Law enforcement obtained the blood evidence without a search warrant, and over
16

objections from the Defendant, Tricia M. Franklin ("Franklin"). Franklin seeks to suppress
17
18

evidence of the test results from the blood.

1

19

Background and Prior Proceedings

20

In an Information filed on July 30, 2013, the State ofldaho charged Franklin with a

21

felony charge of DUI, Idaho Code§ 18-8004 and a misdemeanor charge Driving Without

22

23
24
25
26

1 Franklin also seeks to suppress statements made to Jaw enforcement. However, Franklin has failed to identify any
specific statement. This aspect of the motion to suppress will be denied at this time because the Court is unable to
determine which, if any statements, are challenged.
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No.

I!

,II
Privileges, Idaho Code § 18-8001. Franklin was arraigned on October 10, 2013; she pleaded not
1

2
3

guilty and the matter was set for a jury trial.
On October 22, 2013, Franklin filed this Motion to Suppress. The State's opposition was

4

filed on December 9, 2013. An evidentiary hearing was held at the Ada County Courthouse on

5

December 23, 2013, and continued at the Boise County Courthouse on December 26, 2013.

6

Franklin was represented by her attorney, Phillip Gordon. The State was represented by Deputy

7

8

Boise County Prosecuting Attorney Jay F. Rosenthal. The State elicited testimony from Janet
Schadt, a contract phlebotomist, John Devalle ("Devalle"), Garden Valley Fire Chief, Robert

9

Dale Rogers "Rogers"), Boise County Sheriff Chief Deputy and Boise County Sheriff Deputy
10

Robert Tatilian ("Tatilian"). Franklin also testified at the hearing. At the close of evidence,
11

counsel made closing arguments. The Court took the matter under advisement.
12
13

On February 6, 2013, Devalle was dispatched to the scene of a single vehicle injury
2

14

accident at milepost 5.7 of the Banks Lowman Road. He arrived at about 10:29 p.m. Other

15

responders were treating Franklin, who was injured. He could detect alcohol coming from

16

Franklin. Devalle was not aware of any other person who had been in the vehicle at the time of

17

the accident.

18

At about 10:12 p.m., Tatilian received a call from dispatch to respond to the scene. When

19

he got the call, Tatillian was at home in Boise, and off duty. He left immediately for the scene of
20

the accident, arriving at about 10:4 7 p.m. He saw a red Ford pickup truck teetering on a guard
21

rail. Tatilian recognized the vehicle from a contact earlier in the evening. Tatilian testified that
22

23

while he was on normal patrol duty at about 8:30 p.m., he received a call from dispatch regarding

24
25

26

2
There is no transcript of the hearing. The facts are based upon the Court's review of the preliminary hearing
transcript, and the Court's recollection of the witness testimony and arguments and from review of the Court's
handwritten notes taken during the hearing.
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a report of a suspected intoxicated driver that had just left Longhorn Saloon in Crouch in a red
1
2
3

Ford pickup truck. Tatilian found the vehicle parked at the Wander Inn in Crouch. Tatilian
contacted Tricia Franklin and Jason Snowball who were in one of the rooms. Both were

4

intoxicated. Tatilian warned them not to drive again that night, or they would be arrested for

5

DUL Tatilian testified he remembered Franklin because he had encountered her about 30 - 45

6

minutes before the 8:30 p.m. call from dispatch. Tatilian had seen Franklin walking towards the

7

8

Longhorn Saloon in Crouch. Franklin said she was looking for her boyfriend. Tatilian testified
he could detect the strong odor of alcohol and she seemed intoxicated.

9

At the scene of the accident, Tatilian was told by fire department personnel that the
10

injured female at the scene had been transported by Crouch Ambulance to the Crouch landing
11

12
13

zone for helicopter transportation to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise. Tatilian
conducted an investigation into the accident. Tatilian testified he was informed by the fire chief

14

that Franklin was the only occupant of the vehicle. However, Tatilian testified he found Jason

15

Snowball's wallet at the scene and he was concerned that Snowball may have been in the vehicle

16

at the time of the accident. Tatilian also wanted to determine who was driving the vehicle at the

17

time of the accident. After searching for another victim, and conducting the accident

18

investigation, Tatilian returned to the Wander Inn. He contacted Mr. Snowball, who had to be

19

awakened. Based upon his contact with Mr. Snowball, Tatilian concluded that Franklin was the
20

driver. Tatilian then requested dispatch to send another officer and a phlebotomist to the hospital
21

to draw blood for testing from Franklin.
22
23
24

Tatilian was not certain at what time he asked for the officer to assist with a blood draw.
Rogers testified he received the call at his home in Boise at about 12:20 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. in the

25
26
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early morning hours of February 7, 2013. Rogers was asked to respond to the hospital to retrieve
1

2
3

a blood sample kit from the phlebotomist. Rogers got to the hospital in about 10 minutes.
Tatilian did not seek or even consider seeking a search warrant. At the time, his agency

4

believed that law enforcement had the right to a warrantless blood draw for testing under Idaho's

5

implied consent statute.

6
7
8

Shadt testified she received a call at about midnight. On cross, referring to notes, she
testified that she got called at about 11: 15 p.m. and got to the hospital at about 11 :30 p.m.. On
cross, she testified the blood was obtained by the nurse at 12:40 a.m.

9

There is some inconsistency in the evidence about when Tatilian requested a blood draw.
10

The Court finds that Rogers account is credible and consistent with Tatilian's account that the
11

12
13
14

15

request was not made until about midnight. Devalle testified that the fire personnel and Tatilian
left the accident scene at 11 :55 p.m. This is consistent with Tatilian' s recollection and with
Rogers' testimony.
Rogers met with the phlebotomist at the hospital. Rogers contacted Franklin who was

16

uncooperative and objected to the blood draw. For medical reasons, and unrelated to any request

17

by law enforcement, hospital personnel were going to draw blood from Franklin. Rogers handed

18

the phlebotomist a standard law enforcement blood draw kit. The phlebotomist handed the two

19

tubes to the hospital nurse who was drawing Franklin's blood. The hospital nurse filled the tubes
20

with Franklin's blood and returned the tubes to the phlebotomist. The phlebotomist put the tubes
21

in the kit and returned the kit to Rogers. Rogers sealed the kit.
22
23

Discussion

24

The Fourt.h Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 oft.he Idaho

25

Constitution protect persons from "unreasonable searches and seizures." "The administration of

26
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a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and a search within the purview of the
1
2

Fourth Amendment to

United States Constitution.

State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907,

3

24 3 P .3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). A search conducted without a warrant

4

is presumptively unreasonable. Id (citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,302, 160 P.3d 739, 741
(2007); State v. Dewitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712, 184 P.3d 215,218).

6

To overcome the presumption, the State bears the burden of establishing two
prerequisites. First, the State must prove that a warrantless search fell within a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Second, the State must
show that even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant
requirement, it must still be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding
circumstances.

7

8
9

10

Id (Internal citations omitted). Since the State did not obtain a search warrant in this case, the

11

State has the burden of demonstrating that there is a well-recognized exception to the warrant

12

requirement, and that the search was reasonable in light of all the other surrounding

.13
14

circumstances. The State argues that Idaho's implied consent statute provides an exception to the
warrant requirement in this case. The Court agrees.

15

Idaho's implied consent statute is found at Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1), which provides as
16

follows:
17

Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.

18
19

20
21
22
23

24

25
26

Idaho Code § 18-8002(1 ). Under this provision, "anyone driving on Idaho roads is deemed to
/ have

impliedly consented to evidentia.i.7 testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs when a

police officer has reasonable cause to believe the person was driving under the influence."
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS- PAGE 5

DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 712, 184 PJd at 218. By driving on an Idaho road, every driver has given
1

2
3

advance consent to submit to a test

alcohol concentration. Id. (citing State v. Rodriguez, 128

Idaho 521, 523, 915 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Ct. App. 1996). Moreover, even though a driver can

4

object and may have the physical ability to prevent a test, in Idaho "there is no legal right to

5

withdraw the statutorily implied consent." State v. Nickerson, '132 Idaho 406,410,973 P.2d 758,

6

762 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). See also State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364,370,233 P.3d

7

1286, 1292 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Diaz, we conclude that

8

a protest to a blood draw does not invalidate consent created by a person's actions and statute.");

9

LeC!ercq, 149 Idaho at 909 . Finally, if an officer has the right to require an evidentiary test, the
10

officer can choose either a breath or a blood test. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741.
11

12
13

The Court concludes the consent issue here is controlled by the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Diaz. Id. In Diaz, an officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that a driver

14

was impaired. The driver refused a breath test. The officer transported the driver to a hospital

15

where blood was drawn by a hospital technician. The driver did not physically resist, but

16

protested the blood draw. Independent of the exception for exigent circumstances, the Supreme

17

Court found the seizure of blood did not require a search warrant because the blood draw was

18

consensual pursuant to Idaho's implied consent law, Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1). The Supreme

19

Court also found that, under Idaho's implied consent law, the officer had the choice to require a
20

blood sample as long as the procedure was done in. a medically acceptable manner and without
21

unreasonable force.
22

23

In this case, the Court will find that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that

24

Franklin was the driver and was impaired. As a result, the Court will find that there is a consent

25

exception to the warrant requirement under Idaho Code § 18-8002( 1). Under controlling Idaho

26
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25

!I
II
precedent, this Court is obliged to rule that the officer had the right to obtain a blood sample over

/
1

Franklin's protests. 5

2

Even where there is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the

3
4

State must also show that "the search is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances."

5

Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 370,233 P.3d at 1292. This has been interpreted to require "the blood

6

draw to be done in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force." Id. at 371,

7

8

233 P.3d at 1293. Under the circumstances detailed above, the Court finds that the blood was
drawn in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force. For these reasons, the

9

Court will deny the motion to suppress.
10

Citing to a recent United States Supreme Court Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552
11

12
13

(2013), Franklin argues that that a warrant for the extraction of blood was required in this case.

In McNeely, the Supreme Court addressed a narrow issue; to wit: whether the bodies natural

14

metabolization of alcohol alone, without the consideration of other factors, constitutes exigent

15

circumstances for purposes of the warrant exception.. Id. at 15 56. The Court ruled as follows:

16

The question presented here is whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in
the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for noncbnsen_sual blood testing in all
drunk-driving cases. We conclude that it does not, and we hold, consistent with
general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this context must be
determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.

17
18

19
20

21
22

Id. In the Court's view, the decision in .McNeely does not address, much less overrule, settled

Idaho law that law enforcement is not required to obtain a search warrant to obtain a blood
sample over the objections of a driver based on the implied consent warrant where, as here, there

23

24
25

26

5

The Court's decision in State v. Diaz has been criticized as inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court case law because
the Idaho's statutory implied consent is neither voluntary nor revocable. Seamon, Richard, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
SlDETRACKS lDAHO IMPLIED CONSENT LAW, published in Volume 57, No. 1 The Advocate (January 2014). However,
as a trial court, this Court does not have the authority to overrule or ignore controlling precedent.
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I!

1

are reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was impaired while driving. Cf Reeder v.

2

State, 06-13-00126-CR, 2014 WL 60162 (Tex. App. Jan. 8, 2014) and Smith v. State, No. 1

3

11-00694-CR, 2013 WL 5970400, at *l (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 31, 2013, no pet. h.)

4

(finding that McNeely did not invalidate Texas statutory implied consent law.) (These opinions

5

have not been released for publication in the permanent law reports and may be subject to

6

revision or withdrawal.); State v. Flonnory, 2013 WL 4567874 (Del. Super. July 17, 2013)

7

(finding that McNeely did not invalidate Delaware statutory implied consent law); In re Hart,

s

2013 WI App 94, 349 Wis. 2d 528, 835 N.W.2d 292 (McNeely does not impact Wisconsin

9

implied consent law); State v. Brennick, COA13-627, 2013 WL 6234650 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 3,

10

2013) (unpublished) (citing State v. Dahlquist, -N.C.App. - - , S.E.2d-- (Ct. App. 2013)

11

(COAI3-276) for the proposition that McNeely did not invalidate statutory implied consent law).

12

The State also argues that the blood draw in this case did not require a search warrant

13

because, under the totality of the circumstances, there were exigencies sufficient to excuse the

14

requirement of a warrant. The State points out that in Idaho, if the measured alcohol

15

concentration is below 0.08 at the time of the test, the State cannot present retrograde

16

extrapolation to demonstrate that the alcohol concentration would have been above the legal

17

limit at the time of driving. State v. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701, 979 P.2d 103 (1999) abrogated in

1s

part on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,265 P.3d

19

502 (2011 ). Although McNeely holds that natural metabolization does not constitute exigent

2o

circumstances per se, the Court acknowledged that it may be a factor in determining whether

21

exigent circumstances existed in a particular case. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1568.

22
23
24

25
26

The State argues that there are exigent circumstances associated with obtaining an after
hours search warrant in Boise County. In the Court's view, this argument by itself is not

Iconvincing.

As noted above, at the time of this incident, the Boise County Sherriffs Office did

not seek a warrant based upon its view that under the implied consent law, as construed by the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS-- PAGE 8

1

Idaho courts, there was no need for a search warrant. As a result, there was no attempt to obtain

2

an after hours warrant for a blood draw in a DUI investigation. The State's argument that there

3

would have been difficulties in obtaining a search warrant in a timely fashion is based upon

4

largely speculative concerns. Here, law enforcement did not make any effort to secure a warrant

5

and the State has not presented facts that would have demonstrated that the effort would have

6

resulted in a sufficient delay as to adversely affect the test results. There is a full-time magistrate

7

in Boise County. The County has an elected prosecuting attorney who is a resident of the

8

county. The Sheriffs office certainly knows where the magistrate and prosecutor reside, and

9

how to contact each in the event of an emergency. Deputies in the field can contact dispatch and

10

other officers by radio. The magistrate can be contacted personally, or by phone, either by the

11

officer, or through assistance of dispatch. The Sheriff's office was also aware that there is

12

always an on call prosecutor and magistrate in Ada County for after hours warrant applications.

13

The State has failed to demonstrate that efforts to obtain a search warrant would have resulted in

14

delays that could have adversely affected the investigation.

15

Notwithstanding that the State made no effort to obtain a warrant, considering all the

16

circumstances, the Court does conclude that there are exigent circumstances excusing a warrant

17

in this case. The accident was reported just prior to 10: 12 p.m. The officer did not complete his

18

investigation and conclude that Franklin was the driver until about midnight, almost two (2)

19

hours after the accident. Because of this, the Court concludes that the additional time it would

20

have taken to obtain a warrant would likely have resulted in such a delay as to potentially

21

deprive the state of important evidence of alcohol concentration. The Court will find that the

22

delay occasioned by the time necessary to conclude the investigation and determine that

23

Franklin was the driver constitutes exigent circumstances. The process to obtain a warrant could

24

not have begun until about midnight. The further delay in obtaining a warrant meant that there

25

would have been a total delay of at least two (2) to three (3) hours. Such a delay would have

26
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JI

II

1

further elimination of alcohol that could have materially affected the State's ability to

2

prove an alcohol concentration above the legal

3

1560, 185 L.Ed. 2d 696 (2013), the Court noted that:

4

5
6

In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552,

Testimony before the trial court in this case indicated that the percentage of
alcohol in an individual's blood typically decreases by approximately 0.015
percent to 0.02 percent per hour once the alcohol has been fully absorbed. App.
47.

7

Id. The Court concludes that there are exigent circumstances where, as here, law enforcement

8

cannot obtain a blood sample in a DUI investigation for between two (2) and three (3) hours after

9

developing probable cause to secure a warrant. Moreover, due to Franklin's injuries, there was

10
11

no other reasonable means of determining alcohol concentration.
Even though the Court has determined to deny the motion to suppress, the Court finds it

12

necessary to address an additional argument made by the State. The State also argues that even
13

if there was no available exception to the warrant requirement, the Court should nonetheless
14

deny the motion to suppress because Franklin's constitutional rights do not merit protection. The
15
16

State argues that Franklin's rights should not be recognized because Franklin is guilty of driving

17

while significantly impaired, she placed the public at risk, and admitted four prior DUis. The

18

State argues that the public interest would be served by ignoring Franklin's constitutional rights.

19

In all candor, this argument from the State's attorney is shocking to this Court. Franklin

20

21
22

is presumed innocent and whether Franklin is guilty of any offense is for the jury to decide.
Under our law and system of justice, even a person charged with heinous crimes has important
constitutional rights and protections, and it is the solemn obligation of the courts to recognize

23

and enforce these rights.
24
25

26
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In summarizing the unique role

a prosecutor, Justice Sutherland has made the

1

2
3

4

s
6
7

8
9

often quoted and apt observations:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in. a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). All

10

prosecutors would benefit from periodically reviewing Comment [1] to Rule 3.8 of the Idaho

11

Rules of Professional Conduct which explains that a prosecutor has the responsibility of "a

12

minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."

13

'

The Court will decline the invitation to ignore Franklin's constitutional rights to

14

facilitate the State's ability to convict.
15

Conclusion
16

As explained above, the Court will deny the motion to suppress.
17
18

19

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

_/_7_ day of January, 2014.

20
21

22
23
24

25
26

'
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PAt K1CK H. OWEN
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Facsimile: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff,

vs.
TRICIA FRANKLIN,

Defendant.

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

COMES NOW, Philip Gordon, Attorney of Record for the Defend.ant herein, and hereby
moves this Court for an Order reconsidering its MEMORANDilltf DECISION AND ORDER
RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS, made and entered herein on the 17th day of January, 2014, in the

follo'wing particulars and for the following reasons:
1.

IM:PLIED CONSENT: The court's reliance on Idaho case law for the proposition

that the defendant impliedly consented to allow her blood to be drawn over her objection has
been called into question by a very recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
('"SCOTUS").
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Philip Gordon, ISB # 1996
GORDON LAW
W. Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 345-7100
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
TRICIA FRANKLIN,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

COMES NOW, Philip Gordon, Attorney of Record for the Defendant herein, and hereby
moves this Court for an Order reconsidering its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS, made and entered herein on the 17th day of January, 2014, in the
following particulars and for the following reasons:
1.

IMPLIED CONSENT: The court's reliance on Idaho case law for the proposition

that the defendant impliedly consented to allow her blood to be drawn over her objection has
been called into question by a very recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
("SCOTUS").
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A1.issouri v. _McNeely, 569
2013, Courts

S. _ _ (2013) was issued by SCOTUS in the

Idaho and the United

have

a plethora of Fourth

Amendment and State Constitutional challenges to the drawing of DUI suspects' blood in the
absence of a warrant. These challenges generally take the form of Motions to Suppress the
results of the tests of the drawn blood for alcohol concentration.
These challenges, and the State's responses to them, exhibit certain established patterns.
Almost invariably the Defendant seeking suppression relies largely on McNeely, supra, and seeks
to develop facts which demonstrate the absence of particularized exigent circumstances. In tum,
counsel for the State typically counters by citing, inter alia, State v. Diaz, State v Rodriguez,

State v Nickerson, State v. Wheeler and/or State v. LeClercq (all citations omitted). The thrust
of the State's argument is generally two-fold:
a.

McNeely, supra, did not specifically address the role of implied consent statutes.
More importantly, Justice Sotomayor did not specifically rule that, for purposes of
constitutional analysis, the existence of an implied consent statute was, in and of
itself insufficient to establish the existence of a "consent exception" to the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of a warrant. And

b.

Consent having impliedly been given, under controlling Idaho precedent, it cannot
be withdravm. Hence, the reasoning continues, there is a per se consent exception
to the warrant requirement.

Indeed, in the case at bar, these very arguments were made by Counsel for the State, and
they appear to have prevailed in this Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION:
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In this case, the Court will find that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect
that Franklin was the driver and was impaired. As a result, the Court will find
that there is a consent exception to the warrant requirement under Idaho Code §
18-8002(1). Under controlling Idaho precedent, this Court is obliged to rule that
6, 1.
the officer had the right to obtain a blood sample over Franklin's protests.
23 - P. 7, 1. 2.
The force of the State's formulaic response to McNeely Motions, and, by extension, the
Court's ruling was seriously undercut by a very recent action on the part of SCOTUS. On
January

13th

of this year, the high Court granted certiorari to a decision of the Court of Appeals of

Texas and vacated the judgment of conviction which had been entered therein. See "Exhibit A",
attached hereto. As is apparent from the Opinion of the Texas Court attached hereto as "Exhibit
B", Aviles' was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, and a sample of his blood was
drawn without a warrant and over Aviles' objection. Exhibit B, P. 4, and P. 7. The Texas Court
of Appeals rebuffed Aviles' constitutionally grounded objection to the warrantless seizure, and
based its ruling in the Texas "implied consent" law:
... .Aviles's case deals with an offense while operating a vehicle in a public place,
and is thus governed by Chapter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code. The
Texas Transportation Code expands the State's ability to search and seize without
a warrant, providing implied consent to obtain blood samples from person
suspected of driving while intoxicated, in certain circumstances even without a
search warrant. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held in Beeman v. State:
[t]he implied consent law .... expands on the State's search
capabilities by providing a framework for drawing DVv1 suspects'
blood in the absence of a search warrant. It gives officers and
additional weapon in their investigative arsenal, enabling therm to
draw blood in certain limited circumstances even without a search
warrant. 86 S. W 3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Exhibit B,
P. 7
The Texas law found to conflict with J...1cNeely in the Aviles case is substantially more
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restrictive than the Idaho analogue, applying only to situations where "the suspect refuses to
provide a specimen voluntarily and the anesting officer has credible information that the suspect
has been previously convicted twice of DWI. .. ". Idaho law contains no such restriction, and the
blood of Dill suspects is routinely dravm without their consent and indeed over their objections,
regardless of whether or not the individual has any prior convictions for driving under the
influence of alcohol and/or other intoxicating substances. Inferentially, then, if SCOTUS applied

McNeely to vacate a conviction based on the results of blood drawn without a warrant but
pursuant to a statute significantly more circumscribed than the Idaho equivalent, it seems clear
that our substantially more generally applicable law will face similar treatment. While there may
previously have been a plausible argument that McNeely did not specifically address the role of,
and therefore did not supercede State "implied consent" laws, the Aviles decision appears to have
addressed that issue and mooted the position uniformly contended for by Prosecutors throughout
the State, including in the instant action.
Thus, should Ms. Franklin be convicted after a trial in which the results of the test of her
blood for alcohol concentration are admitted into evidence, the likelihood is great that such a
conviction will eventually be vacated on the strength of McNeely. Rather than allowing this
cause to go forward to trial, this Court should instead reconsider its prior Memorandum Decision,
and issue a new decision granting Franklin's Motion to Suppress.
2.

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: The Court concludes "that there are exigent

circumstances excusing a warrant in this case." Defendant contends that this finding is clearly
enoneous and is made in derogation of the controlling facts.
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Court observes that:
Accident was reported just prior to 10: 12 p.m. The officer did not complete his
investigation and conclude that Franklin was the driver until about midnight, almost rn'o
(2) hours after the accident. Because of this, the Court concludes that the additional time
it would have taken to obtain a warrant would likely have resulted in such a delay as to
potentially deprive the state of important evidence of alcohol concentration. The Court
will find that the delay occasioned by the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant
would likely have resulted in such a delay as to potentially deprive the state of important
evidence of alcohol concentration." Memorandum Decision, P. 9, 11. 17-21.
Consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances, an exercise mandated by
McNeely, supra, compels a contrary conclusion.

A listing of the uncontested facts, adduced at the hearing on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress and/or at the Preliminary Hearing held before Judge Cockerille, which demonstrates
decisively that a warrant could easily have been obtained in a timely manner, and certainly
prior to the time that Ms. Franklin's blood was actuaUy drawn without a warrant, and

over her clearly stated objection includes the following:
1.

Deputy Tatillian (hereafter "Tatillian") testified that, at approximately 10: 12 p.m.
he received word that the accident had occurred, from Boise County Sheriff's
Dispatch (hereafter "Dispatch").

2.

Tatillian testified that, at all times thereafter, he had access to Dispatch both
through the "hand held" radio in his car, and through a mobile unit on his person.
Thus, he could, at anytime between 10:12 p.m. and 12:10 or 12:20 p.m. (The time
at which Chief Deputy Rogers -hereafter "Rogers" - received a call from Dispatch
asking him to travel to St. Alphonsus to assist in drawing Ms. Franklin's blood.)
have, through Dispatch, initiated the process of obtaining a warrant, either by

MOTION TO RECONSIDER - Page 5

utilizing the services of the resident Boise

Magistrate, or by

obtain a warrant in Ada
3.

Tatillian testified that by the time he got to the scene of the accident, Ms. Franklin
had already been transported, and, while he learned that it was she who was
driving, he did not accompany her to the hospital.

4.

Tatillian testified that Chief Delvalle told him, within minutes after his arrival at
the accident scene, that he believed Ms. Franklin had a strong odor of alcohol
about her person.

5.

Tatillian testified that several of the other "first responders" at the scene were able
to assist in traffic control and other phases of clearing the accident scene. Their
presence, and participation meant, inter alia, that Tatillian could have taken a few
minutes to initiate the process of obtaining a warrant. While cellular service may
not have been available in the immediate area of the accident, clearly Dispatch
could have facilitated the process. Alternatively, Dispatch could, at any time
after Tatillian arrived on the scene, have sought the assistance of Rogers -who
testified that he was at home in Meridian all that evening- in obtaining a warrant
in Ada County.

6.

Rogers had served as a Boise City Police Officer for 30 years. He testified that:
a.

He was aware that there was always an on-call Magistrate in Ada County.

b.

He was aware that there was always an on-call Prosecutor in Ada County.

c.

He had on many occasions while working in Boise, obtained warrants after
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hours utilizing the services of the on-call Magistrate and Prosecutor.
d.

He still knew

e.

He knew some of the sitting Magistrates, and some Deputy Ada County

to obtain a warrant after

court hours.

Prosecutors.
f.

He still had many friends on the Boise City Police Depa.rtment who could
have helped him obtain a warrant if problems arose.

g.

He had an official Boise County Sheriffs Office vehicle at his home, and
it had a hand held link to Dispatch.

h.

Dispatch had his cell number and could reach him at any time, and, in fact,
did reach him to ask him to travel to the hospital to oversee the drawing of
Ms. Franklin's blood.

1.

He was aware that he could obtain a warrant by having telephone contact
with the on_-call Magistrate.

7.

The strongest and most controvertible evidence of the fact that Tatillian could
have obtained a warrant -without in a timely manner and without delay was
provided by the testimony of the phlebotomist. The Court will recall that her
records, produced contemporaneously with the events in question, demonstrated
that she arrived at the hospital at approximately 11: 15 p.m. 1, and waited there
approximately 1 1/2 hours before Rogers arrived on the scene to witness and

1. Given that it took Ms. Schadt some time to drive to the hospital, she necessarily would have been contacted by
Dispatch and sent there at or prior to 11 :00 p.m., i.e. no later than approximately 13 minutes after Tatillian arrived
on the scene of the accident.
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q

oversee the warrantless drawing of Ms. Franklin's blood sample. Her arrival at
the hospital for the very specific purpose of obtaining a sample of Ms.
blood, 45 minutes prior to the time that the Comi assigned as the moment when
Tatillian "completed[d] his investigation and conclude[d] that Franklin was the
driver" Memorandum, P. 9, 11. 17-18, is significant. Tatillian testified that, almost
immediately upon arrival at the accident scene, he learned from DelV alle that Ms.
Franklin had been transported to Banks by ambulance to then be helicoptered to
St. Alphonsus. The very early involvement of the Phlebotomist for the very
specific purpose of drawing blood from this very specific individual who,
Tatillian knew, had been transported to this very specific location, conclusively
establishes that, Tatillian had concluded within minutes after his arrival on the
scene that Franklin was the driver of the vehicle, that she was probably driving
under the influence of alcohol, and that he wanted to obtain evidence to be used
against her in a subsequent prosecution. Having determined, so soon after his
arrival that the Phlebotomist needed to be dispatched to St. Alphonsus to obtain a
sample of not "some blood" but rather Ms. Franldin's blood, nothing prevented
him from simultaneously asking Dispatch to commence the process of obtaining a
warrant to draw that blood.

Upon receiving such a request, Dispatch could, in

turn, have contacted the always reachable Rogers and requested him to seek the
warrant. Indeed, Rogers could have been contacted at the same time or even
before the services of the Phlebotomist were sought, i.e. at about 11 :00 p.m., 1
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hour and 40 minutes before Ms. Franklin's blood was actually drawn.
Ms. Schadt who was, as the Court noted, a "contract phlebotomist"
Memorandum, P. 2, 1. 8, testified that she was "dispatched" there, by none other
than Boise County Dispatch. Clearly the order to contact her could only have
been initiated by the only law enforcement officer at the scene, i.e. Tatillian, and
that order had to have been made at or prior to 11 :00 p.m. Plainly this suggests
that Tatillian not only did not need to but also did in fact not wait until midnight
to "complete his investigation and conclude that Franklin was the driver"
Memorandum, P. 9, 11. 17-18. Rather the facts demonstrate beyond cavil that
Tatillian had not only concluded that Franklin was the driver but also took steps to
obtain evidence from her, at or before 11 p.m., i.e 1 hour and 45 minutes before
the blood draw occurred.

In sum, careful examination of the totality of the facts surrounding this case, demonstrate
the total absence of exigent circumstances of a type and kind sufficient to excuse the officers
from obtaining a warrant to draw Ms. Franklin's blood. The real, indeed the only reason that no
efforts whatsoever were made to obtain a warrant was the officers' mistaken belief that no
warrant was needed. Both officers testified to this belief. Neither officer offered any testimony
suggesting that it would have been difficult to obtain a warrant in the one hour and fifty minute
interval between the time that Tatillian arrived on the scene and confirmed that Franklin was
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probably the driver of the vehicle,

the time when her blood was actually dravm.

Philip Gordon
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Certificate of service
I hereby certify that on January 22nd, 2014, I caused the within and foregoing document,
to be served on the following person, by the method indicated below:
Boise County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 186
Idaho City, Id 83631

_ _ hand delivery
U.S. mail
_ _ overnight mail
K facsimile: 392-3760
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Philip Gordon
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CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS

12-10871

NEWBOLD, JOSEPH K. V. UNITED STATES
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further
consideration in light of that court's opinion in

Mi17er v. United States, 735 F. 3d 141 (CA4 2013).

13-343

UNITED STATES V. NEVADA PARTNERS FUND, ET AL.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.

The

judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further
consideration in light of United States v. Woods, 571 U. S.
(2013).

13-5423

NEATHERY, LARRY N. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed rn forma

pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further
consideration in light of Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U. S.

~

(2013).

13-6353

AVILES, ANTONIO V. TEXAS
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.

1

EXHIBIT

A_
/0 I

The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, for further consideration
in light of Missouri v. McNee7y, 569 U.S._ (2013).

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES
13M54

NAT. COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. V. KELLER, SAMUEL M., ET AL.
The motion of A&E Television Networks, et al. for leave to
file a brief as amici curiae is denied.

The motion of

National Collegiate Athletic Association for leave to intervene
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
13M66

DOE, J. V. CLC, ET AL.
The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record
is denied.

13M67

BROWN, MAURICE L. V. LOPEZ, WARDEN

13M68

COLEMAN, JEFFERSON V. GAETZ, WARDEN

13M69

MELOT, BILLY R., ET UX. V. UNITED STATES
The motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs
of certiorari out of time are denied.

13M70

ZOPATTI, KARAN L. V. RANCHO DORADO HOMEOWNERS, ET AL.
The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the supplemental appendix under seal is granted.

126, ORIG.

KANSAS V. NEBRASKA AND COLORADO
The Report of the Special Master is received and ordered
filed.

Exceptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be

filed within 45 days.

Replies, if any, with supporting briefs,

may be filed within 30 days.

Sur-replies, if any, with

supporting briefs, may be filed within 30 days.

2
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Aviles v. State
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
September 26, 2012, Delivered; September 26, 2012, Filed
No. 04-11-00877 -CR

Reporter: 385 S.W.3d 110; 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8069; 2012 WL 4373509
Procedural Posture
Antonio AVILES, Appellant v. The STATE of
Texas, Appellee

Notice: PUBLISH

Subsequent History: Released for Publication
January 04, 2013.
Petition for discretionary review refused by In
re Aviles, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 770
(Tex. Crim. App., May 8, 2013)
Rehearing denied by In re Aviles, 2013 Tex.
Crim. App. LEXIS 893 (Tex. Crim. App., June
12, 2013)
Vacated by, Remanded by, Motion granted by
Aviles v. Texas, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 563 (U.S., Jan.
13, 2014)
Prior History: [**1] From the 226th Judicial
District Court, Bexar County, Texas. Trial
Court No. 2011-CR-7244. Honorable Sid L.
Harle, Judge Presiding.
Disposition: AFFIRMED.

ICore Terms
blood, arrest, waiTant, specimen, person,
search, require, trial, draw, suspect, trial court,
evidence, consent, seizure, motion to suppress,
testified, probable, burden, stop, law, driving
while intoxicated, transport, totality, breath,
review, drive, search warrant, intoxicate,
initiate, vehicle

ICase Summary

Defendant was charged with felony driving
while intoxicated. After the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, denied his
motion to suppress, defendant entered a plea of
nolo contendere and was sentenced to two
years confinement in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice - Institutional Division. Defendant appealed.
Overview

A police officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while intoxicated, based
on his erratic driving, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and performance during the fieldsobriety tests. The officer requested a specimen
of defendant's breath and read him the statutory warning allowing defendant to refuse the
breath and blood draws. When defendant refused, the officer required a mandatory blood
draw from defendant based on Tex. Transp. Code
Ann. § 724.0 l 2(b )(3 )(B) (2011) because there
was evidence that defendant had two prior driving while intoxicated convictions. That situation, as outlined in Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
724.012, was one of the circumstances where
blood could be drawn without a search warrant. Thus, the warrantless seizure of defendant' s blood was conducted according to the prescriptions of the Texas Transportation Code,
and without violating defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights. Therefore, the trial court
did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress or in admitting defendant's blood specimen into evidence.
Outcome
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
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judgment.

ILe:idsNexis® Headnotes
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Blood Alcohol &
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General
Overview

HNI See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
724.0 72(b )(3 )(B> (2011).
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceedings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression
of Evidence
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review > De Novo Review > Motions to Suppress
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Standards of Review > Deferential Review > General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review > Substantial Evidence > Motions to Suppress

HN2 An appellate court reviews the trial court's
denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. A trial court's determination of historical facts will be given almost
total deference, while the trial court's application of the law will be reviewed de nova.
When the trial court does not issue findings of
fact and none are requested, the appellate
court implies findings that support the trial
court's ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the ruling, supports those
findings. The trial judge is the sole trier of fact
and judge of credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to their testimony.
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression
of Evidence

HN3 A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld if there is any valid
theory of law applicable to the case, even if
the trial court did not base its decision on that
theory.
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights> Search
& Seizure > Scope of Protection
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceedings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression
of Evidence

HN4 A defendant seeking to suppress evidence

violation bears the initial burden of rebutting
the presumption of proper police conduct. A defendant meets that burden by demonstrating
that the challenged search or seizure occurred
without a warrant. The burden then shifts to the
State to prove that the search or seizure was
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. That burden may be satisfied by a showing that one of the statutory exceptions to the
warrant requirement is met.
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights> Search
& Seizure > Probable Cause
Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceedings > Pretrial Motions & Procedures > Suppression
of Evidence
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Standards of Review > De Novo Review > Motions to Suppress

HNS For purposes of a motion to suppress,
whether a specific search or seizure is reasonable or supported by probable cause is a question of law subject to de novo review.
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search
& Seizure > Scope of Protection
Criminal Law & Procedure> Search & Seizure> Warrantless Searches > Investigative Stops
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Warrantless
Searches > Stop & Frisk> Reasonable Suspicion

HN6 Law enforcement officers may stop and
briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. To initiate an investigative stop, the officer must
possess a reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts that, in light of the officer's experience and general knowledge, would
lead the officer to reasonably conclude that
the person detained actually is, has been, or soon
will be engaged in criminal activity. Whether
the officer's suspicion was reasonable is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Vehicular
Crimes > Traffic Regulation 'Violations > General Overview
Transportation Law > Private Vehicles > Traffic Regulation > General Overview

on the basis of an alleged Fourth Amendment
CARTER WINTERS
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HN7 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.060(b)
(2011) requires drivers to remain in a single
lane unless movement outside of the lane can
be made safely.
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search
& Seizure > Probable Cause
Criminal Law & Procedure> Commencement of Criminal Proceedings > Arrests > Probable Cause
Criminal Law & Procedure> Commencement of Criminal Proceedings > Arrests > Vv'anantless Arrests

HN8 Whether probable cause exists to justify
a warrantless an-est must be considered under the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the
anest.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol &
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General
Overview

HN13 The implied consent law codified in
Tex. Transo. Code Ann. § 724.011 expands on
the State's search capabilities by providing a
framework for drawing driving while intoxicated suspects' blood in the absence of a search
warrant. It gives officers an additional
weapon in their investigative arsenal, enabling
them to draw blood in certain limited circumstances even without a search warrant.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Blood Alcohol &
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > Refusals to
Submit

Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search
& Seizure > Scope of Protection
Criminal Law & Procedure> Search & Seizure > General Overview

HNI 4 The Texas Transportation Code provides
that a person who has been arrested for the offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and in a public place is deemed to have
HN9 The withdrawal of a blood specimen
consented
to the taking of one or more specifrom a person is considered a search and seimens
of
blood
or breath to analyze the alcozure under the Fourth Amendment.
hol concentration amount or presence of a conConstitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Search trolled substance. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
724.011 (2011). The person retains the right,
& Seizure > Scope of Protection
subject to automatic suspension of his license,
HNIO The Fourth Amendment to the United
to refuse to give a specimen. Tex. Transp. Code
States Constitution and Tex. Const. art. I, § 9 as- Ann. § 724.013. However, if the suspect resure the right to be free from unreasonable
fuses to provide a specimen voluntarily and the
searches.
arresting officer has credible information that
the suspect has been previously convicted twice
Constitutional Law> ... > Fundamental Rights > Search of driving while intoxicated, then the officer
& Seizure > Scope of Protection
shall require the taking of a specimen of the perCriminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seison's breath or blood. Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
zure > Warrantless Searches > General Overview
§ 724.012(b)(3)(B).
HNll A search or seizure conducted without a
Criminal Law & Procedure> Appeals > Procedural
warrant is per se unreasonable absent a recogMatters > Briefs
nized exception to the wanant requirement.
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Blood Alcohol &
Field Sobriety Testing > Implied Consent > General
Overview

HN12 The Texas Transportation Code expands
the State's ability to search and seize without
a warrant, providing implied consent to obtain
blood samples from persons suspected of driving while intoxicated, in certain circumstances,
even without a search warrant.

HN15 Tex. R. App. P 38.](i) states that a brief
must contain clear and concise argument for
contentions made with appropriate citations to
the record and authorities.

Counsel: For APPELLANT: Victor Manuel
Valdes, Attorney At Law, San Antonio, TX.

For APPELLEE: Nathan Morey, San Antonio,
TX.
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Judges: Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice. Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice,
Karen Angelini, Justice, Marialyn Barnard, Justice.

Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard

IOpinion
[*111] AFFIRlvfED

Officer Rios testified that after he pulled the vehicle over, he noticed the driver, later identified as Aviles, had bloodshot eyes and slurred
speech. Aviles was unsteady on his feet when Officer Rios asked him to exit the vehicle.
Then, when Officer Rios asked Aviles to perform three standardized field sobriety teststhe horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN"), the
walk-and-turn, and the one-leg-stand-Officer
Rios testified Aviles exhibited signs of intoxication on each test. Based onAviles's erratic diiving, physical appearance, [**3] and performance on the field sobriety tests, Officer Rios
placed Aviles under arrest for DWI.

Appellant Antonio Aviles was charged with
felony driving while intoxicated. After [*112]
the trial c.ourt denied his motion to suppress,
Aviles entered a plea of nolo contendere and was
Following the arrest, Officer Rios checked
sentenced to two years confinement in the
Aviles's
criminal history on his mobile laptop
Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Instiand discovered Aviles had two prior DWI con-·
tutional Division. 1 On appeal, Aviles chalvictions.
Officer Rios testified he believed
lenges the trial court's denial of his motion to
the
database
he accessed via his mobile laptop
suppress, arguing the court erred by admitting
was
reliable.
Officer Rios requested a speciinto evidence his blood specimen because he
men
of
Aviles's
breath or blood and read him
was arrested without a warrant, and his blood
the
DWI
statutory
warning in Spanish.2 When
sample was obtained without consent and withAviles
refused
to
produce
either specimen, Ofout a waffant. We affirm the trial court's judgficer
Rios
required
a
blood
draw from Aviles
ment.
based upon section 724.012 of the Texas
Transportation Code. HNI Section. 724.012
BACKGROUND
states: "[a] peace officer shall require the taking of a specimen of the person's breath or blood
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Offiunder any of the following circumstances ...
cer Joe Rios testified that on June 2, 2011, he
[for example, if] at the time of the arrest, the ofwas patrolling the streets of San Antonio as part
ficer possesses or receives reliable informaof the DWI ("Driving While Intoxicated") ention from a credible source that the person, on
forcement program. Officer Rios was driving
two or more occasions, has been previously
northbound on Zarzamora at approximately
convicted of or placed on community supervi2:20 a.m. when he saw a Mazda pickup veersion for an offense under Section 49.04 [DWI] .
ing across lane markers. As Officer Rios ap.. Penal Code." TEX. TRANSP. CoDE ANN ....§.
proached the vehicle, it crossed the lane mark724.012(b)(3)(B) (West 2011). Officer Rios
ers again and veered into his lane. Based on this
took Aviles to the nurse's infirmary for the blood
erratic driving, Officer Rios suspected the
draw, and filled out a THP-51 [**4] statutory
driver was intoxicated and initiated a traffic
authorization form,3 a mandatory blood draw
stop to check on the driver's condition.
checklist, and a chain of custody form. Officer Rios took [*113] Aviles to nurse Eliza1

Despite his plea, Aviles has a right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2 (noting that in plea
bargain cases, defendant may appeal matters raised on written motion filed [**2] and ruled on before trial, or after getting trial
court's permission to appeal).
2

Aviles is a Spanish speaker.

3

The THP-51 fonn contains the same language as section 724.012-"[i]f at the time of the suspect's a.'Test, [the police officer] possessed or received reliable information from a credible source that on two or more occasions the suspect had previously been convicted of [. . .] DWI," the officer may require the suspect to give a specimen of blood.
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beth Arguello who drew Aviles' s blood. Officer
Rios testified he saw the nurse draw Aviles's
blood into a vial, put the vial in an envelope, and
put it
a locked container inside a refrigerator.

HN2 We review the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard
of review. Valtierra v. State. 310 S .W.3d 442.
447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court's determination of historical facts will be given almost total deference, while the trial court's apOn cross-examination, Officer Rios testified
plication of the law will be reviewed de
his patrol car did not have onboard video, and
nova. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323. 328
that Aviles did not resist or attempt to flee
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When the trial court
once he initiated the traffic stop. Officer Rios
does not issue findings of fact and none are realso testified he was certified to administer field quested, as in this case, we imply findings
sobriety tests, and he took a refresher course
that support the trial court's ruling if the evion the subject within the last twelve to eighdence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
teen months.
ruling, supports those findings. See Valtierra.
310 S. W.3d. at 449. "[T]he trial judge is the sole
Elizabeth Arguello testified she is a registered
trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnurse with University Hospital and assigned to
nesses and the weight to be given to their testhe City of San Antonio magistrate's office. Artimony." St. George v. State. 237 S.W.3d 720,
guello detailed [**5] the procedures she fol725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). HN3 A trial
lowed when she drew Aviles's blood followcourt's ruling on a motion to [**7] suppress
ing his arrest. On cross-examination, Arguello
will be upheld if there is any valid theory oflaw
admitted she did not have a direct recollection of
applicable to the case, even if the trial court
Aviles, and was basing her testimony on the
did not base its decision on that theory. State v.
written affidavit she signed at the time of
Steelman. 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim.
Aviles's blood draw.
App. 2002).
After hearing the evidence and argument, the
Warrantless Arrest
trial court denied Aviles's motion to suppress.
Thereafter, Aviles pled nolo contendere to
Aviles first contends the trial court erred in dethe charge of driving while intoxicated and
nying his motion to suppress because he was
was sentenced to two years confinement. Aviles
arrested without a warrant. HN4 A defendant
now appeals, contending the trial court erred
seeking to suppress evidence on the basis of an
in denying his motion to suppress.
alleged Fourth [*114] Amendment violation
bears the initial burden of rebutting the presumpANALYSIS
tion of proper police conduct. Young v. State,
283
S.W.3d 854. 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A
On appeal, Aviles argues the trial court erred in
defendant
meets this burden by demonstrating
denying his motion to suppress because: (1)
that
the
challenged
search or seizure occurred
he was arrested without a warrant, (2) his blood
without a warrant. Id. The burden then shifts
sample was obtained without consent and withto the State to prove that the search or seizure
out a warrant, 4 and (3) the blood was admitwas
reasonable under the totality of the circumted into evidence in violation of his rights unstances.
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666,
der the Sixth., F(fth, and Fourteenth
(Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). This burden
672-73
Amendments.
may be satisfied by a showing that one of the
statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement
Standard of Review
4

Notably, Aviles fails to address the Texas Transportation Code, specifically section 724.012, which governs the issue he
brings on appeal-the blood draw following his D'\VI arrest. Other than stating at oral argument that the statute must comply
with the dictates of the state and federal constitutions, [**6} Aviles also fails to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. See
Smith v. State. 721 S.W.2d 844. 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that even constitutional claims can be waived by failing
to object); Smith v. State. 256 S.W.3d 341. 343 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007) (same).
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is met. See Torres v. State: 182 S.W.3d 899.
902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
this case, it is undisputed

no warrant

was issued for Aviles' s arrest. As a result, the
State bore the burden of establishing [**8] the
reasonableness of Aviles' s detention and arrest. See Young, 283 S.W.3d at 872; Amador.
221 S.W.3d at 672-73. HNS Whether a specific search or seizure is reasonable or supported by probable cause is a question of law
subject to de novo review. Dixon v. State, 206
S.W.3d 613. 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

HN6 Law enforcement officers may stop and
briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Teny
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. L 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889 (1968). To initiate an investigative
stop, the officer must possess a reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts that, in
light of the officer's experience and general
knowledge, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that the person detained actually
is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581. 104 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1989); Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Whether the officer's
suspicion was reasonable is evaluated based on
the totality of the circumstances. See Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011).
At the suppression hearing, Officer Rios testified Aviles' s conduct attracted [**9] his attention "at 2:20 AM at night" because he was
"veering across lane markers" and "veered into
his lane." We hold this erratic driving gave Officer Rios reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop to check on the driver's condition.
See Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376, 377, 381
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding officer had
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated and was justified in making investigatory stop when officer saw defendant weave at least three times out of his lane
over short distance around 1 :00 a.m.).
Aviles's driving also constituted a traffic violation, which authorized Officer Rios to make

the traffic stop. See HN7 TEX. TRANSP. CooE
ANN. 9 545.060(b) (West 2011) (requiring drivers to remain in single lane unless movement
outside of lane can be made safely).
When Officer Rios approached Aviles, he
found Aviles had bloodshot eyes and slurred
speech. When asked to exit the vehicle, Aviles
was extremely unsteady on his feet. Officer
Rios asked Aviles to perform three standardized field sobriety tests-the HGN, walk-andturn, and the one-leg-stand. Officer Rios testified Aviles exhibited signs of intoxication on
each test.

HN8 Whether probable cause [**10] exists to
justify a warrantless arrest must be considered under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Amador v. State, 275
S.W.3d 872. 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We
find the facts described above gave Officer Rios
probable cause to arrest Aviles for driving
while intoxicated, based on his erratic driving,
slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and performance [*115] during the field-sobriety tests.
See Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901-02
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (allowing officer to
make warrantless arrest based on his observations and personal knowledge that offense was
or is being committed); State v. Stevenson,
958 S.W.2d 824, 829 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty. 468 U.S.
420, 423, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317
(1984 )) (holding appellant's failure of field
sobriety test provided probable cause for arrest); see also State v. Garrett, 22 S.W.3d 650,
654 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000) (noting that
smell of alcohol, watery eyes, and unsteadiness
are all classic signs that suggest suspect's mental and physical faculties might be impaired and
help establish probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while intoxicated). Therefore,
we overrule Aviles's point of error regarding an
improper [**11] warrantless arrest.

Blood Draw
HN9 The withdrawal of a blood specimen
from a person is considered a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v.
Cal{fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct.
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1826. 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). HNIO The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution a..nd Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution assure the right to be free from unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. Amend. Iv; TEx.
CONST. art. L & 9. HNll A search or seizure
conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357. 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576
(1967); Walter v. State. 28 S.W.3d 538. 541
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Aviles contends the trial court erred in admitting his blood specimen into evidence because
the sample was taken without his consent
and without a warrant. Aviles cites case law for
the proposition that absent consent, taking a
blood sample from a defendant in custody requires a validly-obtained warrant. See Davis v.
State, 831 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Austin
1992. pet. ref d.); see also McBride v. State,
840 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, pet.
ref d.). He also cites Article 18.01 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. arguing
that a blood draw is an evidentiary
[**12] search requiring a warrant. However,
Davis and McBride do not apply to this case because they dealt with murder and sexual assault, respectively, whereas Aviles's case deals
with an offense while operating a vehicle in
a public place, and is thus governed by Chapter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code.
HN12 The Texas Transportation Code expands
the State's ability to search and seize without
a wan·ant, providing implied consent to obtain
blood samples from persons suspected of driving while intoxicated, in certain circumstances,
even without a search warrant. As the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held in Beeman v.
State,

HN13 "[t]he implied consent law
[codified in TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN._§.
724.011] expands on the State's
search capabilities by providing a
framework for drawing DWI suspects' blood in the absence of a search
warrant. It gives officers an additional weapon in their investigative ar-

senal, enabling them to draw blood
in certain limited circumstances even
without a search warrant."
86 S. W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
HN14 The Texas Transportation Code provides
that a person who has been arrested for the offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and in a public place [**13] is deemed
to have consented to the taking of one or more
specimens of blood or breath to analyze the alcohol concentration amount or presence of a
controlled substance. TEX. TRANSP. CoDE ANN.
§ 724.011 (West 2011). The person retains the
right, [*116] subject to automatic suspension of
his license, to refuse to give a specimen. Id. §.
724.013. However, if the suspect refuses to provide a specimen voluntarily and the arresting
officer has credible information that the suspect has been previously convicted twice of
DWI, then the officer "shall require the taking of a specimen of the person's breath or blood
.... " Id. § 724.0l 2(b )(3 )(B ).

Officer Rios requested a specimen of Aviles's
breath and read him the statutory warning allowing Aviles to refuse the breath and blood
draws. When Aviles refused, Officer Rios required a mandatory blood draw from Aviles
based on section 724.012(b)(3)(B). There is evidence that Officer Rios possessed credible information from a reliable source-his mobile
laptop-that Aviles had two prior DWI convictions. This situation, as outlined in section
724.012, is one of the "circumstances" the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held where
blood may be drawn without a [**14] search
warrant. See Beeman. 86 S.W.3d at 616. Thus,
the wmTantless seizure of Aviles' s blood was
conducted according to the prescriptions of the
Transportation Code, and without violating
Aviles's Fourth Amendment rights.
Aviles argues there was no physical impossibility for Officer Rios to obtain a warrant from
the magistrate because his blood was drawn at
the infirmary in the magistrate's office. This
is immaterial given the mandate of section
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724.012(b)(3){B). Aviles finally argues that by
did not err in denying Aviles' s motion to supadmitting the blood into evidence, the court vio- press or in admitting his blood specimen
lated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourevidence. There was probable cause for
Aviles' s arrest. Furthermore, according to the
teenth Amendments. Although Ai iles presents this contention as his third point of error,
Texas Transportation Code section 724.012,
[**15] Officer Rios was authorized to require
he fails to address this point in the substantive
portion of his brief. Thus, he has waived his
the mandatory blood draw from Aviles withlast point of en-or. See HN15 TEX. R. APP. P.
out express consent and without a warrant, given
38. Hi) (stating brief must contain clear and con- Aviles's two prior DWI convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
cise argument for contentions made with appropriate citations to record and authorities).
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
1

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court
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j Opinion

[*111] AFFIRMED

Appellant Antonio Aviles was charged with
felony driving while intoxicated. After [*112]
the trial court denied his motion to suppress,
Aviles entered a plea of nolo contendere and was
sentenced to two years confinement in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division. 1 On appeal, Aviles challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress, arguing the court erred by admitting
into evidence his blood specimen because he
was arrested without a wanant, and his blood
sample was obtained without consent and without a warrant. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Joe Rios testified that on June 2, 2011, he
was patrolling the streets of San Antonio as part
of the DW1 ("Driving While Intoxicated") enforcement program. Officer Rios was driving
northbound on Zarzamora at approximately
2:20 a.m. when he saw a Mazda pickup veering across lane markers. As Officer Rios approached the vehicle, it crossed the lane markers again and veered into his lane. Based on this
erratic driving, Officer Rios suspected the
driver was intoxicated and initiated a traffic
stop to check on the driver's condition.

Officer Rios testified that after he pulled the vehicle over, he noticed the driver, later identified as Aviles, had bloodshot eyes and slurred
speech. Aviles was unsteady on his feet when Officer Rios asked him to exit the vehicle.
Then, when Officer Rios asked Aviles to perform three standardized field sobriety teststhe horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN"), the
walk-and-tum, and the one-leg-stand-Officer
Rios testified Aviles exhibited signs of intoxication on each test. Based on Aviles' s erratic driving, physical appearance, [**3] and performance on the field sobriety tests, Officer Rios
placed Aviles under arrest for DWI.
Following the arrest, Officer Rios checked
Aviles' s criminal history on his mobile laptop
and discovered Aviles had two prior DWI convictions. Officer Rios testified he believed
the database he accessed via his mobile laptop
was reliable. Officer Rios requested a specimen of Aviles's breath or blood and read him
the DWI statutory warning in Spanish.2 When
Aviles refused to produce either specimen, Officer Rios required a blood draw from Aviles
based upon section 724.012 of the Texas
Transportation Code. HNI Section 724.012
states: "[a] peace officer shall require the taking of a specimen of the person's breath or blood
under any of the following circumstances ...
[for example, if] at the time of the arrest, the officer possesses or receives reliable information from a credible source that the person, on
two or more occasions, has been previously
convicted of or placed on community supervision for an offense under Section 49.04 [DWI] .
.. Penal Code." TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN._§_
724.012(b)(3)(B) (West 2011). Officer Rios
took Aviles to the nurse's infirmary for the blood
draw, and filled out a THP-51 [**4] statutory
authorization form, 3 a mandatory blood draw
checklist, and a chain of custody form. Officer Rios took [*113] Aviles to nurse Eliza-

1
Despite his plea, Aviles has a right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. See TEx. R. APP. P. 25.2 (noting that in plea
bargain cases, defendant may appeal matters raised on written motion filed [**2] and ruled on before trial, or after getting trial
court's permission to appeal).
2

Aviles is a Spanish speaker.

3

The THP-51 form contains the same language as section 724.012~"[i]f at the time of the suspect's arrest, [the police officer] possessed or received reliable information from a credible source that on two or more occasions the suspect had previously been convicted of[... ) DWI," the officer may require the suspect to give a specimen of blood.
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beth Arguello who drew Aviles' s blood. Officer HN2 We review the trial court's denial of a motestified he saw the nurse draw Aviles' s
tion to suppress under a bifurcated standard
into a vial, put the vial in an envelope,
of review. Valtierra v. State. 310 S.W.3d 442,
put it in a locked container inside a refrigera447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court's detor.
termination of historical facts will be given almost total deference, while the trial court's apOn cross-examination, Officer Rios testified
plication of the law will be reviewed de
his patrol car did not have onboard video, and
novo. Cannouche v. State, IO S.W.3d 323, 328
that Aviles did not resist or attempt to flee
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When the trial court
once he initiated the traffic stop. Officer Rios
does not issue findings of fact and none are realso testified he was certified to administer field quested, as in this case, we imply findings
sobriety tests, and he took a refresher course
that support the trial court's ruling if the evion the subject within the last twelve to eighdence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
teen months.
ruling, supports those findings. See Valtierra,
310 S.W.3d. at 449. "[T]he trial judge is the sole
Elizabeth Arguello testified she is a registered
trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnurse with University Hospital and assigned to
nesses and the weight to be given to their testhe City of San Antonio magistrate's office. Artimony." St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720,
guello detailed [**5] the procedures she fol725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). HN3 A trial
lowed when she drew Aviles's blood followcourt's ruling on a motion to [**7] suppress
ing his arrest. On cross-examination, Arguello
will be upheld if there is any valid theory of law
admitted she did not have a direct recollection of
applicable to the case, even if the trial court
Aviles, and was basing her testimony on the
did not base its decision on that theory. State v.
written affidavit she signed at the time of
Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim.
Aviles's blood draw.
App. 2002).
After hearing the evidence and argument, the
Warrantless Arrest
trial court denied Aviles' s motion to suppress.
Thereafter, Aviles pled nolo contendere to
Aviles first contends the trial court erred in dethe charge of driving while intoxicated and
was sentenced to two years confinement. Aviles nying his motion to suppress because he was
arrested without a warrant. HN4 A defendant
now appeals, contending the trial court erred
to suppress evidence on the basis of an
seeking
in denying his motion to suppress.
alleged Fourth [*114] Amendment violation
bears the initial burden of rebutting the presumpANALYSIS
tion of proper police conduct. Young v. State,
On appeal, Aviles argues the trial court erred in 283 S.W.3d 854, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A
defendant meets this burden by demonstrating
denying his motion to suppress because: (1)
that
the challenged search or seizure occurred
he was arrested without a warrant, (2) his blood
without
a warrant. Id. The burden then shifts
sample was obtained without consent and withto
the
State
to prove that the search or seizure
out a warrant,4 and (3) the blood was admitwas
reasonable
under the totality of the circumted into evidence in violation of his rights unstances. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666,
der the Sixth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
672-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This burden
Amendments.
may be satisfied by a showing that one of the
statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement
Standard of Review
4

Notably, Aviles fails to address the Texas Transportation Code, specifically section 724.012, which governs the issue he
brings on appeal-the blood draw following his DWI arrest. Other than stating at oral argument that the statute must comply
with the dictates of the state and federal constitutions, [**6] Aviles also fails to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. See
Smith v. State. 721 S.W.2d 844. 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that even constitutional claims can be waived by failing
to object); Smith 1, State. 256 S.W.3d 341. 343 (Tex. Aop.-San Antonio 2007) (same).
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is met. See Torres v. State. 182 S.W.3d 899.
902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

the traffic stop. See HN7 TEx. TRANSP. CoDE
ANN. § 545.060(b) (West 2011) (requiring drivers to remain in single lane unless movement
outside of lane can be made safely).

In this case, it is undisputed that no warrant
was issued for Aviles' s arrest. As a result, the
State bore the burden of establishing [**8] the
reasonableness of Aviles' s detention and arrest. See Young. 283 S.W.3d at 872; Amador.
221 S.W.3d at 672-73. HNS Whether a specific search or seizure is reasonable or supported by probable cause is a question of law
subject to de novo review. Dixon v. State, 206
S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. C1im. App. 2006).

HN6 Law enforcement officers may stop and
briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Teny
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868. 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889 (1968). To initiate an investigative
stop, the officer must possess a reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts that, in
light of the officer's experience and general
knowledge, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that the person detained actually
is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Solwlow, 490 U.S.
1. 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581. 104 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1989); Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527. 530
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Whether the officer's
suspicion was reasonable is evaluated based on
the totality of the circumstances. See Derichsweiler v. State. 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011).
At the suppression hearing, Officer Rios testified Aviles' s conduct attracted [**9] his attention "at 2:20 AM at night" because he was
"veering across lane markers" and "veered into
his lane." We hold this erratic driving gave Officer Rios reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop to check on the driver's condition.
See Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376. 377, 381
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding officer had
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated and was justified in making investigatory stop when officer saw defendant weave at least three times out of his lane
over short distance around 1:00 a.m.).
Aviles's driving also constituted a traffic violation, which authorized Officer Rios to make

When Officer Rios approached Aviles, he
found Aviles had bloodshot eyes and slurred
speech. When asked to exit the vehicle, Aviles
was extremely unsteady on his feet. Officer
Rios asked Aviles to perform three standardized field sobriety tests-the HGN, walk-andturn, and the one-leg-stand. Officer Rios testified Aviles exhibited signs of intoxication on
each test.

HN8 Whether probable cause [**10] exists to
justify a warrantless arrest must be considered under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Amador v. State, 275
S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We
find the facts described above gave Officer Rios
probable cause to arrest Aviles for driving
while intoxicated, based on his erratic driving,
slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and performance [*115] during the field-sobriety tests.
See Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901-02
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (allowing officer to
make warrantless arrest based on his observations and personal knowledge that offense was
or is being committed); State v. Stevenson,
958 S.W.2d 824, 829 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty. 468 U.S.
420, 423, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317
(1984)) (holding appellant's failure of field
sobriety test provided probable cause for arrest); see also State v. Garrett, 22 S.W.3d 650,
654 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000) (noting that
smell of alcohol, watery eyes, and unsteadiness
are all classic signs that suggest suspect' s mental and physical faculties might be impaired and
help establish probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while intoxicated). Therefore,
we overrule Aviles's point of error regarding an
improper [**11] warrantless arrest.
Blood Draw
HN9 The withdrawal of a blood specimen
from a person is considered a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v.
California. 384 U.S. 757, 767. 86 S. Ct.
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1826. 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). HNlO The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution assure the right to be free from unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. Am.end. Iv;
CoNST. art. L § 9. HNll A search or seizure
conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 3 89
U.S. 347. 357. 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576
0967); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

senal, enabling them to draw blood
in certain limited circumstances even
without a search warrant."
86 S. W3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002).

HN14 The Texas Transportation Code provides
that a person who has been arrested for the offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and in a public place [**13] is deemed
lo have consented to the taking of one or more
specimens of blood or breath to analyze the alcohol concentration amount or presence of a
controlled substance. TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 724.011 (West 2011). The person retains the
right, [*116] subject to automatic suspension of
his license, to refuse to give a specimen. Id. §.
724.013. However, if the suspect refuses to provide a specimen voluntarily and the arresting
officer has credible information that the suspect has been previously convicted twice of
DWI, then the officer "shall require the taking of a specimen of the person's breath or blood
.... " Id. § 724. 0 l 2(b )(3 )(B ).

Aviles contends the trial court erred in admitting his blood specimen into evidence because
the sample was taken without his consent
and without a warrant. Aviles cites case law for
the proposition that absent consent, taking a
blood sample from a defendant in custody requires a validly-obtained warrant. See Davis v.
State, 831 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Austin
1992, pet. ref'd.); see also McBride v. State,
840 S .W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, pet.
ref'd.). He also cites Article 18.01 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. arguing
that a blood draw is an evidentiary
Officer Rios requested a specimen of Aviles's
[**12] search requiring a warrant. However,
Davis and McBride do not apply to this case be- breath and read him the statutory warning allowing Aviles to refuse the breath and blood
cause they dealt with murder and sexual asdraws.
When Aviles refused, Officer Rios resault, respectively, whereas Aviles' s case deals
quired
a mandatory blood draw from Aviles
with an offense while operating a vehicle in
based
on
section 724.012(b)(3)(B). There is evia public place, and is thus governed by Chapdence that Officer Rios possessed credible inter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code.
HN12 The Texas Transp01iation Code expands formation from a reliable source-his mobile
laptop-that Aviles had two prior DWI convicthe State's ability to search and seize without
a warrant, providing implied consent to obtain tions. This situation, as outlined in section
724.012, is one of the "circumstances" the
blood samples from persons suspected of driving while intoxicated, in certain circumstances, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held where
blood may be drawn without a [**14] search
even without a search warrant. As the Texas
warrant. See Beeman. 86 S.W.3d at 616. Thus,
Court of Criminal Appeals held in Beeman v.
the warrantless seizure of Aviles' s blood was
State,
conducted according to the prescriptions of the
Transpo1iation Code, and without violating
HN13 "[t]he implied consent law
Aviles' s Fourth Amendment rights.
[codified in TEx. TRANSP. CoDE ANN._§_
724.011] expands on the State's
Aviles argues there was no physical impossibilsearch capabilities by providing a
ity for Officer Rios to obtain a warrant from
framework for drawing DWI susthe magistrate because his blood was drawn at
pects' blood in the absence of a search
the
infirmary in the magistrate's office. This
warrant. It gives officers.an addiis
immaterial
given the mandate of section
tional weapon in their investigative ar-

CARTER WTh1TERS

118

Page 8 of 8
A

L "t

724.012(b )(3 )(B). Aviles finally argues that by
admitting the blood into evidence, the court
lated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Although Aviles presents this contention as his third point of error,
fails to address this point in the substantive
portion of his brief. Thus, he has waived his
last point of en-or. See HNIS TEx. R. APP. P.
3 8 .1 (i) (stating brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions made with appropriate citations to record and authorities).

did not en- in denying Aviles's motion to suppress or
admitting his blood specimen into
evidence. There was probable cause for
Aviles' s an-est. Furthermore, according to the
Texas Transportation Code section 724.012,
[**15] Officer Rios was authmized to require
the mandatory blood draw from Aviles without express consent and without a warrant, given
Aviles's two prior DWI convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court
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GUilTY PLEA ADVISORY

Date:

I
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Pleading Guilty to: Charge(s):

Fe-:!j

;cJ yf2_s;

J)cce-

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS

Minimum & Maximum Prison/Fine

I~ tJ07} &d
I

'

& EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS

BY PLEA OF GUILTY

(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE)

I. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything about the crime(s) you are
accused of committing. If you have a trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you
any questions. However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court.
I u n ~ that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent before and during
trial.
.
II. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of g.uilty to the crime(s) in this
case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any question or
to provide any information that might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can
also refuse to answer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment for
the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty.
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the right to remain
silent with respect to any other crime(s) an~spect to answering questions or providing
information that may increase my sentence.
.

Ill. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney and cannot pay for
one, you ca!!-sk the judge for an attorney who will be paid by the county.
I
understand ~ .

rv.

You are presumed to be innocenLXou would be found guilty if: 1) you plead guilty in front of the
judge, or 2) you are found guilty a jury tdat.

at

-1-
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I ~ t a ~ d that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed innocent

You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court hearing to determine
whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) brought against you. In a jury trial, you have
the right to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must
convince each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I ~stan.d that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and public jury trial.

VI. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs during a jury trial where
the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify under oath in front of you, the jury,
and your attorney. Your attorney could then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could
also call your own witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or innocence. If
you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, the state will pay the cost of
bringing your witnesses to court.
l understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my rightjo _.f.Onfront the witnesses against me,
and to present witnesses and evidence in my defense. (;)f/f~ .

QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA

(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question consult your attorney
before answering.)
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE

1. Do you read and write the English language?
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to
help you fill out this form?

2. What is your age?

?/7
fl

C.

M ,: t l ( ~ll I\_,
What was the highest grade you completed in school? _C~o--..l~l~~'---1<---------.
..

I

..----,

.It

IA

3. What is your true and legal name? ~ ( (J (L,
4.

NIA

NO

YES

If you did not complete high school, have you received
either a general education diploma or high school
equivalency diploma?

5. Are you currently under the care of a mental health
professional?

-2-

(i;)
YES

NO

6)
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NIA

6. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health
disorder?

~

~NO

If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? ___:t?J;.-,..<'-'---,yf)--(,__AY,=-..---CX-"--"'0__,f'--0_
7. Are you currently prescribed any medication?
If so, have you taken your prescription medication
during the past 24 hours?

(9

NO

€)No

8. in the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or
drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages which you
believe affect your ability to make a reasoned and
informed decision in this case?

YES

9. ls there any other reason that you would be unable to
make a reasoned and informed decision in this case?

YES

10. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement?

YES

8

If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement?
(If available, a written plea agreement should be
attached hereto as "Addendum 'A"')

11. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial
the one paragraph below which describes the type
of plea you are entering:
a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement.
This means that if the district court does not impose the specific
sentence as recommended by both parties, l will be allowed to
withdraw my plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial. _ _ __
b. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea
agreement. This means that the court is not bound by the agreement
or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence
authorized by law, including the maximum sentence stated above.
Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court
chooses not to follow the agreement, I will not have the right to
withdraw my guilty plea. _ _ __

-3-
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NIA

As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading
guilty
more than one crime?
If so, do you understand that your sentences for
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently
(at the same time) or consecutively (one after the other)?

YES

NO

14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment
of conviction and sentence as part of your plea
agreement?

YES

(!§I

15. Have any other promises been made to you which have
influenced your decision to plead guilty?

YES

13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues?
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal?

cA;{ ( cfl"l!±Vi'ttf ~A fl/ ru5

8

If so, what are those promises?

&

16. Have you had sufficient time to discuss
your case with your attorney?

17. Have you told your attorney everything you know about
the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty?
18. Is there anything you have requested your attorney
to do that has not been done?

NO

@No
YES€)

If yes, please explain.

19. Your attorney can get various items from the
prosecutor relating to your case. These may include
police reports, witness statements, tape recordings,
photographs, reports of scientific testing, etc. This is
called discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence
provided to your attorney in discovery?
-4-
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NO
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N/A

Are there any witnesses whose testimony would show
that you are innocent?

YES

. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive
any defenses, both factual and legal, that you believe
you may have in this case?

Q
NO

22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that
you believe should still be filed in this case?

YES@

If so, what motions or requests?

23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to challenge
any rulings that came before the guilty plea including:
1) any searches or seizures that occurred in your case;
2) any issues concerning the method or manner of your
Arrest; and 3) any issues about any statements you may
have made to law enforcement officers?

~YE

((7

NO

If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this case
could be the basis of a violation of that probation or parole? YES

NO

24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are
admitting the truth of each and every allegation contained
in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty?

25. Are you currently on probation or parole?

26. If you are not a citizen of the United States, the entry
of a plea or making of factual admissions could have
consequences of deportation or removal, inability to
obtain legal status in the United States, or denial of
an application for United States citizenship. Do you
understand?
27. Is the crime to which you will plead guilty one which
will require you to register as a sex offender?
(I.C. § 18-8304)

28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case?
(1.C. § 19-5304)

-5-
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@No
YES

e)

(t)NO
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NIA

Have you agreed to pay restitution in another case as
a condition of your plea agreement in this case?
If so, to whom? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(J

30. Do you understand that if the Court orders a presentence
Investigation report you shall be ordered to pay an amount
to be determined by the Department of Correction
·
not to exceed $100? (I.C. § 19-2516)
~
31. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension as a
result of a guilty plea in this case?
If so, for how long must your license be suspended?

tt:;;)
V,

33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you may be
required to pay the costs of prosecution and
investigation? (I.C. § 37-2732A(K))

NO

up::h f-2y {2...$ ·

32. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a mandatory
domestic violence, substance abuse, or psychosexual
evaluation is required?
(1.C. §§ 18-918(7)(a),-8005(9),-8317)

NO

b

YES

YES

t:V

e

34. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to a felony
you will be required to comply with the Idaho DNA Databas~
Testing Act and that failure to do so is a felony offense?
~ NO
35. Are you pleading guilty to a crime of violence for which
the court could impose a civil penalty of up to $5,000,
payable to the victim of the crime? (I.C. § 19-5307)
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your
right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3)

37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your right
to hold public office in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3)

38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,

L)
YES

/v:)
I/
a
~

~

NO

NO

n

during the period of your sentence, you will lose your right
to perform jury service in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3)
~ NO

39. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony
you wili lose your right to purchase, possess, or carry
firearms? (I.C. § 18-310)
-6-

/ollp,

eNO
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40. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney,
can force you to plead guilty in this case?

NO

41. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily?

NO

Are you pleading guilty because you did commit the acts
alleged in the information or indictment?

43. If you were provided with an interpreter to help you fill out
this form, have you had any trouble understanding your
interpreter?
44. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions
in this form which you could not resolve by discussion with
your attorney?

L:)
lc:..v

NO

£)
YES

NO l

r:!;f

fl:;:;\
YES

~

have answered the questions on pages 1-7 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form truthfully,
understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each question and
answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no
one has threatened me to do so.

Datedthis

,Q,q~

dayof~J~

,-W13.-

/2.0{i.J,

~v:.-.fk~~
DEFENDANT

ve discussed, in detail, the foregoing questions and answers

/
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!this case until appellate court comes down with decision on
1
another similar case. states reasons. setting this in june

I

11 : 10: 53 AM! no objections
'
11 :10:57 AMfHonorable Patrick Hjwill set sentencing to 6/12. warns def of drinking while out
I
!Owen
11:11:51 AMiend

4/10/2014

i
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District Cou rt June 11, 2014 H

Time

rable Patrick H Owen , presiding

Speaker

B-COURTROOM

Note

10:29:28 AMJSentencing CR-2013-458 j0efendant present with Counsel
/State v TRICIA
:
!FRANKLIN - Judge
!
iPatrick H Owen - Chief :
i
/Dpty Prosecutor Jay
Rosenthal - Defense Atty
!Phillip Gordon - COURT /
/REPORTER Kasey
.
Redlich - Clerk Lisa
/London

l

i

i

10:29:31 AM fHonorable Patrick H
/Owen
10:30:03 AM iDefense Attorney

tcALL OF THE CASE.

i

I

iask reconsider to stay sentencing. discusses implied

.... . . .. .. ........... ..... .1... . . . . . .. . . . . .. ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . .. .... 1.?.?. ~.~:~~. . . . . ..... . .... . . . . ..... ..:. . . . . .. . ... . .... . . . . ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . .... . ... .. .. . ..
10:33:48 AM 1Honorable Patrick H

/decline to reconsider. Will proceed to sentencing .

i... . . . ... .... . . .. . . . .. .. . ... .. . . ..... . . .... . . . . . .... . . . .. .. .... ...... . . ... . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . ... . . . . . .... . . . . ·

........................................... !Owen................................................................
10:36:56 AMjJay Rosenthal
jNo additions or corrections to psi
jno additions or corrections to psi
10:36:59 AM jDefense Attorney
10:37:03 AMjd
[have read psi. doesn't need more time
10:37:21 AM!Jay Rosenthal
!statement. same as Tussing . Recommends CAPP rider
i
:or severe sentence.
10:40:31 AM JDefense Attorney
/statement. asks for 1 yr fixed suspend sentence and put.
i
/on probation.
I
·{o":·si:·4·9. AM·l~t~~·afi"ie···Paii:rck·R·················1·························································································································································-····-·········-················1
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••O OO OO•• o ooo ,o OOOOOO•OOOOOOlOO<•oO• OO oOoOOOO•oO OO O•OO•oOOoO Oo o OooOo o > ooO H Oo o ooooOooO o o ·O • • • • • • -

10:52:54 AM fd
10:54:58 AM f Honorable Patrick H
/Owen
/
10:56:06 AM fd
10:56:09 AM1Honorable Patrick H
/Owen

II

• o • • • • • • • • • • O • • J • • o • • o•• • o • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • o • • o • • • • o • • .• o •o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • - • • > o Ooo O<O-OooOoO oooO o oO o o Oo oOo O O oo o o o OO o o oO O OOoOOOO o Oo <OOo O O OoO OOoO O•oOoooO, O OoOOoOooOOooOO-oOOO-OoO o oOOo o OoOooOOo Oo Oo o O

!statement
!find guilty. will stay executin of this sentence pending
/appeal. warns of alcohol consumption, will vacate stay
/and impose sentence
!agrees
l as serious as can be. I will impose sentence if you drink.
/joc, 1+5=6 recommend CAPP rider, susp di for 2yrs, 1yr
/absolute. Can apply for driving priv. in second yr. No
/credit. no fine. I will stay the execution of this sentence
i pending the appeal currently in front of the supreme
jcourt.

11 :04:16 AMjd
j
11 :04:31 AM iHonorable Patrick H
/giving you an opportunity to take advantage
iOwen
!
11 :04:45 AM~
',.! end
. . . . ·1REPa°RTER k "asey Redlich ·~.EST COST $100.00 - Clerk ·
Lisa London

i
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2013-00458

vs.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
AND ORDER RETAINING
JURISDICTION

TRICIA M. FRANKLIN,
DOB:
SSN:
Defendant.

On June 12, 2014, Jay F. Rosenthal, Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Boise, State
of Idaho, and the defendant, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, with her attorney, Philip H. Gordon,
appeared before this Court for sentencing. The defendant was duly informed of the Information
filed against her for the crimes of COUNT I: OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WI-ULE
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR OTHER DRUGS (THIRD OFFENSE
WITHIN TEN YEARS), FELONY, LC. §18-8004, §18-8005(6), and COUNT II: DRIVING
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES (SECOND WITHIN FIVE YEARS), MISDEMEANOR, LC. §188001(4), committed on or about February 6, 2013, and her plea of guilty to Count I thereto on
January 29, 2014.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER RETAINING JURISDICTION - Page l
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The defendant, and defendant's counsel, were then asked if they had any legal cause or
reason to offer why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced against the defendant, and
if the defendant, or defendant's counsel, wished to offer any evidence or to make a statement on
behalf of the defendant, or to present any information to the Court in mitigation of punishment;
and the Court, having accepted such statements, and having found no legal cause or reason why
judgment and sentence should not be pronounced against the defendant at this time; does render
its judgment of conviction as follows, to-wit:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant is
guilty of the crime of COUNT I: OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR OTHER DRUGS (THIRD OFFENSE WITHIN TEN
YEARS), FELONY, I.C. §18-8004, §18-8005(6), and that she be sentenced pursuant to the
Uniform Sentence Law of the State of Idaho, Idaho Code § 19-2513, to the custody of the State
ofldaho Board of Correction for an aggregate term of six ( 6) years: with the first one (1) year of
said term to be FIXED, and with the remaining five (5) years of said term to be
INDETERMINATE, with such sentence to commence immediately.
Count II of the Information is hereby dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
The Court will retain jurisdiction for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed three
hundred sixty-five (365) days pursuant to LC.§ 19-2601(4).
The Court recommends the Department of Correction place the defendant in the CAPP
rider program.
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 31-320 I A(b) the defendant shaB pay court costs in the
amount of $17.50; County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to
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LC. § 31-4502; P.O.S.T. Academy fees in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to LC. § 3 l-3201B;
£STARS technology fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to LC. § 31-3201(5); $75.00
reimbursement, to the Victims Compensation Fund pursuant to LC. § 72-1025; Peace Officer
Temporary Disability Fund in the amount of $3.00 pursuant to LC. § 72-1105; $30.00 domestic
violence fee; Victim Notification Fee (VINE) in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to LC. § 313204; Emergency Surcharge Fee in the amount of $100.00 pursuant to LC. § 31-3201H; and
$15.00 surcharge required by LC. § 18-8010 for interlock ignition and electronic monitoring
devices.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's driver's license or permit is suspended

for a period of two (2) years. The first year of the suspension is an absolute suspension pursuant
to LC. § 18-8005, to commence on the date of defendant's release from incarceration and
consecutive to any current driver's license suspensions. Thereafter, the defendant's driver's
license is suspended on a further period of one ( 1) year. The defendant can apply to the Court for
restricted privileges during this further period.
The defendant shall be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Boise County, to be
delivered FORTHWITH by him into the custody of the State of Idaho Board of Correction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this Judgment to
the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of the defendant.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
You, TRICIA M. FRANKLIN, are hereby notified that you have the right to appeal this
order to the Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two ( 42) days
from the entry ofthis judgment.
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are further notified that you have the right to be represented by an attorney in any
appeal, that if you cannot afford to retain an attorney, one may be appointed at public expense.
Further, if you are a needy person, the costs of the appeal may be paid for by the State of Idaho.

If you have questions about your appeal rights, you should consult your present la\\yer.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this lih day of June, 2014.

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF IDA.H. 0 } SS
COUNTY OF BOISE
·
I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument is a
full, true and correct ~opy of the orJg1nal on file in
the office of the und1>rs!gned Clerk.
0--

-

l
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the

j£'J_ day of June, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct

copy of the within instrument to:
JAY ROSENTHAL
BOISE COUNTY PROSECUTil-JG ATTORNEY
406 MONTGOMERY STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 186
IDAHO CITY, IDAHO 83631
PHILIP H. GORDON
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHARTERED
623 WHAYS ST
BOISE, ID 83702-5512
ADA COUNTY JAIL
VIA: EMAIL
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT
VIA: EMAIL
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
VIA: EMAIL
DRIVER SERVICES
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PO BOX 7129
BOISE ID 83707

MARY T. PRISCO
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By~___,~;;;;;;·.;...J!..t.~-,:~~·IG....;-:....0~,C~le~rk~~~
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-2013-00458

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER STAYING EXECUTION
OF JUDGMENT

TRIC
DOB
SSN:

N,

Defendant.

Pursuant to I.A.R. 13(c)(7), as an exercise of discretion, the Court will stay execution of the
judgment upon Defendant's appeal of the suppression ruling to the Idaho Supreme Court. The stay
of execution is conditioned upon the defendant filing and pursuing such an appeal, or unless as
otherwise ordered by the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

f]

day of June, 2014.

trick H. Owen
District Judge

ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT-PAGE-1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1 hereby certify

on

day of June, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and correct

copy of the within instrument to:
JAY ROSENTHAL
BOISE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORh1EY
406 MONTGOMERY STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 186
IDAHO CITY, IDAHO 83631
PHILIP H. GORDON
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHARTERED
623 WHAYS ST
BOISE, ID 83702-5512
ADA COUNTY JAIL
VIA: EMAIL
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT
VIA: EMAIL
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
VIA: EMAIL
DRIVER SERVICES
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PO BOX 7129
BOISE ID 83707

MARY T. PRISCO

ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT- PAGE-2

Ju L 30. 2014 9: 48AM

Go rd on La. w Ot t I ces
RfCT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO
ded in Book _ _P.age,_ _

Fited

JUL 3 0 2014 _

No.

~ARY PRISCO, Clerk

Philip Gordon, ISB #1996
GORDON LAW OFFICES,
623 W, Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 345~7100
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050

By .

J.it:41-s0·

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE
TRICIA FRANKLIN,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458
NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE
ATTORNEYS FOR THE RESPONDENT, NAMELY JAY ROSENTHAL, BOISE COUNTY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,406 MONTGOMERY STREET, P.O. BOX 186,
IDAHO CITY, ID 83631, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT the above named appellant, Trioia Franklin, hereby
appeals against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment of
Conviction filed herein on the 19th day of June, 2014, and from any and all pre~trial decisions,
including the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed on Januazy 17u\
NOTICE OF APPEALw Page 1
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DEPUTY

IJUl,.JV•
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2014, and any written denial of a Motion fo:r Reconsideration of that Decision and Order.
In conformance with Rule 11 (c) of the above entitled court, Appellant, states as follows:

1.

The title of the action and the case number assigned to it in the District Court are
as set forth above,

2.

The Court which heard the proceeding is the District Court for the Fourth Judicial
District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Boise, Honorable Patrick
H. Owen, District Judge.

3,

The party making and filing this appeal is the Defendant, Tricia Franklin, and her
attorney is the undersigned, whose address, phone number and email address are
as set forth above. The respondent in this matter is the State of Idaho, which was

represented in the trial Court by the Prosecuting Attorney for Boise, County,
Idaho. The respondent will be represented on appeal by the Office of the Attorney
General ofidaho.
4.

What is being appealed from is the Judgment of Conviction filed herein on the
19th day of June, 2014, and from any and all pre-trial decisions1 including the

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed on January 171\
2014, and any written denial of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision and
Order.
5.

The principal issue on appeal is the Defendant's contention that the results of the

test of a sample of her blood, which was drawn without a warrant and over her
objection, should have been suppressed.

NOTICE OF APPEAL- Page 2
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6.

This appealis taken as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(l) or (6)
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, in that it is an appeal either from a final
judgment of conviction or a judgment imposing (but staying) sentence
after conviction.

7.

Defenda..11t requests a standard transcript, as the same is defined in Rule 25
(d) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. The transcript of the hearing on the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress has already been prepared, and it should
be included in the record. That latter transcript has already been provided

to counsel in hard copy. Defendant requests that the transcript of the
sentencing hearing be prepared compressed format, as described in Rule
26(m), I.A.R.

8.

At present it is the intention of the Defendant to designate, for inclusion in
the clerk's record, only such matters as are included in the standard record,
as set forth Rule 28(b)(2), I.A.R. and such other matters as, after due
inspection to be hereafter conducted, appear necessary to the proper
appellate resolution of this cause.

9.

As the attorney of record for the appellant, I hereby certify as follows:
a.)

Concurrently with the filing of this Notice of Appeal 1 a copy thereofis
being served upon the Court Reporter, who transcribed the sentencing
· hearing held in this matter.

b.)

As soon as the clerk of the district court provides the undersigned with an

NOTICE OF APPEAL= Page 3
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estimated cost to prepare the reporter's transcript, the appellant will pay

the same.
c.)

As soon as the clerk of the district court provides the undersigned with an
estimated cost to prepare t'fie clerk's record, the appellant will pay the

same.
d.)

There are no appellate filing fees given that this is a criminal appeal.

e.)

That service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to

(1 )1 Idaho Code.
Dated: July 301h, 2014.

e within and

foregoing document,

o indicated below:
Jay Rosenthal
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 186
Idaho City, Id 83631
State ofidaho

Office of Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720w0010

NOTICE OF APPEAL· Page 4

_ _ hand delivery
U.S. mail
_ _ overnight mail
_,.K. facsimile: 392-3760

In the Supreme Court of the State Olrl~1sEcouNrY,10
Recorded in Book_. _Page._.-

ST ATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER CONDITIONALLY
DISMISSING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 42390-2014
Boise County No. 2013-458

The Appellant having failed to pay the necessary fee for preparation of the Clerk's
Record on appeal as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 27(c) and the fee for preparation of the
Reporter's Transcript on appeal as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 24(c). In addition., the Notice
of Appeal is not in compliance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17 for the reason neither the Notice of
Appeal nor the Certificate of Services shows service on the reporter of whom a transcript is
requested; therefore,

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is, CONDITIONALLY
DISMISSED unless the required fees for preparation of the Cierk's Record and Reporter's
Transcript are paid to the District Court Clerk or an Order is obtained from the District Court
providing for payment at county expense within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that in the event this appeal continues, this appeal is
SUSPENDED in order for Appellant to file an AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL in compliance
with Idaho Appellate Rule 17. The Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed ,;vith the District Court
Clerk v..rithin fourteen (14) days of the reinstatement.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED lliat this appeal is SUSPENDED until further notice.
(If-:

DATED this _fL_ day of August, 2014.

.

.

.

.For the Supreme Court

"nieiyhw'- ¥~~'\Stephen W. Kenyon,~
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Judge

ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL- Docket No. 42390-2014

/Lf/

g.

28. 2014 1: 11 PM
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Philip Gordon, ISB # 1996
GORDON LAW OFFICES,
623 W. Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-7100
Facsimile: (208) 345-0050
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE
TRlCIA FRANKLIN,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458

)
)
)
)
)

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE
ATTORNEYS FOR THE RESPONDENT, NAMELY JAY ROSENTHAL, BOISE COUNTY
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY)406 MONTGOMERY STREET, P.O. BOX 186,
IDAHO CITY, ID 83631, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT the above named appellant, Tricia Franklin, hereby
appeals against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment of
Conviction filed herein on the 19th day of June, 2014, and from any and all pre-trial decisions,
including the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed on January 17fu,

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL- Page 1
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2014, and any written denial of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision and Order.
In conforma..nce with Rule 11 (c) of the above entitled court, Appellant, states as follows:

1.

The title of the action and the case number assigned to it in the District Court are
as set forth above,

2.

The Court which heard the proceeding is the District Court for the Fourth Judicial
District of the State ofidaho, in and for the County of Boise, Honorable Patrick
H. Owen, District Judge.

3.

The party making and filing this appeal is the Defendant, Tricia Franklin, and her
attorney is the undersigned, whose address, phone number and email address are
as set forth above. The respondent in this matter is the State of Idahoi which was
represented in the trial Court by the Prosecuting Attorney for Boise, County,

Idaho. The respondent will be represented on appeal by the Office of the Attorney
General ofidaho.
4.

\\lhat is being appealed ftorn is the Judgment of Conviction filed herein on the
19th day of June, 2014, and from any and all pre-trial decisions, including the

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed on January 17\
2014, and any Mitten denial of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision and

Order.
5.

The principal issue on appeal is the Defendant's contention that the results of the
test of a sample of her blood, which was drawn vvi.thout a warrant and over her
objection, should have been suppressed.
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This appeal is taken as a matter of right, pursuant to
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, in that it is an appeal

11 (c)(l) or (6)
a final

judgment of conviction or a judgment imposing (but staying) sentence
after conviction.
7.

Defenda.'11.t requests a standard transcript, as the same is defined in Rule 25
(d) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. The transcript of the hearing on the
Defendanf s Motion to Suppress has already been prepared, and it should
be included in the record. That latter transcript has already been provided
to counsel in hard copy. Defendant requests that the transcript of the
sentencing hearing be prepared com.pressed format, as described in Rule
26(m), I.A.R.

8,

At present it is the intention of the Defendant to designate, for inclusion in
the clerk's record, only such matters as are included in the standard record1
as set forth Rule 28(b)(2), l.A.R. and such other matters as, after due
inspection to be hereafter conducted) appear necessary to the proper
appellate resolution of this cause.

9.

As the attorney ofrecord for the appellant; I hereby certify as follows:
a,)

Concurrently with the filing of this Amended Notice of Appeal, a copy
thereof is being hand served upon the Court Reporter, who transcribed the
sentencing hearing held in this matter.

b.)

A check in the amount of the estimated cost of preparing a transcript of the

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL- Page 3
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requested hearing is being hand delivered to the

Court Reporter,

together with a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal. As soon as the
clerk of the district court provides the undersigned with an estimated cost
to prepare the reporter's transcript, the appellai.i.t will pay the same.
c.)

A check in the a.mount of one hu..1").dred dollars ($100.00) was mailed to the

clerk of the district court on Wednesday, August 27t\ 2014 1 to cover tfie

estimated cost to prepare the clerk's record.
d.)

There are no appellate filing fees given that this is a criminal appeal.

e.)

Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to

Rule 20 and the Attorney General ofidaho, pursuant to Section 67-1401
(1 )) Idaho Code.

Dated: August 28111 , 2014.

I hereby certify that on Augus 8th, 2014, I caused
within and foregoing document,
to be served on the following person by the methods in · ted below:

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO }
COUNTY OF BOISE SS.
I hereby certify that the foregoing instrument is a
full, true and correct copy of the oriainal on file in
the office of the under · ·
Da
-)
V
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Jay Rosenthal
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 186
Idaho City, Id 83631

_ _ hand delivery
·U.S. mail
_ _ overnight mail
facsimile:

State ofidaho
Office of Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

_ _ hand delivery
U.S. mail
_ _ overnight mail
facsimile: 854-8074

Kasey Redlich
Court Reporter for
the Honorable Patrick Owen, District Judge
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_){,_ hand delivery
_ _ U.S.mail
_ _ overnight mail
facsimile: 854-8074

the S

ourt of the State of Idaho

DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO
Recorded in Book _ _ _Page_ _

Filed

STATE OF IDA.HO.
Plaintiff-Respondent,
\'.

TRICIA FRANKLIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

OCT I 4

/
No.

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER DISlvfISSING APPEAL
Supreme Court Dock.et No. 42390-2014
Boise Cou..11ty No. 2013-458

An ORDER CONDITJONALLY DIS.MISSING APPEAL v,ras entered August 8~

2014, because the fees for preparation of the Clerk1s Record and Reporter1s Transcript had not paid.
Appellant having failed to comply with this Court1s order of August 8, 2014; therefore,

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED the ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING
APPEAL is AFFIRlvfED and tliattp.is appeal be, and hereby is, DISivllSSED.
DATED t h i s ~day of October, 2014.
For the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Judge

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL-Do~ket No. 42390-2014

In the Supreme Court f the State of Idaho
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION

,--, DISTRICT COURT
,uURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO

OCT 1 7 2014
OF IDAHO.

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)
)

V.

TRICIA FRAN:Uil'1,

ORDER WfTHDRA'\VING DISMISSAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 42390-2014
Boise County No. 2013-458

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

An ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL for failure to pay the fees

for preparation of the Clerk's Record and the Reporter's Transcript and the Notice of Appeal

\Vas

not in compliance with Idaho Appellate RuJe 17 for the reason no service is shown on the reporter

of whom a transcript is requested was issued August 8, 2014. On October 16, 2014, the District

Court infom1ed the Court that the fees have been paid; therefore,
The ORDER CONDrTlONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL entered August 8, 2014
be, and hereby is, WITHDRAWN and the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript will be due on
or before December 22, 2014.

DATED this

Jl day of October, 20l4.
For the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
District Court Judge

ORDER WITHDR.t-\ WING DISMISSAL-Docket No. 42390-2014

P.b.ilip Gordon, ISB #1996
Bruce S. Bistline, ISB #1988
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
623 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702-5512
Telephone:
208-345-7100
208-345-0050
Facsimile:

MMISTFIATE'S DIVISION
DISTRICT COURT
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO

Attorney for PlaintifjlAppellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. CR 2013-0000458
Docket No. 42390
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS

STATE OF IDAHO,

LED . ORIGINAL

ATTORNEY OF RECO

Defendant/Respondent.

CO:rv1ES NOW Philip Gordon, of the firm Gordon Law Offices, Chtd., and pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 45, hereby moves this Court for an order allowing the firm of Gordon Law
Offices, Chtd., to withdraw as attorneys of record for the Appellant Tricia Franklin in the abovecaptioned matter.
This Motion is made and based upon the fact that the Appellant is indigent, a.rid unable to
afford the services of private counsel to pursue this appeal on her behalf. The undersigned
attorney did represent the Appellant qua Defendant in the Court below, but the Appellant was
unable to pay for all of the work performed by the undersigned in the District Court, and a very
substantial balance remains owing for work done and performed in the District Court.
Further, the principal issue in this appeal is one which was the subject of State of Idaho v.
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD Page I

ORIGINAL

Aficah Wulff, in which case the Court issued its opinion on October 29th, 2014. In that matter,

Wulff was represented by

office of the State Appellate Public Defender, and it is certain

members of that office have already done the great majority of the research and
which would be necessary in order to successfully prosecute the appeal in the instant action.

In the event that this Motion is granted, and the undersigned is given leave to withdraw as
attorney of record for the Defendant/AppeUa_nt herein, the UI1dersigned intends to immediately
thereafter file a Motion in the District CoUt-t, asking that the office of the State Appellate Public

Defender be appointed to represent her i ~ u r t .

----

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ~ ; : f October, 20 I 4.

ricia Franklin

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on e __ day of Octob , 2014, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing Motion to With aw a.s Attorney of cord by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each of the following:

Jay Rosenthal
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 1&6
Idaho City, Id 83631

_ _ hand delivery
U.S. mail
_ _ overnight mail
_,&_ facsimile: 392-3760

State of Idaho
Office of Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83 720-00 I 0

_ _ hand delivery
U.S. mail
overnight mail
~ facsimile: 854-8074

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD Page 2

\ 0

Tricia FranlJ.in
Defendant/Appellant
4007 Taft St
Boise, Idaho 83702

hand delivery
~U.S.mail
_ _ overnight mail
:fi i ·1e:

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD Page 3

the Supreme Court of the State

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

QJ;JJiUfii~;:r

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
WITHDRAW AND SUSPEND
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Supreme Court Docket No. 42390-2014
Boise County No. 2013-458

Ref 14-520

A MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD was filed by counsel for

Appellant on October 30, 2014.

Therefore,

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY
be, and hereby is, GRANTED on the condition counsel for Appellant shall serve a copy of this
Order upon Appellant ON OR BEFORE SEVEN (7) DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER and
shall file proof of service of this Order on or before seven (7) days thereafter.

Furthermore,

Appellant Tricia Franklin shall have twenty-one (21) days upon receipt of this Court's Order to

submit a Notice of Appearance of new counsel. If no such notice is filed, it will be assumed that
Appellant Tricia Franklin is appearing prose for further proceedings in this appeal.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal shall be SUSPENDED for a period of
THIRTY-FIVE .(35) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER at which time the due date for
the filing of APPELLANT'S BRIEF shall be reset.

DATED this

Jo

day of November, 2014.

By Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk

ORDER GRANTING MOTION - Docket No. 42390-2014
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DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO
Recorded in uvv"---· "i:l"·--

Tricia Franklin
4007 Taft Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Defendant Appearing Pro Se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.
TRICIA FRANKLIN

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

COMES NOW Defendant, Tricia Franklin, appearing pro se, and hereby moves this
Court for its order as follows:
1.

Granting leave to Philip Gordon, who has been her attorney of record both in this
Court, and before the Idaho Supreme Court, but who has been granted leave to
withdraw as attorney by the said Supreme Court, to withdraw as attorney of record
before this Court.

2.

Appointing the office of the State Appellate Public Defender to represent the
Defendant, qua appellant, in all further proceedings before the Supreme Court of
Idaho.

This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the Philip Gordon, prior
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER- Page 1

counsel for the Defendant, filed a Motion in the Idaho Supreme Court, pursuant to IAR 45 and
45 .1,

"'-''"''U"J'f',

leave to withdraw as Attorney of Record for the Defendant/Appellant. This Motion

was based on the fact that the Defendant/Appellant was no longer able to afford the services of
private counsel, and also on the fact that the principal issue before the Supreme Court had
already been briefed, argued and submitted to the Court.
The Idaho Supreme Court thereafter issued its Order, granting Philip Gordon leave to
withdraw as attorney of record for the Defendant/Appellant. My understanding of the way the
Idaho Appellate Rules operate, as conveyed to me by my prior Counsel, is that, once the Supreme
Court grants an attorney in an appeal leave to withdraw, I must first apply to the District Court to
obtain the services of the State Appellate Defender to represent me in continuing proceedings
before the Idaho Supreme Court. Therefore, this Motion is brought to this Court.
Dated: December

{t, 2014.

~~-~
Tricia Franklin

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLt\TE PUBLIC DEFENDER-Page 2

ISS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on Decemberi(, 2014, I caused the within and foregoing
document, to be
on the following persons, by the method indicated below:
Jay Rosenthal
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 186
Idaho City, Id 83631

hand deli very
U.S. mail
_ _ overnight mail
facsimile: 392-3760

State of Idaho
Office of Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

-~hand delivery
U.S. mail
-+-- - overnight mail
facsimile: 854-8074

cl&r~d~~
Tricia Franklin

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER- Page 3

D1STFl1CT COURT BOISE COUNTY, rDAHO
cordsd in
Filed

21

-

No.

Tricia Franklin
4007 Taft Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

By_ _,__
~Clerk

DEPUTY

Pro Se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

STATE OF IDAHO

CASE NO. CR 2013-0000458
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF TRICIA FRANKLIN IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

vs.

TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss.
)

TRICIA FRANKLIN, being first duly sworn on her oath, does state and depose as follows:
I.

I am the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, and I make this Affidavit in support of my
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender;

2.

I am making Affidavit based upon my personal and direct knowledge, unless otherwise stated
herein.

3.

I am indigent and unable to afford the services of private counsel to pursue the appeal in this

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER- Page 1

matter.
4.

I do not have

education or

experience to proceed with my appeal pro se. The principal

issue in this appeal is one which was the subject of State ofIdaho v. Micah Wulff, in which
the Court issued its Opinion on October 29, 2014. As in that matter Mr. Wulff was
represented by the office of the State Appellate Public Defender, and it is certain that
members of that office have already done the great majority of the research and writing
which would be necessary in order to successfully prosecute the appeal in the instant action.
5.

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Philip Gordon, who was my attorney in this Court, and
who also began my appeal, leave to withdraw as my attorney of record on appeal.

6.

I believe that I have meritorious grounds for continuing my appeal, especially in light of the
decision in State of Idaho v. Micah Wulff.
Dated: December / r'", 2014.

~~
Tricia Franklin

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for the State of
Idaho, as of the day and year above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: Boise, Idaho
My Commission expires:

~ -;2/i ·;zOJcf

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER- Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l(_,

I hereby certify that on December
2014, I caused to be served a trne and correct copy
of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter by the method indicated below and
addressed to the following:

Jay Rosenthal
Boise County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
406 Montgomery Street
P.O. Box 186
Idaho City, Id 83631

_ _ hand delivery
- - U.S. mail
- - overnight mail
facsimile: 392-3760

State of Idaho
Office of Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

~ _ hand delivery
___,__U.S. mail
_ _ overnight mail
facsimile: 854-8074

Tricia Franklin

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER- Page 3
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COURT BOISE COUNW,hQAHO
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI
STATE
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B SE
3

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO CR-2013-458

4

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR APPOiNTMENT OF COUNSEL
ON APPEAL
1 ( ~ ::::z

VS,

5

o

TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant,

Supreme Court N~C)

1

Having reviewed the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and being
9

satisfied that the Defendant is a needy person entitled to appointment of counsel;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender be

IO

appointed to represented the Defendant in her Appeal.

ll
12

Dated:

~!n~

l - ( 1.-- ( S

13

District Judge

14

15
l6
17

111
19
20
21

22

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this!]_ day of Rh ; 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
lnterdept. Mail

State Appellate Public Defender
364 7 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise Id 83703
Tricia Franklin
4007 Taft St
Boise Id 83702

Mary Prisco

23

By: _ ___,t...,,s;,::...::::.------

25
26

II Order for Appointment of Counsel
I l(,P

i:

IN

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR BOISE COUNTY

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

)
)

SUPREME COURT NO

)

J../2 3lfO

vs

)

CASE NO. CR-201.3-45&

Tricia Frnn..ldin,

)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
APPEAL

}
)

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from: Fourth Judicial District. Boise County, Honorable Patrick Owen Presiding.
Case number from court: CR-2013-4 58
Order or Judgment appealed from: Judgment of Conviction and Order Retaining
Jurisdiction, filed June l~,, fQ14.

Attorney for Appellant: Phi!lip Gordon
Attorney for Respondent: Lawrence G Wasden
Appealed by: Tricia Franklin

Appealed against: State of Idaho
Notice of Appeal filed: July 30, 2014
Ametl.ded Notice of Appeal filed:
Appellate fee paid: 0.00

Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request foe additional record filed: No
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional Reporter's Transcript filed: No
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes
ff so Name of Reporter: No service. made

CERTtFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

Plaintiff/Respondent,
VS.

TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant/Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 42390
CASE NO. CR-2013-458
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, Mary T Prisco, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boise do hereby certify:
The following will be submitted as an exhibit to this Record on Appeal:

(1) EXHIBIT LIST, which contains the exhibits, which were offered or admitted
into evidence during the trial:
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I
Defendant's Exhibit No. A

Idaho State Forensic Services
Admitted
E-Mail letter
Admitted

(2) TRANSCRIPT of July 22, 2013 PRELIMINARY HEARING
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this 30th day of March, 2015.

Mary T Prisco
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Dated 03/27/15

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant/Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.
CASE NO. CR-2013-458

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, Mary T Prisco, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State ofidaho, in and for the County of Boise, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Record in this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct,
and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said court this 30TH day of March, 2015.

Mary T Prisco
Clerk of the District Court

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

lw.3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
TRICIA FRANKLIN,
Defendant/Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 42390
CASE NO. CR-2013-458
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-------------)
I, Mary T Prisco, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boise, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD ON
APPEAL to each of the Attorneys ofrecord in this cause as follows:

LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
IDAHO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. BOX 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

MARCH 30TH, 2015

ROBERT CHASTAIN
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT

Mary T Prisco
Clerk of the District Court

Kelly White, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

